




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Memoirs of the great European congresses



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MEMOIRS

OF THE

GREAT EUROPEAN CONGRESSES

OF

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VIENNA—PARIS, 1814-15—AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1818—TROPPAU, 1820—
AND LAYBACH, 1820-21;

WITH A VIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS FROM THE ASSEMBLY OF
THE STATES-GENERAL IN FRANCE.

BY THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND, G.C. B.

LONDON:

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1860.

EUROPEAN CONGRESSES.

CHAPTER I.

THE period to which these Memoirs refer is replete with events of so much importance, that it is impossible to enter upon the task of tracing any account of them without being impressed with the great responsibility which must attach to such an undertaking. From the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789 to the peace in 1815 the States of Europe had been subjected to more changes and to greater disasters than are recorded in the crowded history of preceding centuries. During that period the balance which had been maintained between those states was overthrown, the entire subjugation of the Continent to France was nearly effected, and again that power was driven back within its ancient limits. The moral and political opinions and feelings of mankind were shaken, the respect and attachment to the ancient and established forms of government were broken in upon, and the wildest theories were in many instances adopted in their place.

It is the purpose of the present Memoirs to unfold the history of the reconstruction of the political system of Europe after this general convulsion; and with the view of bringing to the consideration of this subject whatever information may tend to its elucidation, it will be advantageous to review the period which imme-

diately preceded the assembly of the States-General in France, and to trace some of the most important transactions which, from that moment until the Peace of Paris in 1814, bore influence upon the relative position of the different members of the European Commonwealth. It will also be of considerable interest, and a measure of justice to the statesmen whose deeds and counsels are to be set forth, that some account of the peculiar situations in which they were placed, the difficulties by which they were surrounded, and the principles upon which they were forced to act, should be given, in order that a fair and unbiassed judgment may be exercised with regard to them. And upon this subject it is undoubtedly true, that in different countries the same transactions will be viewed in lights as various as are the constitutions, habits, and political tendencies of the people. While in Great Britain—a great and powerful nation, uninfluenced, through its insular position, by any desire of immediate territorial aggrandizement—the subtleties of diplomacy which tended to such an object would be looked upon with dissatisfaction, in others, less fortunately situated, they would be required from the statesmen charged with their general interests. If Scotland were still an independent country, and by its general policy leagued with the enemies of England, and constantly thwarting the objects of its ambition, the nation would resent the neglect of a minister who should reject any opportunity which might offer of reducing that power, and of depriving it of the means of continuing its hostility. Cases of immediate similarity to this are constantly occurring upon the Continent. They have as frequently occurred to ourselves in India. The manner in which they are dealt with must be viewed with an impartial consideration of all the circumstances by which they are attended, as also of the passions and even of the

prejudices of the people in whose favour the political advantages are sought after or established. In a spirit of candour such as is here described, it is but justice to look at the conduct of the various statesmen who have wielded the powers of the States of Europe during the last century, and more particularly during that period which but a short time preceded the commencement of the French Revolution.

The seizure of Silesia by Frederic the Great, the invasion of Saxony, the attempts of the Austrian Government to obtain possession of Bavaria, of the Russian and Austrian Governments to extend their conquests in Turkey, of the Prussian Government to profit by the war in which these countries were engaged to extend its dominions on the side of Poland while that country should be indemnified through the recession of Galicia by Austria, the project of the French Government to extend its influence over Holland which was counteracted by England and Prussia, the seizure of Corsica by that Government, and its alliance in unison with Spain, with the North American Colonies while in revolt against the mother country, together with the final partition of the kingdom of Poland . . . all these events, which mark the unsettled state of Europe during the period in which they took place, were still of such a nature as not materially to disturb the general balance of power first established by the peace of Westphalia, and confirmed by the result of the wars in which the great Duke of Marlborough bore so considerable a part, and maintained until by the convulsion in France it was totally overthrown. It is necessary, however, to recall the recollection of these events in order justly to appreciate the measures which were adopted when the great catastrophe of the French Revolution broke forth upon the world, and stamped a new character upon all the

political motives and principles by which it had till then been guided.

The rise and progress of the desire of reform and amelioration in the institutions of France may be traced from the reign of Louis XIV. to the termination of the American war. A considerable portion of the sensitive and intelligent French people felt themselves as being without the security of civil liberty, without confidence in the administration of the laws, without the means of procuring redress for the grievances they were suffering, injured in their fortunes, and retarded in their general prosperity, by the unequal and partial system of taxation under which the revenue was collected. All these were serious evils, mainly resulting from the decay of some institutions and the perversion of others, and calculated to create dissatisfaction and ill-will towards the Government. To remedy this state of things (while the nation was suffering under great financial embarrassments) was a task too difficult to be accomplished by men of ordinary capacity. To alter established forms of government, to adapt new institutions to the wants and exigencies of a great nation, and yet to hold fast the reins of government and to maintain its authority, is an undertaking for which few minds are tempered. It is a task more likely to be seized upon by rash and inconsiderate men, than to be deliberately undertaken by those who, being acquainted with the difficulties of the government of nations, would be guided, in any such attempts, by the dictates of prudence and moderation. Such unfortunately proved to be the case in France; and when once the fever of innovation prevailed amongst the people, the feeble barriers which had been raised by weak and inefficient men, as a protection to the general interests of the State, were overthrown, and universal desolation was brought upon the country. In the progress towards this great cala-

mity the true principles of free government were confounded with the most extravagant theories of the equal rights of men, with the abolition of all orders, privileges, and distinctions, and with the overthrow of all those authorities and that control by which alone civil society can be held together. These wild and pernicious doctrines, clothed in the specious arguments of enthusiastic propagators, were sent forth to the people of every other country, and the general overthrow of all existing institutions seemed to be the object of those who had installed themselves as the Government of France. Under circumstances so appalling, it became the duty of the sovereigns of Europe to prepare the means of protecting themselves and their subjects from the general disorganization which was thus threatened. The whole of France was involved in anarchy and confusion; the lives of the royal family, of the nobility, and of the men of property throughout the kingdom, were either sacrificed or menaced; and an organised system of spoliation and confiscation was universally established. The Governments of other countries were thus placed under the necessity of taking the earliest and most decisive measures to stem the torrent of misrule and oppression which the innovators in France had sought, by an appeal to the passions of mankind, to render general throughout the world. The first document which appears to take cognisance of this subject, and to suggest the propriety of an armed interference, is a letter from Frederic William, King of Prussia, addressed to the Marquis Lucchesini, at that time his minister in Poland, but appointed his plenipotentiary to the Congress of Sistow, which bears date from Breslau the 15th of September, 1790:—

No. 1.

Translation of the Extract from the Letter of the KING of PRUSSIA to the
MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“ I send you the two chasseurs, whom you may soon want; I will have the cypher which you want prepared immediately; and I have desired the Count Hertzberg to send you a copyist as soon as possible, and to make out your instructions: this, however, is only to avoid giving him annoyance; for it will be better for you to make out your own instructions, and send them to me as soon as they are done. The *status quo* must always form the basis. If the Turks will agree to any little cession, it would be the moment to ask the Court of Vienna either for the district of the Enclaves in Upper Silesia, or for that of Brannau; but it would be better to give up one or both of these than to risk the Turks yielding any of their fortresses to Austria. This must positively be avoided. I highly approve of the journey you propose making to Vienna. According to my latest intelligence the King (of Hungary) intends to be at Francfort on the 17th. You have therefore no time to lose in undertaking this expedition, which will enable you to learn the real sentiments of the King with regard to Prussia, and your former intimacy with M. de Manfredini will greatly assist you in this object. If you find that you are treated with confidence, I should wish you to try the ground, whether, in the event of things being settled with the Turks and in Flanders, the King would be willing to send troops into France, joined to a Prussian corps d’armée, to restore order in the French Government. The corps d’armée sent by Austria into Flanders might be employed for this purpose, with the addition of some Palatine troops. A Spanish army, united with the Piemontese, might act in the southern provinces of France; and 40,000 or 50,000 Prussians, after securing Metz, might enter into the heart of France.

“ The pretext of avenging the wrongs done to his brother-in-law and to his sister would be more than sufficient to authorise the King of Hungary to act as I propose; and he might add to these reasons, the desire to support the Princes of the Empire, in the neighbourhood of Alsace, who have suffered considerably by the disorders committed since the revolution.

“ By acting as I propose it will not be difficult to obtain our ends, after having preliminarily arranged that Austria should

have the *lisière* of French Flanders, which joins Hainault. The Elector Palatine should receive a part of Alsace, and should cede to me Juliers and Bergue. If Austria should want more, we must directly think of Upper Silesia. You will see whether this plan may in time be acted upon; and I shall be very glad to hear of you soon at Vienna, in order to judge what can be done.

“ Believe me sincerely your affectionate friend,

“ F. G.”

The following is the answer of the Marquis Lucchesini :—

No. 2.

To the King alone.

“ SIRE,

“ Warsaw, 18 September, 1790.

“ At the moment I was about setting off for Vienna, conformably to the orders contained in Your Majesty’s autograph letter, I learnt that the departure of the King of Hungary, fixed for the 18th instant, precluded the possibility of executing your royal wishes, Sire, and that I must await the end of the Congress in order to confer with the Marquis Manfredini. Thus, unless Your Majesty should order otherwise, I shall, on returning from Bucharest, pass through Vienna, and, regulating my proceedings according to circumstances, endeavour then to fulfil your royal intentions.

“ As the plan, Sire, which you have deigned to communicate to me respecting the affairs of France cannot be executed until next spring, and after the termination of the negotiations of the Hague and Bucharest, it might, I think, be also traced out on my return, and on my passage through Vienna, and after having myself ascertained if the King of Hungary is disposed to act with Your Majesty, independently of his ministers and of the ancient prejudices of the House of Austria with respect to Prussia. However, Sire, it must be confessed that the irregular proceedings of the National Assembly of France, the principles of an imaginary equality which that body so ostentatiously professes for the purpose of obtaining the support of the masses, the standard of emancipation from ancient institutions and the spirit of insubordination it endeavours to sanction by its example and disseminate by its emissaries, the unjust acts of which it is

guilty towards foreign princes, in contempt of solemn and sacred engagements, stamped with the guarantee of the law of nations, and the epidemical effects of this example which manifest themselves in other countries, might require from the sovereigns a coalition of forces for the purpose of restoring order in the Government, and re-establishing over the people who have been misled by the deceptive appearances of democratic independence, the authority of the laws, and of the sovereigns, their depositaries. Called upon by your position and the interests of your station to enter this coalition, Your Majesty might derive therefrom two equally great advantages—the first, that of obtaining some *arrondissemens*, whether in Westphalia or in Upper Silesia; the second, that of replacing France in its rank among the powers, and of thereby securing to yourself either the fidelity of England, or the possibility of substituting for her alliance that of her rival, in the event of a change of policy in the Cabinet of St. James's.

“For, Sire, it must be acknowledged that the English Ministry has, under present circumstances, too openly manifested its repugnance to co-operate in the abasement of the House of Austria for the Court of Berlin, (while, at the same time, it remains faithfully attached to its present allies,) not to think of emancipating itself, in case of necessity, from the political despotism which the English Ministry finds a satisfaction in exercising over the Courts that are the friends and allies of England. This is an object as important as delicate, one upon which it is essential to preserve the most impenetrable secrecy, and to take the best concerted measures in order that we may not be seen through either in France or in England.

“As to my instructions, Sire, the *vivá voce* orders which Your Majesty gave me at Schonwalde, those contained in your letters and direct commands, the memoir of His Highness the Duke of Brunswick, a few articles contained in those which are from the pen of Count Hertzberg, and my conversations with Baron de Jacobi at Vienna, will enable me to draw them up and submit them from Vienna to the distinguished approbation of Your Majesty. There is an additional reason for my leaving here on Friday next, which I have not stated in my to-day's report, which will be known to Count Hertzberg, and read by Mr. Ewart.

“This English Minister has, however, conceived a bright idea by the proposition of inducing the three mediatorial Powers to

guarantee to the Porte the entire restitution of the conquests made by the Empress of Russia over the Turks, without extending the guarantee to the possessions of Russia, seeing that this sovereign has the vanity to make a separate peace with the Turks, and refuses to admit the mediation of any one whomsoever. Nothing more now remains than to pray that this idea may be adopted by the English Ministry, and that it may be made an article in the instructions of the Chevalier Keith and the Sieur de Haesten.

“The Sieur de Bulgackou has this morning had his first audience of His Polish Majesty. He went to the castle in a brilliant equipage, drawn by six horses, contrary to the custom of Ministers of the second class, who scarcely ever use more than two.

“A Russian courier, coming from St. Petersburg and proceeding in great haste to Vienna, passed by here this afternoon.’

These letters are at once explanatory of the system which, at the period they were written, directed the policy of the Court of Prussia. This kingdom was then a great power, though of recent creation; the conquest of Silesia and the first partition of Poland, in 1772, had raised it from a very inferior state to one of the most important of Europe; but this change was too recent not to have left a desire of still further aggrandisement in its councils, and of revenge and reconquest in the feelings of those who had been despoiled. This sentiment is developed in both the letters above noticed, particularly in that of the Marquis Lucchesini. He is therein anxious to discover whether the King of Hungary (afterwards the Emperor Joseph) will act independently of his ministers, because they were all supposed to be guided by hostile views against Prussia. He wishes his master to be in a situation to oppose France to England, because England had shown a determination to protect Austria from spoliation; and lastly, he sees in the successful invasion of France an opportunity of securing some aggrandisement to Prussia, while the other states which might take part in that

operation would also be rewarded by a territorial indemnity. These views were indeed secondary to the great object of re-establishing order in France and restoring the authority of the King; but in the then unsettled state of Europe such salutary measures were not likely to be undertaken without being connected with the gratification of some separate interests. The views of the Cabinet of Prussia had been directed to interests of this nature during the whole period of the Marquis Lucchesini's mission in Poland. He had been instructed to favour and encourage the independent spirit which had manifested itself in that country, and the desire of emancipating its Government from the influence of Russia, which, in fact, was in great part effected by the changes in the constitution established on the 3rd of May, 1791. These instructions had been given with a view of entering into an alliance offensive and defensive with Poland, the basis of which should be the cession of Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia, upon a guarantee that the two countries (profiting by the war in which Austria and Russia were engaged with the Turks) should oblige the Cabinet of Vienna to cede back to Poland the State of Galicia, of which she had become possessed. This negotiation was broken off at the moment of which we are now treating, by the refusal of the Diet of Poland to agree to the concession of the terms which Prussia required, and which, however distasteful to the general feeling of the people, yet perhaps was the only remaining chance of their maintaining the independence of Poland, or even its existence as a nation. For in consequence of this decision the interests of Poland were abandoned by Prussia, and the Marquis Lucchesini was sent to the Congress of Sistow, assembled for the conclusion of peace between Austria and the Turks, under the mediation of Prussia and the maritime powers, which object was effected in

the following year. Poland was thus left without support, and shortly afterwards an end was put to its existence as an independent kingdom by its second partition, when Prussia leagued herself with Austria and Russia.

The Marquis Lucchesini was proceeding to this congress of Sistow at the moment he wrote his letter to the King, and, according to his advice, all mention of an intervention in the affairs of France was delayed until the following year, when the two Governments of Prussia and Austria agreed to the declaration upon this subject which was signed at Pilnitz. This declaration went to the extent of conjointly employing their forces in order to put the King of France in a situation to lay the foundation of a monarchical Government, conformable alike to the rights of sovereigns and the well-being of the French nation. They were preparing to follow up this arrangement, when the revolutionary Government of France declared war against Austria, and thus commenced that great struggle which in the course of twenty years involved the whole of Europe.

It would be foreign to the design of this work to enter into any account of the transactions which immediately followed this event. France was invaded by the armies of Austria and Prussia under the Duke of Brunswick, but the jealousy and misunderstanding which existed between these two powers, the intrigues of General Dumourier in holding out false hopes that he would join the allied troops in order to deliver the King from the thralldom in which he was kept by the Jacobins in Paris, the temporising character of the Duke himself, who had been induced by the Abbé Siêyes to receive with favour the principles of the constitutionalists, and to whom it had been insinuated that he might be called to the Government of the regene-

rated people of France, and the anxiety of the Prussian Cabinet for the attainment of important acquisitions upon the Vistula: all these circumstances combined to arrest the progress of the allies at the commencement of the campaign of 1792, and to sow the seeds of disunion, so that, even after Great Britain and Holland had in 1793 joined in the general coalition, and after the various successes and disasters of the campaigns of that and the following year, Prussia withdrew from it by a separate treaty with France in the month of April 1795, and engaged at the same time in an armed neutrality with the powers of the north of Germany for their mutual protection, by which she abandoned all the objects which had formerly been contemplated by her, and which had been the basis of her engagements with her allies.

As relating to the transactions which led to this treaty, known as the Treaty of Basle, the following correspondence between the Marquis Lucchesini, the ministers Finkenstein, Alvensleben, and Haugwitz, and the King of Prussia, is inserted, which will serve to indicate the policy by which the Prussian Government was already preparing the way towards a separation from the general alliance of which it had been the original promoter.

No. 3.

Translation of a REPORT made by the Ministers FINKENSTEIN, ALVENSLEBEN, and HAUGWITZ to the KING of PRUSSIA, May 5, 1793.

“The Court of Vienna, in the German despatch of Baron de Thugut, which Prince Reuss was directed to read to the Marquis Lucchesini, and which this last Minister has communicated to us, by order of Your Majesty, having reduced to three principal heads its explanations respecting the Convention of St. Petersburg, as well as the accession which has been proposed to that Court, namely:—

“ 1st. As regards the proportion (*Verhältniss*) which it proposes should exist between the respective indemnities.

“ 2nd. As regards the fixing (*Festsetzung*) of these same indemnities; and

“ 3rd. As regards the security it requires for its own indemnification, and which it expects shall be equal to that of St. Petersburg and Berlin;

“ With respect to the two first points we beg Your Majesty’s permission to refer to the separate report drawn up by me, Haugwitz, which we take the liberty of annexing to the present one, and by which it appears to us to be proved to demonstration against the gratuitous assertions of the Austrian Ministry,—

“ That the pretended principle of parity of advantages between the two Courts, which has nowhere been either laid down or recognised explicitly, is above all, totally inapplicable to the present case, where the point for Your Majesty’s consideration is not that of acquisitions made by agreement, but that of an indemnification which you have a right to demand from Austria herself, on account of an active and very expensive co-operation in a war which concerns that Power as the party attacked and principally interested therein; that Your Majesty has claimed the possession, not eventual, but actual and in full proprietorship, of your indemnities, as the *sine qua non* condition of your assistance in the second campaign of 1793, with the same forces employed in the former one.

“ That the Court of Vienna was previously informed of the extent of your claims in Poland, and

“ That it expressly consented to this actual taking possession of the position in question.

“ There, consequently, remains the third point only, viz., the pretensions of the Court of Vienna with respect to a guarantee similar to those of the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin for its own indemnities, upon the nature of which it has, however, avoided giving any explanation.

“ It results already from the *resumé* we have given of the contents of the separate report hereunto annexed, that Your Majesty being placed in an entirely different position, the Court of Vienna is very far from having, either for the indemnification itself, or particularly for an actual and complete guarantee, the same titles as are given to you, Sire, by the previous claim of

your acquisition in Poland, as an essential condition of your ulterior concurrence in the war, by the acceptance of that condition on the part of the Emperor, and by the complete accomplishment of your promises, by means of your co-operation.

“ But, however this may be, this third object of the Austrian discussions is of less consequence to Your Majesty than it is to the Court of Russia, the more so as it is the unexpected and very considerable aggrandisement of this latter, and the consequent contiguity of frontiers, which have more especially excited the ill-will and jealousy of that of Vienna; and this incontestably appears from the contents even of the despatch of Baron de Thugut, in which the approximation of the frontiers of Galicia and of the new acquisitions of Russia are brought forward as a principal cause of complaint.

“ Hence, we are persuaded that the intention of Your Majesty will be to enter into no explanations with the Imperial Court upon this last and most important article before having previously come to an understanding upon the subject with the Empress of Russia, and thus to restrict the preliminary answers to be given to the Court of Vienna, to a just refutation, either of the principles which it so gratuitously asserts upon the necessity of a parity of indemnifications between the two Courts, or of the ignorance it affects to have been in, of the extent of Your Majesty's views, and of the want of consent on your part, of which she endeavours to take advantage; and as regards the rest, referring that Court to the result of the engagement you are about, Siré, to enter into, upon this subject, with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. As to the mode to be followed with regard to this preliminary answer, we take the liberty of proposing (as the one most analogous to that just adopted by the Court of Vienna, for the overtures); viz., that the Marquis of Lucchesini, after having extracted the principal facts and reasonings given in the annexed report, should cause the *exposé* resulting therefrom to be read to Prince Reuss, furnishing him, at the same time, with a copy, should he require one; but some difficulty must be raised in granting it, similar to that made by the Imperial Minister before he would give him the copy of the despatch which he had received from his Court. The communications to be made, and the conduct to be prescribed, in this posture of affairs, to Count de Goltz at St. Petersburg being, as Your Majesty yourself has deigned to observe, of the utmost importance, we have not lost a moment in occupying ourselves

with the same, and we have the honour of presenting you annexed hereto a copy of the orders which he will receive, by a courier, upon this subject. Your Majesty will be pleased to convince yourself, by a perusal of their contents, that we have, above all, pressed upon the Court of Russia, the inadmissibility of the Austrian proposition to consider the act of taking possession, on the part of Your Majesty and of the Court of Russia in Poland, as simply temporary and eventual, insisting, on the contrary, upon the necessity that exists for the two Courts, in consequence of their present position as respects Austria, to proceed forward without further delay, and conclude, if necessary, without the concurrence of that Power, their definitive arrangement with the Republic of Poland. We have also just addressed to the Sieur de Buchholtz at Warsaw a despatch adapted to these circumstances, directing him to act in concert in this matter with Baron de Sievers, for the purpose of expediting with renewed energy the measures required for perfecting the great work so auspiciously commenced. We have not even awaited the present moment, in order to give both to Count de Goltz and the Sieur Buchholtz such instructions as the present crisis appeared to us to require, and we flatter ourselves that the copies and extracts of our despatches to the former of these Ministers of the 27th and 28th, and of those to the latter of the 26th and 28th April, will prove to Your Majesty that we have anticipated your royal intentions in this respect. Lastly, we consider it our duty to observe further, that we have (by means of a courier who has been despatched under the pretext of Baron de Stein's business), conveyed to Major Knobelsdorff detailed instructions relative to present circumstances, enjoining him, above all, to watch with the closest vigilance the proceedings of the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, and to prevent or calm the apprehensions which will probably be excited in the Sublime Porte relatively to the new acquisitions which Russia has just made in its neighbourhood.

(Signed)

“ FINKENSTEIN.

“ AIVENSLEBEN.

“ HAUGWITZ.”

“ Berlin, 5th May, 1793.
To the King. ”

No. 4.

REPORT addressed to the KING by the MARQUIS of LUCCHESINI, June, 1793.

“Of the four great Powers who have taken part against France, there is not one whose interests exactly coincide with those of the others.

“The Empress of Russia may have considered the commencement of the war as a means of succeeding more easily in her plan of subjugating Poland. She was deeply affected at the injury done to thrones in general by the revolutionists who overturned that of the French monarchy, nor was she, at the same time, insensible to the satisfaction she promised herself from playing the dignified part of directing from the interior of her Cabinet the forces of the other Powers towards the object she aimed at, that of re-establishing, on all points, the ancient monarchical Government in France. Flattered by the praises heaped upon her by the emigrants, and proud of being able to supply with their daily food the children of the great-grandson of that Louis XIV. who had made Europe tremble, she was desirous of taking upon herself the most important part of the enterprise. On the other hand, Russia has a political interest in the preservation of the French power in Europe in all its integrity, as well as in the undisturbed existence of a Government which allows her to interfere in the quarrels of the other sovereigns. She knows her interests too well not to apprehend that if France should cease, for any long time, to be an object of fear and rivalry to England, the latter would tyrannise over every sea, and dictate the law to the whole of Europe. She foresees that these views of England must naturally incline her to an intimacy with the Court of Vienna, and that there might result from this coalition a plan of pacification altogether contrary to her schemes. The English Government was right in avoiding war, in order not to render the people discontented by increasing the taxes, which is the immediate and inevitable consequence of it. But it could not allow the French to take an inch of ground from the Netherlands, and still less permit them to overthrow the Stadtholdership in Holland. The motives which determined the conduct of the English plenipotentiaries at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, still exist, and will prescribe to the English Ministry a similar course of proceeding under present circumstances. The Cabinet of St. James, there-

fore, has never concealed the principles in accordance with which England would have been disposed to restore peace between the belligerent Powers, and which now oblige it to make war. She has the greatest interest in replacing the Austrian Netherlands in the hands of a Prince who has the means of defending them against the ambition of France, which has never ceased to covet them since the days of Louis XIV. For the expenses of the war she sees in the islands of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and St. Domingo, indemnities which are quite to the taste of the nation. Besides, it is natural that the Court of London, desiring to weaken in every direction and in every manner her ancient rival, should have proposed to Austria not to seek anywhere else than in France for an increase of power which would indemnify her for what the war had cost her, and counterbalance the acquisitions which the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg have just made in Poland. The Cabinet of Vienna has eagerly embraced these proposals of England, and endeavours to flatter her *amour propre* by soliciting her to take the principal part in the union to be established between the Allied Powers. It has conceived the grand plan of effecting, on one side, the exchange of Bavaria, and on the other, of extending the power of Austria in Alsace, securing her new acquisitions by a formidable barrier against France, which she begins to consider as her natural enemy. The Court of Vienna justly reckons upon the acquiescence of England in her project of making acquisitions upon France; it possesses the formal co-operation of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg for the necessity of the exchange of Bavaria; and, aware of the repugnance of the Empress of Russia to allow it the least extension of frontiers in Poland, it has reason to hope that this Princess would rather consent, in its favour, to some acquisition in France. So brilliant a perspective, which can only be attained by force of arms, must make the Court of Vienna take the greatest interest in the success of the campaign, and, however, difficult it may be for her to find funds wherewith to prosecute the war, Austria will not be the one to hasten its termination. The King, our master, having succeeded in securing so fine an acquisition in Poland, makes war against France for no other reason than in order to fulfil the duties imposed upon him as a Prince of the Empire, and the ally of the Court of Vienna. He has just bound himself anew to the prosecution of this war by the engagement he has, by the Treaty of the partition of Poland,

entered into with the Empress of Russia not to make peace unless conjointly with His Majesty the Emperor. These three reasons which oblige His Majesty to continue the war, prescribe to him, at the same time, the duty of endeavouring to bring about the possibility of not prolonging it beyond the present campaign. To enable us to succeed in this, it is, in my humble opinion, necessary to avoid very carefully tying up our hands as regards the conditions of peace. It is easy to see that England, in proposing upon this subject a concerted action to the Allied Powers, has no other object than to possess itself of the future negotiation in order to fix at its pleasure the time and the conditions in accordance with its interests. This is the same line of conduct adopted by England in the War of Succession, abandoning afterwards by its special peace in 1713 the Powers which she had armed against Louis XIV. It is the same conduct which she pursued during the war of 1743, without being over-anxious to fulfil at Aix-la-Chapelle what she had promised at Worms to the Courts of Vienna and Turin. Lastly, it is the same conduct of which the august predecessor of our master had to complain in 1762, when, in contempt of the most solemn treaties, the English made hastily a separate peace with France, which was as prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain as it was possible to become to those of Prussia.

“The experience of the past, then, appears to justify the greatest repugnance to treat, in the midst of war, upon the conditions of peace, with a Power whom a popular movement, a momentary triumph of the opposition, or a ministerial revolution would enable to break its engagements with perfect impunity, whilst the slightest deviation in a monarchy from the strict observance of the engagements it may have entered into with England is strongly condemned. If His Majesty and his Ministry should think proper to adopt this principle, it would not be very difficult to put it in practice without giving too great umbrage to the Court of Vienna, nor to that of London. Fortunately, the Empress of Russia has ideas altogether peculiar upon the future pacification, and it appears to me that it would be easy to make use of them, without, however, adopting them, in creating difficulties to the conclusion of the Convention proposed by the English Minister. The resolutions about to be taken by the Court of Vienna, and which it will immediately communicate to us, will enable Your Majesty to decide upon the conduct you will prescribe to your Ministers at London or the

Hague. My part being that of executing the orders which are given me, I shall not go out of it so far as to sketch that delicate course upon which may depend either the prolongation or the end of the war. But my attachment to the welfare of the State which has adopted me, and to the glory of the Sovereign whom I have the honour to serve, compels me to speak with frankness when discussing the scheme of acquisition, which the Court of Vienna announces under the title of the exchange of Bavaria, and the establishment of a formidable barrier against France and Europe. No person can doubt that the exchange of Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands would give to the Court of Vienna a considerable increase of intrinsic power, of military forces, and of political influence in the Empire, and hence over all the intermediary States of Germany. If the Cabinet of Vienna could succeed in adding thereto, by the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine, that barrier from the Rhine to the Moselle, of which Baron de Spielmann was charged to make the proposition to His Majesty in the Conferences at Luxembourg, the Austrian monarchy would be raised to a degree of grandeur, which no possible acquisition on the part of His Majesty could counterbalance. Mistress of Alsace, and dominant through Bavaria, and its own ancient possessions in the circle of Swabia, the House of Austria would press Switzerland so closely as to have there a preponderating influence. Being safe from any sudden attack by France, which, by the loss of Alsace and Lorraine would lose all connexion with the southern circles of the Empire, the Emperor would, on the one hand, have more than ever at his command the three Ecclesiastical electors, the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Margrave of Baden, while, on the other, he could (being sure of Holland by its relations with England) concentrate all his forces towards Bohemia, and occupy himself exclusively with the only powerful enemy which remained for him to combat. Italy dependent upon him, or in fear of his power, the Porte weak and incapacitated from promptly seizing the favourable moment for making a diversion advantageous to its natural Allies; Saxony subjugated by his intrigues, or threatened by his armies; lastly, Russia who has never done much in favour of her Allies—none of these would hold out to Prussia any hope of support and assistance in the case of war between her and the Court of Vienna. To prevent the execution of this vast project is, in my opinion, of an absolute necessity for the future security of the Prussian monarchy.

As to the means of accomplishing this without in the least compromising the alliance which unites the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, or the engagements which His Majesty has entered into with the Empress of Russia, by Article IV. of the Treaty of the 21st January, 1793, I think I can find them in the repugnance of that same Empress of Russia to any considerable dismemberment of the States constituting the French Empire in Europe. In Article VII. of the above-mentioned Treaty, this Princess, after having promised her good offices, and other efficacious means which might be in her power, in order to facilitate and procure for the Court of Vienna the exchange of the Netherlands against Bavaria, adds thereto the other advantages which may be compatible with the general convenience. This clause of compatibility with the general convenience, appears to proscribe irrevocably the idea of Austria's obtaining acquisitions in Lorraine. Independently of the interest which the Empress of Russia, as well as the King our master, has in preserving in France a power capable of counterbalancing the natural ties of Austria with England and Holland, an interest which caused the apprehensions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, on the occasion of the journey of Baron de Spielmann to Luxembourg, and the plans of dismemberment he was known to be entrusted with, it is easy to foresee that the Court of Russia would not willingly lend a hand to any project by which, in consequence of the cession of Lorraine, France would have no further communication with the Empire, and would consequently lose for ever the remains of influence she had exercised there, since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, to the conclusion of the alliance with the Court of Vienna in 1756.

“Arguing from these principles it appears to me very probable that the Court of Russia might be used so as to cause a part of the plan conceived by that of Vienna to fail, and thus conciliating what His Majesty owes to the future security of the monarchy, with what his engagements require of him, the hope may be indulged of being able to come out from this war with honour and advantage, and to contribute to the conclusion of a peace which shall secure to Europe that lengthened repose, of which she has so great a need.”

No. 5.

The KING to BARON JACOBI, in London, June 29, 1793.

“ You are already informed that the courier who brings you this is also the bearer of your instructions for the negotiation of the concert which has so frequently been proposed to me at different times by England, relatively to the affairs of France and the war we are waging with the Revolutionists of that unfortunate kingdom. The better to enable you fully to comprehend the subject, and form to yourself a correct idea of the course I have pursued, I shall commence by making unreservedly known to you not only the reasons which have hitherto prevented me from binding myself with Great Britain by a formal Convention, but also that which now determines me so to do.

“ When the Court of London made its first overtures on the subject of the concert she was desirous of establishing between the Allied Powers, we had no positive idea either of the extent of her participation in the war, or of the real object she proposed to herself in making it; and upon considering, on the one hand, her extreme disinclination to a rupture, and, on the other, the advantages it was probable she might derive from the continuation of the disturbances in France, it was natural to suspect her of wishing to take the lead, either to direct as she pleased the negotiations for peace, the thread of which she always secretly followed with the National Convention, or to protract the war indefinitely, should she find it her interest so to do. Such were the considerations which at first indisposed me to the proposition of England, considerations which were so much the more powerful because, having obtained in Poland the district destined to indemnify me for the expenses of the present war, I had an interest in terminating it as soon as possible, and in confining, if I could do so, my co-operation to the campaign of the current year. My principles have not changed, but those of the British Cabinet have begun to be less disquieting, and to offer a perspective more in harmony with my views, since, according to the repeated assertions in your reports, and all the inferences to be drawn either from the financial system, the declining state of the home trade and manufactures, or, lastly, from the personal dispositions of the Ministers, it is almost certain that England will not continue the war any longer than is absolutely necessary for putting a stop to the excesses of the dominant faction, and for

re-establishing in France an order of things that can be tolerated ; that she will, therefore, act with the same views as those of the Allied Powers ; that, in the meantime, she will lose no time in obtaining, at the expense of her rival, those advantages which are the objects of her ambition, and that she will use her best efforts to accomplish the enterprise in a single campaign.

“ Now, supposing all these consequences to be correct, and that such is really the plan of England, I shall no longer risk anything by a closer alliance with her the moment she has, *ipse facto*, joined the belligerent Powers ; and that, after having already concluded treaties with the Courts of St. Petersburg, Madrid, and Turin, she negotiates others with those of Vienna, Naples, and Lisbon. It is above all, in imitation of Russia, she of all the Powers whose alliance, under present circumstances, is of the greatest advantage to me, that I have decided upon taking part in the general concert ; and it is also the Convention signed at London, on the 25th of last March, between Lord Grenville and Count Woronzow which must serve us for our model, and to which I should prefer conforming myself, inasmuch as, with the exception of the obligations resulting from my alliance with Austria, and from my position as a member of the Empire, I have no direct interest in the war, and, consequently, find myself in the coalition nearly upon the same footing as Russia. You can, therefore, now take advantage of the continually recurring inuendos of the British Ministry, in order again to introduce this subject, and you will have so much the less difficulty in doing this naturally and without affectation, since, in conformity with the instructions contained in my former Despatches, you will not have failed to smooth the way for an early negotiation. According to the treaty of London, of which you have given me the extract in the postscript of your Report of the 26th of March, and which has just been communicated to me *in extenso* by the Court of Russia, the two contracting parties have first stipulated in the preamble

“ to unite their forces in order to oppose a barrier against the proceedings of the present French Government, whose principles tend to the total subversion and destruction of every Government, and of all social order.”

“ After which they promise :

“ ‘ 1. To concert together subsequently for the purpose of mutually aiding and supporting each other in this war.

“ ‘ 2. *Never to lay down arms except by common agreement, and, after having obtained the restitution of the conquests which may have been made over the States of their Majesties, or over the friendly Powers to whom they would consider it proper to grant their guarantee.*

“ ‘ 3. *To prohibit from their respective ports all exportation to France of munitions of war, naval stores, corn, salted meats, &c., &c., and to injure, as much as possible, the trade of France, in order to compel her to accept reasonable conditions of peace.*

“ ‘ 4. *Not to allow other Powers who take no part in this war to protect, either directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, or for their own advantage, the commerce of France.*

“ ‘ 5. *To occupy themselves, without delay, with the means of drawing still closer the ties of friendship by which they are now united, and to conclude, for that purpose, a treaty of commerce and alliance, renewing, in the meantime, by a separate Convention, the Treaty of Commerce of 1766.’*

“ In adopting the substance of this document as the basis of our own Treaty it must, however, be observed with respect to the preamble, that although it undoubtedly declares, with as much correctness as precision, the object and aim of the coalition of the belligerent Courts, the expression ‘*to unite their forces*’ must, nevertheless, be avoided; an expression which is in its place in the Treaty with Russia, but which would be improper and productive of inconvenience in a case where the choice and employment of the means are not exactly the same on both sides. The phrase might easily be turned, and the following substituted: ‘*That the two contracting parties regard under the same point of view the indispensable necessity of opposing, &c., &c.*’

“ Apparently there will be nothing to change in Articles 1 and 2, which form the nucleus of the transaction; but, as the prohibition of exportation, which is the object of the 3rd one, already exists in my States, it must be admitted as such, the 4th Article being, consequently, agreed to as tending to counteract the neutrality of the Powers who take no part in the war. And as England, moreover, has appeared inclined to maintain her commercial relations with Prussia ever since the port of Dantzic has come under my dominion, care will, no doubt, be taken to propose a treaty of commerce between the two Courts analogously with Article 5 of the Russian Convention. It would be desirable

to evade every engagement, even indirect, relative to this matter ; but should the British Ministry insist upon it, and there be no means of negating its urgent appeals, endeavours must at least be made to put off the negociations to future contingencies, and to draw up the article in such a manner *that the two contracting Powers may reserve to themselves the right of subsequently introducing such negociations as they may agree upon touching the respective interests of their commerce.* Yet, since it is impossible to foresee the changes which the English Ministry might be tempted to make in the Convention which is to serve as our model, it will be necessary that you send here the draft of mine as soon as you have drawn it up. It is a delay which you can easily obtain under one excuse or another, and which will be so much the more useful, seeing that, during the interval, we shall probably acquire some fresh information as to the proceedings and negociations of the Court of Vienna. In the meantime you will receive annexed the full power which you will require in order to enter upon yours ; but I rely upon your prudence that, before contracting any engagement, you will again employ every means in your power to obtain exact and authentic information as to the real designs of the Court of London, and upon the extent which it appears desirous of giving to them in the present war. For this purpose be careful to forward to me, in one of your next reports, the result of your enquiries, adding thereto the opinion which you may consider yourself entitled to give, from your knowledge of the subject, either upon the appearances of a speedy pacification or upon the reasons which might incline England towards the continuation of the war. The necessity of obtaining this information becomes most particularly urgent on account of the embarrassing contradiction, that, on the one hand, I have, strictly speaking, promised my concurrence to the Court of Vienna only to the end of the campaign of 1793, whilst, on the other, my secret Convention concluded with Russia, relatively to the affairs of Poland, obliges me to continue my aid to Austria during the entire continuance of the war with France. The embarrassment becomes still greater from the circumstance that the Emperor, foreseeing the difficulty of effecting the exchange of Bavaria, will, probably, determine upon seeking his indemnities in an aggrandisement at the expense of France, and it is to be presumed that, unless events occur which cannot now be anticipated, the remainder of this campaign will barely suffice for the making of conquests proportioned to the claims of

the Court of Vienna. This calculation cannot escape the foresight of the Cabinet of St. James's, and it would, therefore, be essential to discover what are the consequences it deduces therefrom, and what the measures which, in such an event, it itself proposes to take. Should it decide upon finishing the war, cost what it may, in a single campaign, if it feels certain of accomplishing its objects in that short space of time, and if it hopes to drag all the belligerent Powers into one and the same general pacification, the Convention you are about to negotiate will be of inestimable value to the Prussian monarchy, whose future prosperity essentially depends upon the return of peace, after the enormous sacrifices I have been compelled to make in two ruinous campaigns. If, on the contrary, England, waiving all the considerations pressed upon her by her internal condition, should think only of pushing her point, either in order to second the views of Austria or to satisfy her own ambition, the object then would be to find out if the campaign of 1794 would, at least, be the final term of her plan, and if she would be inclined to fix a real value upon the aid of Prussia during the next year; for, otherwise, I should consider myself forced to restrict my co-operation within the slenderest conditions of my indispensable obligations.

“ Nothing but the experience I have at all times had of your integrity and ability could have dictated the confidential instructions contained in the present Despatch. They are, as you may well see, of a character which requires them to be covered with an impenetrable secrecy; and, for that very reason, they also demand, in their execution, the greatest circumspection and address. In the first place you must endeavour to gain the confidence of England, by favour of that Convention she proposes to us; and this must be done without letting her perceive our own embarrassing position: secondly, the object which I have in this transaction must be carefully concealed from the Austrian and Russian Ministers, as the least suspicion of the matter could not fail to awaken mistrust in the Imperial Courts. That of St. Petersburg, however, having been generally informed of my negotiation with England, you will not be able to avoid informing Counts Woronzow and Stahremberg of your interviews with Lord Grenville; but, by alleging an insufficiency of instructions for the final conclusion of the affair, you will defer your explanation with them until the return of the courier whom you will despatch to this place with the draft of the Convention. It is

for your delicacy and tact to blend together advantageously all these nice points; and I flatter myself that, upon so important an occasion, I may rely upon the successful efforts of an old servant whose zeal and attachment are so well known to me.

“ Berlin, 29th June, 1793.

“ To Baron de Jacobi, London.”

No. 6.

Translation of a LETTER from the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI to the KING.

“ SIRE,

“ Vienna, 3rd July, 1793.

“ Although the inexplicable, and to the Russian Ambassador, most unexpected silence of the Ministry of Vienna renders me unable to inform Your Majesty precisely as to the time when the announced unsigned draft despatches can be completed (the said despatches relating to the accession to the Convention of St. Petersburg, and to the wishes of His Imperial Majesty as concerns his own indemnities, respecting which, however, no definite resolution appears to have been taken), I nevertheless hasten to perform what was prescribed to me at the end of the orders of June 10th, and to send back the chasseur Klamman, in order to inform you, Sire, of the manner in which I have acquitted myself of the commission with which Your Majesty deigned to entrust me, by the aforesaid despatch, and of the explanations I have had upon the subject of its contents. In the first conversation I had the honour of having with the Baron Thugut, I entirely passed over the two first points of the overtures made by Prince Reuss on the subject of the Convention of St. Petersburg, namely, the proposition and settlement of the respective indemnities, avoiding also, after having read the orders of the 10th of June, all ulterior explanation upon those two subjects. I, therefore, applied myself so much the more to insist (with respect to the 3rd) upon Your Majesty's religious fidelity and sincere friendship for your august Ally, which could alone have induced you to give such evident proofs of your attachment for His Imperial Majesty. I made the Austrian Minister sensible that nothing but the most anxious desire to be able, without loss of time, to contribute efficaciously to the interests of Austria, could have determined Your Majesty to accelerate, as far as the intervening distance would permit, the concert which Your Majesty must necessarily establish with the Empress of Russia

upon the important article of the indemnities: that after this Your Majesty had hastened even to promote the wishes of His Majesty the Emperor, in the event of the prosecution of the plan for the exchange of Bavaria experiencing too great difficulties, notwithstanding the efficacious and favourable efforts which Your Majesty never ceased to employ in order to facilitate its execution, and by means of which you had also succeeded in preparing and effecting the glorious recovery of the Belgian provinces, an object so indispensable and essential for the realization of the proposed exchange. Lastly, I drew Baron de Thugut's particular attention to the very expressive terms in which Your Majesty intimated that if His Imperial Majesty considered it more suitable to his interests to indemnify himself preferably at the expense of France, a project of this nature would certainly meet with no opposition on your part; that, on the contrary, you would heartily concur therein, and that all which now remained was for you to await more precise information as to the extent which the Emperor was desirous of assigning to his acquisitions in that quarter, in order to enable you, by a vigorous co-operation, to bring about, before the end of the present campaign, a state of things calculated to insure the accomplishment of these designs.

“Baron de Thugut listened very attentively to all which I had the honour of telling him; but in this first conversation he avoided even alluding to the subject of the acquisitions to be made upon France, and was so much the more energetic upon that of the exchange of Bavaria. After remarking how great would be the satisfaction with which His Imperial Majesty would receive, at so critical a conjuncture, the reiterated assurances of Your Majesty that your sentiments for this Court were constantly invariable and persevering, he added that the difficulties which the exchange of Bavaria appeared to meet with, would no doubt be surmounted by the powerful co-operation of Your Majesty, more especially as the Count de Cobenzal believed that he had obtained from the two Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg a guarantee of its accomplishment. I thought, Sire, that I should be acting in conformity with your royal intentions, by rectifying in a courteous and becoming manner the erroneous ideas which the Director-General appeared to me to entertain upon this important matter; and, therefore, availing myself of the instructions Your Majesty's ministry was pleased to forward to me on this subject, and which were dated the 28th of March,

I once more recapitulated to the Baron de Thugut the very efficacious and happy efforts your Majesty has never ceased making since the transmission of the Note of Sterbe for facilitating and effecting the re-occupation of the Austrian Netherlands already entirely in the enemy's power. I represented to this Minister, that but for the taking of Frankfort and the successive advantages gained by Your Majesty over the French, at the close of the last year, by driving them beyond the Rhine, we should be at the present time very far from the possession of the Belgic provinces, while the enemy on the contrary, would have found themselves in the very heart of Germany; that, besides this, Your Majesty had by repeated and energetic representations, forced, so to speak, General Clairfait to remain beyond the Rhine, and by that means put a stop to the incursions of the French; that the Prussians had all alone taken Venloo, without which the deliverance of Maestricht would have been completely impossible; and this fortress once in the hands of the French, the plan of the present campaign, already so favourable to the interests of the House of Austria, would have been entirely disarranged; that lastly, the body of troops under the command of Lieut.-General De Vins-Velsdorff had certainly very efficaciously contributed to the recovery of the Netherlands, according to the testimony of His Imperial Majesty himself, who had charged me officially to bring it to the knowledge of Your Majesty. Baron de Thugut giving me to understand that it was the Austrian armies which had really effected this fortunate and prompt re-occupation, I replied, that I was very far from wishing to detract the least in the world from the glory which Prince Cobourg had acquired upon that occasion, or from the exemplary valour of the Austrian troops, which was the admiration of all Europe, and to which, as he knew, Your Majesty rendered the fullest justice; but that no one, however, could deny, that had it not been for the success which attended Your Majesty's arms at the end of the last year, when the Austrian army in the Netherlands had been almost entirely defeated, the glorious recovery of that country would not have been accomplished last spring, and that it was thus clear and evident that you had contributed thereto in the most efficacious manner. That as Your Majesty again offered, at the present moment, your good offices in order to insure the success of the exchange project, I appealed to the Emperor's justice and to the enlightened judgment of the Imperial Ministry itself, whether

Your Majesty had not religiously fulfilled all the engagements entered into with his august ally, for the purpose of facilitating and effecting the exchange in question.

“Feeling, no doubt, the justice of these representations, the Baron de Thugut assured me that he undoubtedly acknowledged, with the warmest sensibility, the friendly and satisfactory expressions contained in the despatch which I had just read to him ; but that the point in question was the guarantee for the execution which he believed had been given by Your Majesty and the Empress of Russia, and of which the Petersburg Convention itself made mention. In answer to this I confined myself to admitting that I knew nothing whatever about such a guarantee of execution, but only of one of agreement, and confessed that I was yet too young in the career of diplomacy for me to understand precisely what could be meant by a guarantee of execution upon an object the realization of which evidently depended upon future and uncertain events ; that it certainly belonged to the two contracting Sovereigns exclusively to give the authentic explanation of the terms employed in the Convention of St. Petersburg, but that it appeared to me, individually, that the terms therein used were so clear as not to allow of a double interpretation. Upon which Baron de Thugut ended this conversation by the remark, which I reciprocated, that whatever he had said to me on the subject of Bavaria was in no respect official, but merely a friendly conversation entered into for the purpose of mutual elucidation, and for avoiding as much as possible any differences of opinion between the two allied Courts.

“I am, &c., &c.,

(Signed)

“CESAR.”

No. 7.

Translation of a REPORT addressed to the KING by the Ministers FINKENSTEIN, ALVENSLEBEN, and HAUGWITZ, July 10, 1793.

“Your Majesty will have been already informed, by the last despatch from St. Petersburg, of the important contents of the answer which the Empress of Russia has caused to be delivered by Count Rasoumoffsky to the Court of Vienna with regard to the overtures of the latter on the subject of the St. Petersburg Convention. The Sieur d’Alopeus, more communicative hereon than was the Count d’Oestermann, has just

sent us a copy of the despatch addressed, upon this matter, to the said Ambassador, and dated the 16th (27th) May, as well as of that he has himself received, and which was sent at the same time as the first. We have consequently the honour of presenting both, hereunto annexed, to Your Majesty, observing that in Count Rasoumoffsky's we have taken the liberty of underlining the passages which appeared to us to merit particular attention. We more especially include in this number the phrase wherein it is said that the Convention of St. Petersburg, to which the Empress presses the Court of Vienna to accede, and to which also, according to every appearance, the latter will accede without any hesitation, obliged Your Majesty to co-operate in the expensive war which she is now engaged in prosecuting, *so long as it should last*. We must own that this Convention expresses itself upon this point with too much precision for it to be possible entirely to elude the engagement it contains; and if the Emperor accede thereto it will be for the sole purpose of restricting, as much as is in his power, the said obligation, to which our efforts must likewise be confined. On the other hand, however, it will not escape the enlightened attention of Your Majesty that the Empress herself appears to favour this restriction, inasmuch as it is said, towards the end of the despatch to Count Rasoumoffsky, *that it is of importance to the Court of Vienna to bring about a concurrence more or less liberal on the part of Prussia*; an expression which appears to us to indicate that, while representing to the Court of Vienna the proposed accession to the Convention of St. Petersburg as the means of securing Your Majesty's continued co-operation in the war, the Empress has, notwithstanding, been desirous of laying upon the Emperor the task of ultimately arranging with her the mode and extent of that concurrence. It has therefore appeared to us of so much the greater importance that Your Majesty should, as much as possible, keep your hands free upon this point, in the final answer which is yet to be given to the Court of Vienna relatively to the indemnities of the latter, and that, with this view, you should confine yourself in that answer, as far as Your Majesty's co-operation in the war is concerned, to some what general terms, in order that Your Majesty may not be bound further than circumstances may require.

"We have occupied ourselves in drawing up this answer agreeably to the principle we have just indicated, giving it at the same time the form of an ostensible despatch, addressed to

the Sieur César ; and persuaded that, with respect to the object itself of the Austrian indemnities, that their acquisition at the expense of France would be infinitely preferable to the exchange of Bavaria, we have thought we should meet the intentions of Your Majesty by evincing, as regards the views which the Emperor might be desirous of manifesting on that head, a considerable degree of facility and obligingness ; it being, however, well understood that he should previously make known to Your Majesty in what they consist, in order that you may subsequently explain yourself on the subject. We submit this herewith unto annexed despatch to the examination and approval of Your Majesty, begging that, should it give you satisfaction, Your Majesty would be pleased to affix your signature, and cause it to be despatched immediately from head-quarters. Upon the exact accomplishment of the stipulations contained in the Convention of St. Petersburg for the prosecution of the war, and the accession of the Court of Vienna to that Convention, it also appeared to us as indubitable that the interests of Your Majesty in such complicated circumstances require more than ever that you should no longer decline the alliance so often proposed by the British Court for the purpose of continuing and terminating the war with one accord ; since it is to be hoped that events will produce a contingency which, while determining the English Minister in favour of the peace which he is certainly desirous of accelerating, would open to Your Majesty the prospect of yourself arriving at this so salutary an end by the re-establishment of the general tranquillity.

“ Therefore, according to the authorization already contained in the orders of Your Majesty of the 22nd May, it shall be our care, as soon as the answer of the Empress upon this matter shall reach us, to send without delay to Baron de Jacobi the full power which Your Majesty has signed, and to furnish him with the necessary instructions.

“ By so doing we hope to conform to the royal will of Your Majesty, and we await, with the profoundest respect, the orders with which you may be pleased to honour us upon the important object of this most humble report.

(Signed)

“ FINKENSTEIN.

“ ALVENSLEBEN.

“ HAUGWITZ.”

“ Berlin, June 10, 1793.

“ To the King.”

No. 8.

Translation of a REPORT addressed to the KING by the Ministers
ALVENSLEBEN and HAUGWITZ, July 13, 1793.

“ The Marquis Lucchesini has just forwarded to us by courier the plan which Lord Beauchamp, now the Earl of Yarmouth, has been charged to propose to Your Majesty to serve as a basis for the Convention to be concluded between you, Sire, and England, relatively to the present war. This transaction having ever appeared to us of a preponderating importance, and the consequences which may result therefrom being so closely connected with the welfare of the Prussian monarchy, we presume, Sire, to lay before you, most respectfully, the observations which the first overtures of the Plenipotentiary have suggested to us.

“ Although Baron Jacobi is already provided with the instructions and full powers requisite for the negotiation, we cannot deny that the mission of Lord Yarmouth and the credentials with which he is furnished are entitled to some consideration. It strikes us that Your Majesty would fear to disoblige the King of England by refusing to enter into discussion with the confidential agent whom he has sent to head-quarters; and this impression has induced us to inform Baron Jacobi, by yesterday's post, that he must suspend for the present his proceedings, and await further orders, which he will receive immediately.

“ Upon comparing the plan transmitted through Lord Yarmouth with the note we have drawn up upon the Convention, signed by Lord Grenville and Count Woronzow, we confess that the articles are nearly the same, and present no essential difference; but Your Majesty will be pleased to recollect that, in the despatch addressed to your Minister in London, we have made the final conclusion to depend upon certain previous notions which enabled us to judge of the real intentions of England, and to adopt, in consequence, the changes and additions of which the Treaty appeared susceptible. This information being still a desideratum, the least we can do at present is to consider maturely these same propositions of Lord Yarmouth as far as we are acquainted with them through the summary of his first conference with the Marquis Lucchesini.

“ They indeed confirm the conjectures we have for some time formed of the tendency of England to terminate the war as soon

as possible, and to simplify its co-operation either by putting aside the indemnification of the belligerent Powers, or by avoiding to take part in the definitive arrangement of the internal affairs of France. But, on the other hand, we have been struck with surprise at seeing the English negotiation specify in detail the efforts which Your Majesty is considered as bound to impose upon yourself in this war, as a member of the Empire, as the ally of Austria, as the ally of Great Britain, as the ally of Holland; an enumeration so much the more remarkable as His Britannic Majesty, in his letter of the 26th June, also makes mention of the aid he would have expected from you, had you not already, by your active intervention, contributed to the common cause. An insinuation so positively made could not but redouble our attention upon the obligations which may result from the Convention; nor can we conceal from ourselves that Articles 1 and 4, although in other respects conceived in very general terms, decidedly imply *an unlimited co-operation as to time*. Thus, notwithstanding the disposition of England to make the war last so long only as is strictly necessary, it may, however, be in the order of possibilities that this Power may find itself compelled still further to continue the war during one or several campaigns; in the event of which, Sire, you would be irrevocably dragged in also, by virtue of the new Convention; and the same would be the case with the other co-interested parties, who would all require from Prussia the assistance stipulated by the treaties. In this manner Your Majesty would be bound to furnish—

| | Men. |
|--|--------|
| To the Court of Vienna | 20,000 |
| To the Court of London | 20,000 |
| To the Republic of the United Provinces | 12,000 |
| For the Contingents of the Empire, about | 13,000 |
| Total | 65,000 |

This calculation astounds us, for it offers us the most complete certainty that Your Majesty's finances are not in a condition to support so considerable a force, and that were you to continue it, at your own expense, for the next year only, you would run the risk, Sire, of inflicting a mortal blow upon the political existence of the monarchy and the welfare of your people. This truth is an alarming one, but it is precisely because it is so that we venture to lay it before the eyes of a King who is the friend of truth and the father of his subjects.

“ So intimate an ally as the Court of England is, one which does justice to the prodigious sacrifices Your Majesty has already made, and which is not ignorant that the resources of Prussia are limited, could never take offence at having the prospect of our embarrassments presented to it, or that, in demonstrating to it the impossibility of meeting them, the sole means of remedying them should at the same time be indicated. Those means, Sire, would consist in securing for yourself, should the prosecution of the war become absolutely inevitable, the following very express condition :—‘ That the Empire and all the co-interested Powers should furnish to Your Majesty the pecuniary resources of which you stand in need in order to prolong your co-operation.’

“ For this purpose it would be requisite to add a secret article to the Convention to be concluded with the Court of London, to the effect that Your Majesty engages to co-operate until the conclusion of the present campaign, but that for another one it would be actually necessary that the other Powers co-interested with the Court of London should furnish the pecuniary means you might require. Should this stipulation be refused, Your Majesty should then break the ice, and categorically declare that it is utterly impossible for you to continue the war at your own charge, &c. &c.

“ Such, Sire, is the point of view in which we think it behoves us to regard the present state of the negotiation with the Court of London ; and we should consider ourselves fortunate if Your Majesty should deign to authorize the Marquis Lucchesini to insert our suggestions in the fundamental principles of the Treaty.

(Signed) “ ALVENSLEBEN.
“ HAUGWITZ.”

“ Berlin 13th July, 1793.
“ To the King.”

No. 9.

Translation of a REPORT addressed to the KING by the Ministers
ALVENSLEBEN and HAUGWITZ.

“ We have just received the direct letter Your Majesty has done us the favour of addressing to us, dated the 13th July, and accompanied by the original Convention which the Marquis Lucchesini has been instructed to sign with Lord Beauchamp relatively to the affairs of France. By our very humble report of the 15th

instant, Your Majesty will no doubt, in the interval, have been convinced that, from the very moment we were informed of the overtures of the English plenipotentiary, we recognised the necessity of transferring, Sire, into your camp, and under your own eyes, the seat of the negotiation ; and that, without even awaiting the orders of Your Majesty, we hastened to submit to you the full power required by the Marquis Lucchesini, in order to conclude the transaction, and to suspend, provisionally, the operations of Baron de Jacobi in London. While taking these necessary steps, we also undertook the essential duty of laying before you, Sire, the reflections which appeared to us naturally suggested by the first propositions of Lord Beauchamp. They will not have had the time to reach your Majesty before the accomplishment of the work ; and all that now remains, therefore, is to forward to you the annexed ratification, which you had commanded us to transmit to you. But, full of the confidence which we place in your goodness, and listening solely to the ardent zeal with which we are animated for your service, we dare flatter ourselves that you will not have refused to cast a glance upon our respectful representations, and it is in this hope that we propose resuming the thread of them.

“ It is out of all doubt, Sire, that the project brought by Lord Beauchamp from London nearly approaches the one which we had ourselves sketched from the tenor of the Convention concluded on the 23rd January, between Lord Grenville and Count Woronzow ; but Your Majesty’s position being so vastly different both from that of Russia, who, in the course of this war, has confined herself to enacting a purely passive part, and from that of all the other coalised Powers, who act either in their own defence or for objects of private interest, we have, in our instructions to Baron de Jacobi, limited ourselves to consulting the previous notions he might have been able to collect ; and this is the reason of our enjoining him very particularly to defer the final conclusion until he had put it in our power maturely to weigh circumstances. We were beforehand imbued with the great truth, that if it was intended to tie Your Majesty’s hands by an unlimited co-operation, the safety of your kingdom required an additional stipulation, which might protect you from the ruinous expenses of a third campaign—expenses the burden of which you could no longer bear, and for which Your Majesty is entitled to claim the aid of foreign subventions. So soon as the negociation was no longer to be continued at London, we readily conceived that

it would be difficult to stop it until Baron de Jacobi had forwarded to us the result of his inquiries ; and even supposing the possibility of admitting so long a delay, we still entertained doubts of being able to obtain such information through his medium, because it was evident that Lord Grenville would avoid any positive explanation for fear of counteracting Lord Beauchamp's proceedings. It is therefore upon the examination of what passed between the latter and the Marquis Lucchesini in their first conference that we must establish our opinion as well as the conception of the separate article mentioned in our very humble report, and the necessity of which has appeared, and still does appear, to us so urgent, that unless it be agreed to in one way or another, by the Court of England, and successively by all the co-interested parties, the future co-operation of Your Majesty becomes absolutely impossible, according to the alarming calculations which we took the liberty of submitting to you, and which now acquire a greater degree of certainty, inasmuch as we learn by the last letter from the Marquis Lucchesini that Lord Beauchamp had already spoken to him somewhat confidently of England's preparations for a second campaign, and gave him an inkling of a plan of indemnities in favour of Austria, the execution of which presaged many years more of war. Persuaded that these important reflections have not, Sire, escaped the penetration of your exalted intelligence, we however confess that when once the Convention is concluded, signed, and ratified, there remains scarcely any probability of the additional article being afterwards introduced therein, without which, we think, it must lose all its real value, the impossibility of fulfilling the stipulations of the said Convention being clearly proved. But since Your Majesty has just established with the King of Great Britain a more confidential communication upon the present posture of affairs, and are besides connected with that Sovereign by so many intimate relations, would it not be as well to make known to him immediately the difficulties with which Prussia is menaced, and propose to him the only remedy which can be applied to them ?

“ It appears to us that the final clause of Article I. of the new Convention might naturally furnish the opportunity ; the very opportune pivot, ‘ *that the contracting Powers will continue to employ their respective forces, so far as the circumstances in which they shall find themselves will permit,* ’ being susceptible of a very wide interpretation, a commencement might be made by de-

ducing therefrom the subject of a secret declaration, in which Your Majesty should make known, in confidence, to your ancient ally, that having acceded to the alliance which the King of England had proposed to you relatively to the war, Your Majesty thought it your duty to make to him the frank and confidential avowal, that after the immense sacrifices and efforts which you had undertaken and made during the former campaign, and which you were determined to continue vigorously until the end of the present one, you would no longer be in a condition to prosecute subsequently, at your own charge, a war into which you had only entered as an auxiliary Power. That if the allied Courts in coalition took an earnest interest in securing the aid of Prussia for the following campaigns, all that would be necessary was to provide her with pecuniary means proportioned to the enterprise, and to come to an understanding thereon with Your Majesty. That Your Majesty would expect the King of England to take the lead in acknowledging the justice of these principles; and that you should reserve it to yourself, Sire, to come to an explanation with the other belligerent Powers in succession.

“ We entreat your Majesty to regard with a favourable eye the very powerful motives which have induced us to return to the charge, in order to reproduce before you the indispensable necessity of a measure to which we attach the glory of your reign and the prosperity of the monarchy. It is impossible for us to dissemble, either to ourselves or to you, Sire, the evils and dangers which the continuation of this fatal war would not fail to create, if at least the weight of the expense were not ultimately thrown upon the Powers who, strictly speaking, ought to have borne it from the very commencement. Lord Beauchamp having announced other additional communications which will relate to objects of the greatest importance to Prussia, the negociation is always considered as remaining open; and the Marquis Lucchesini will have no difficulty in insuring, with his usual ability, the enforcement of the capital point, which still remains to be discussed, for want of its having been inserted in the principal Convention.

“ We shall esteem ourselves the most fortunate servants of Your Majesty, if the expedient we have just suggested should attain its object; and if in repeating our respectful admonitions, we should derive the pleasing satisfaction of having deserved your august approbation.

(Signed)

“ ALVENSLEBEN.

“ HAUGWITZ.

“ Berlin, 19th July, 1793.

“ To the King.”

It would be extraneous to the views contemplated in this memoir to recapitulate the long and complicated discussion which took place after the date of this correspondence, until the object to which it pointed, namely, the separation by Prussia from her connexion with the Allied Powers, was effected. This object she attained by the Treaty of Basle, signed on the 3rd of April, 1795.

The important negotiations by which this Treaty was brought about, are most ably and satisfactorily related in the work, entitled 'The Memoirs d'un Homme d'Etat,' published in Paris, 1831, and in the early chapters of the excellent 'History of the French Revolution' by Sir Archibald Alison, as also in the 3rd vol. of the 'Diaries and Correspondence of the First Earl of Malmesbury,' in which an account is given of the Treaty of Subsidy and Alliance between Great Britain and the States-General with Prussia, negociated at Berlin, and signed by Lord Malmesbury and Count Hertsberg at the Hague, 19th April, 1794. Before the end of that year, and after the payment of 600,000*l.* of the subsidy stipulated by it from Great Britain to Prussia, and without the fulfilment of its obligations on the part of the Prussian Government, the rupture of that treaty was announced by a note of Baron Hardenberg, delivered at Frankfort, 25th October, 1794, to Lord Malmesbury, and Baron Kinckel, the Dutch Plenipotentiary; and on the 3rd April, 1795, the Prussian Government concluded with France a Treaty of Amity, by which it ceded to her all the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. By this act Prussia entirely separated herself from the alliance she had previously proposed and contracted with England, Austria, and Russia, and established a most intimate and friendly connexion with the French Government, which lasted till the end of the war.

The relations of peace having been thus established

between these two countries, the Marquis Lucchesini was soon afterwards sent as the Prussian minister to Paris, where he was received in the first instance by Bonaparte, M. de Talleyrand, and the Government, with the greatest confidence and favour. Soon after, however, he was generally understood to be living on terms of great intimacy with the men of letters who at that time were residing in that capital, but who were supposed to be acting in opposition to the measures of the First Consul. It is curious to observe in the following documents the jealousy with which this circumstance was regarded by him. The subjoined letters, of which the first is from the King of Prussia, and the second from his private secretary, are proofs of the anxious desire which at that time existed at Berlin to maintain the best understanding with the French Government:—

No. 10.

KING OF PRUSSIA to MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“A few days ago General Bournonville requested an audience of me, in which, after having communicated the propositions with which he was charged upon the subject of affairs in general, and given me proofs of the confidence of his Government, he made no secret of your intimacies in Paris being but ill calculated to promote it. Tastes creditable in themselves, when public business is not compromised thereby, are said to exercise too great an influence in the choice of your society, and you are represented as preferring to live with a class of persons—that of literary men—who, so far from making themselves useful, turn their abilities to bad account. If tranquillity prevailed, doubtless the Government would pass this over without notice; but after the political storms which have agitated France, and when either excitement or malevolence menaces its repose, it becomes the duty of the First Consul to exercise the strictest vigilance. Well aware who the persons are that intend mischief, he forms beforehand his opinion of those who take a pleasure in being intimate with them, and upon this principle it is that he regulates his confidence.

Your instructions are too exact, and you have evinced in too many missions your respect for them, to allow the idea to exist for one moment, of attributing to you a real error; but no one knows better than yourself that in political affairs, to avoid doing wrong is not sufficient. All those nice gradations which appear of little or no value, but of which confidence or mistrust is in fact made up, are by no means to be neglected when such vital interests are concerned, and mine gain or lose in proportion as my ministers either succeed in conciliating personal esteem or neglect the means of so doing. But the evil is now done, and at this moment it will be impossible for you to serve me at Paris as your zeal would prompt you, or as your talents justified me in hoping; but I flatter myself at least that the impression will be but transient, and that you will find no difficulty in regaining confidence by proving, even in the most trifling particulars or at another time, that France has acquired my friendship, that my wishes are in favour of the wise Government whose desire is order and peace, and that by obeying my instructions in all that can convince that Government, your zeal for the object is identified with that of your office. Desirous of rendering to your long services all the justice they deserve, I shall learn with real satisfaction that you have overcome the prejudices which cause me so much uneasiness, and that you have regained the confidence of the First Consul.

“I pray God, &c.,

“FRÉDÉRIC GUILLAUME.”

“Charlottenburg, 6th June, 1801.

“Marquis L.”

No. 11.

From M. de LOMBARD to the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“For reasons which your Excellency will understand, I added no observations of my own to the King’s letter, on the day it was despatched. Besides, I should have nothing but curiosity to gratify; for there are impressions to which the Marquis Lucchesini is insensible.

“The French Government has not caused *insinuations* to be made: but the most formal, the most violent, the most angry declaration—a declaration amounting almost to the demand of a recall. To these complaints the letter which your Excellency has received was to be considered as the ostensible reply. I know

not if it be well calculated for its object ; but of this I am positively certain, that the King believes everything to be possible with your Excellency ; and that after having, by his despatch, calmed (as he expects) every angry feeling, and satisfied offended self-love, he does not despair of witnessing an immediate triumph upon your part. I shall not speak to you of the opinion which has been entertained respecting you. You were formed to dictate it, not to let it disquiet you ; but at a distance of two hundred leagues the data which are wanting are sometimes taken as granted, and calculations are suspended which ought to have been agreed upon from the first. In one point of view alone, I think you will not be displeased at hearing from the man whose post allows him the best means of observation, that if ever there were a person respecting whom opinion was unanimous, it is yourself. Three months after your *début* in Paris, you created enthusiasm ; and although at present a slight feeling of regret is mixed with it, every one is sensible that you alone could cause such regret, and that there is but one whose loss would admit of no consolation.

“I have asked myself what impression His Majesty’s letter would make on me, were I in your place ; but I feel that I must be actually in it, in order to answer the question. Every condition has an *amour propre* peculiar to itself ; to be superior to petty considerations is yours. A Lucchesini is but a Prussian, he is only great, he revenges himself by compelling esteem ; and, certain of one day leaving in the hearts of his countrymen the remembrance of his unequalled services, he cares but little if there should be found among the archives of his master’s cabinet, a melancholy and perishable record of passions to which he is a stranger.

“I have the honour to be, with a respect only equalled by my devotedness,

(Signed)

“LOMBARD.”

A few months previous to the date of these letters, the declaration of the British Government against the armed neutrality at sea, which was headed by Russia, had called forth from the Cabinet of Berlin the announcement of a line of policy which would have militated against the views and interests of England. This policy might eventually have been carried to a great

extent, had it not been arrested by the victory of the British fleet at Copenhagen, the death of the Emperor Paul, and the dissolution of the coalition which had been formed; but the following letter from the first minister of Prussia, Count Haugwitz, explains the general system which, had the war broken out, it was his intention to have recommended to his Court:—

No. 12.

Translation of COUNT HAUGWITZ's Letter to the MARQUIS of LUCCHESINI,
1801.

“I write to you in the greatest haste, my dear Excellency, being desirous to avail myself of the courier General Bournonville is just sending off to Paris, in order to give you a preliminary reply to your last despatches of the 22nd and 25th inst., and to communicate to you intelligence of the utmost importance, and which must serve as your special guide. England has just formally declared war against Russia, alleging, among other reasons for so doing, the Convention for the maritime neutrality, which she declares to be injurious to and an attack upon her rights and interests. Denmark and Sweden are not yet named in the declaration; but, considering upon what the above reasons are founded, there is no doubt but that they equally apply to those Powers. Lord Carysfort has officially communicated the circumstance here, and the King has already decided upon the course to be taken. An immediate answer will be given to the British Minister declaring the formal adhesion of the King to the said maritime Convention, and requiring, without any delay, the Court of England to put a stop to its hostile measures against the Northern Powers; in default of which His Majesty will be compelled to adopt such, on his part, as are necessary for fulfilling the engagements he has entered into with them. The consequences of this reply are to be foreseen, but the King, without awaiting them, is determined upon being in advance of the time when England, as is anticipated, will carry out her measures against the Northern Courts. We shall take possession of the mouths of the Elbe and of the Weser, and even of the country of Hanover, and silent preparations are making at this very moment for that purpose. For the present, and I cannot im-

press it upon you too strongly, the utmost secrecy should be observed, a caution the more important as Baron de Jacobi must be previously informed of it without delay, so that he may have time to warn such of our vessels as may be in England to leave as soon as possible. You can, however, without making any official communication, give beforehand the positive assurance that the King, having acceded to the maritime Convention, will be faithful to the engagements he has entered into with the Northern Powers, and will act accordingly. I expect to despatch to you, in a few days, a courier who will be the bearer of more detailed instructions and of interesting communications; amongst the rest a complete copy of the maritime Convention.

“ I embrace you, my dear Excellency, with all my soul, and renew the assurances with, &c.

(Signed)

“ HAUGWITZ.”

“ Berlin, February 3, 1801.”

The hostilities which, according to this letter, were upon the point of breaking out between Prussia and England, were fortunately averted; but the spirit in which the Prussian Cabinet was at that time directed, and the eagerness to seize an opportunity for the invasion of Hanover and the neighbouring states, are characteristic of the minister who terminated his political career by bringing upon his country the misfortunes which followed the battle of Jena. By siding with or yielding to the grasping ambition of Bonaparte, Count Haugwitz prepared the way for this dreadful calamity, and has afforded a useful lesson to the world of the impolicy of deferring to a system of injustice and of aggression, upon any hope that, should a suitable opportunity arise, the same inflictions would not be visited upon those who from cunning or cowardice have approved of or encouraged it.

Shortly after the date of this letter the Peace of Amiens was concluded, and tranquillity was established throughout the world; but the passions of mankind had been too violently agitated, too many interests had

been overthrown, and too much food for the ambition of a numerous body of men who had suddenly risen into power and consequence was still abroad, to allow of its long continuance. The aggressions of France on every side alarmed the Government of England; the menace of the First Consul that Great Britain should be excluded from all influence upon the Continent, and that she was unequal to contend with France, roused the spirit of the country; and the reported armaments in the ports of France and Holland induced the British Government to arm, and to prepare for the contest which, for the maintenance of the power and independence of the country, it appeared evident it would have to engage in. This determination was publicly announced in the King's speech to the two Houses of Parliament on the 8th of March, 1803. The following letter from the Baron Jacobi Kleist, the Prussian minister then residing in London, and addressed to the Marquis Succesini in Paris, will give a satisfactory view of the state of things at that moment, both in England and on the Continent, as they were observed by so distinguished and able a diplomatist:—

No. 13.

LETTER of the BARON JACOBI.

“ MONS. LE MARQUIS,

“ London, 29th March, 1803.

“ Yesterday I received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour of writing on the 22nd inst., and I appreciate too highly the expressions of confidence in me contained therein not to take the earliest opportunity of replying to it.

“ I shall address myself, first, to that part of your letter which appears to me to hold out the happiest prognostic of the maintenance of peace between this country and France. You express, Sir, your firm conviction as to the sincere desire of the French Government to preserve peace, and its unreserved willingness to calm the distrust of England, so that nothing

compatible with the dignity and security of the French Government would be rejected at Paris.

“It affords me the greatest pleasure, to be enabled to assure you, on my part, that the friendly views of the British Government are most decided; and if, in my position here, I possess not the same facilities as you do in Paris for judging of the pacific system of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, I can, at least, confidently state that, throughout England, there is but one opinion upon the moderate and pacific character of the King and his Ministry, as well as upon their wish, at length, to live with France upon terms of sincere friendship.

“This is a truth of which no well-informed foreign Power will, I think, entertain the slightest doubt. All the parties into which the nation and Parliament of England are divided are unanimous upon this point, but they are not equally so as regards the motives of these peaceable dispositions, some attributing them to prudence and sagacity, while others see nothing in them but weakness. In both these cases, and however they may originate, since the French Government is animated with the sincere wish to tranquillise the anxiety of England, let us not admit a doubt of her succeeding. It appears to me that no very great diplomatic skill is required to bring about a sincere reconciliation, provided that, in their salutary labours, the negotiators be guided by upright and honourable principles. But, as you remark, my Lord, it is certain that, unless every prepossession against either of the two Powers be excluded, every effort will be fruitless. Menaces especially would be but labour lost.

“With regard to the inclinations of the European Powers it appears to me that the want of peace is so imperious, after the bloody and disastrous war which has been terminated by the peace of Amiens, that not one could be found blind enough to refuse contributing, in all sincerity, to the maritime peace. Your colleagues in Paris, my Lord, who appear to despair of preserving it on account of the presumed impossibility of the success of a conciliatory negotiation, are certainly not the fittest of all persons for undertaking so important a work. They would commence by doubts and discouragement, and success in affairs is very rare when our mind represents it to us as impossible. But upon what foundations do they rest their melancholy convictions as to the failure of such a negotiation? Their doubts must be supported by such grave considerations that it becomes highly important to know them but, while I am ignorant of

them, I cannot, indeed, but persuade myself that a negotiation, begun under the happy auspices of a mutual and sincere desire for peace, would be crowned with complete success. I would venture to guarantee beforehand that parties here are fully determined to admit every modification compatible with the honour and security of the Crown and of the nation. My reasons are these: independently of the circumstance that the pacific inclinations of the King and of the Ministry appear to form the principal traits in their character, they have, moreover, the most powerful motives for wishing to avoid a rupture.

“ They are not ignorant of the fatal consequences which would infallibly result from it to Portugal, Naples, and other secondary Powers. Holland could not fail to suffer by it. The Court of the Tuileries has given it to be pretty well understood here that, as it is impossible for France to contend at sea with the English fleets, it would be on the Continent that the torch of war would be made to blaze, should it, unfortunately, be rekindled by the proceedings of England: nor is it made a matter of concealment that the French armies would easily find, for the third time, their road to Vienna. No doubt even is entertained that the war would soon extend itself to Hanover and Hamburg, and number those countries among its victims. Lastly, experience shows but too plainly that the national prosperity, which gains the most by the blessings of peace, good order, and the extinction of the debt, could not but suffer the severest injuries from the unforeseen convulsions attendant upon a new war. No one, assuredly, could guarantee that a complete anarchy would not again succeed to that order which is only being just resuscitated upon the Continent.

“ All these grave considerations cannot fail to have occupied the councils of His Britannic Majesty in the most serious manner; and, although I am certainly less initiated into the mysteries of the two Cabinets than you, who are accredited to a Government united to Prussia by the ties of a perfect friendship, strengthened, moreover, by interests frequently similar, still I venture to assure you that, without having forgotten a single one of those reflections, the apprehensions of the British Government respecting the continually progressive projects of aggrandizement attributed to the First Consul, have been so serious that not one of the above considerations has succeeded in allaying them. For this reason they appear to me the sole and exclusive causes of the attitude which the King has thought it

his duty ultimately to assume, by means of the message in question.

“Were your Excellency acquainted with my reports which have preceded and followed that of the 18th of February, of which you speak to me, your Lordship would not have the least doubt as to my firm and constant conviction that peace between the two Governments cannot be maintained unless the sagacity of the First Consul succeed in tranquillising the apprehensions of the British Government upon the subject of the policy adopted by France.

“It is asserted here that the pacific conquests of the First Consul since the preliminaries of the peace of Amiens equal, if they do not surpass, all those which France has acquired by the most brilliant victories; and the uneasiness of the British Cabinet upon the subject has always been on the increase. The assurances of the French Ministers here as to the friendly dispositions of their Government have never produced the desired effect. The political measures of the Court of the Tuileries have made so striking an impression upon the minds of the British Ministers that, notwithstanding the frank and open character of General Andreossi, his protestations of friendship have always been looked upon as at variance with fact. I will not, my Lord, conceal from you that I have myself been called upon, more than once, to defend the policy of the First Consul by the consideration that a Government recently established under forms absolutely different from that of the one to which it succeeded, must necessarily follow a different course from other Governments established upon the basis of time and of the habit of conforming to what is called the equilibrium of Europe; that all still depended upon the imposing attitude which the French Government might preserve for the purpose of quelling anarchists at home, and of securing respect from the other European nations abroad; that, as the consolidation of the actual Government in France could not but interest all Europe for the purpose of stopping the contagion of the revolutionary spirit, and, as the First Consul must himself be sensible that confidence is the most solid basis of his immense power, he would not hereafter refuse, at a proper time and place, to enter into the views of the present Ministry, and certainly endeavour gradually to remove all the causes of England’s apprehensions with respect to the preponderating power of France upon the Continent.

“For a moment it appeared to me that my observations had

produced some effect ; they have, however, been very considerably weakened by the precise declarations emanating from the Cabinet of the Tuileries with respect to the incompetency of the British Government to interfere, in any way, with Continental affairs. It is possible that the Cabinet of St. James's might have determined upon awaiting, in silence, the time when the measures attributed to the First Consul, for the purpose of more and more extending his dictatorial influence over his neighbours, should be determined upon ; but the above declaration having been several times repeated, the Treaty of Amiens having been appealed to as the only rule for the relations between the two Powers, and, lastly, other circumstances too long to be here enumerated, appear, at length, to have electrified the whole of the British Ministry.

“ The Government thought itself insulted by the pretension announced in the face of all Europe to exclude England from Continental affairs. The idea was insupportable of being declared cut off from its old political relations of friendship and of commerce with the Continent of Europe. No doubt, you have seen the sarcastic observations upon this subject with which all the newspapers teemed. At length the last *exposé* made to the legislative body filled the measure to overflowing. That *exposé* speaks of the weakness of England as compared with France, of the vacillation of the Ministry. The consciousness of its own greatness, the jealousy of the preponderating aggrandizement of France, all the passions of mortified self-love, have been more powerfully awakened than ever. I speak not of the jealousy which might have been excited by the renovated prosperity of the Republic under the Consular Government, and of the successful results of the 18th Brumaire. However rapid may be these advances, too much yet remains to be done ere France can become an object of misplaced envy for England ; but the jealousy I mean is that which has been excited here by the language of the French Government in speaking of the place it had taken among the Powers of Europe, and of that which it pretended to assign to England with respect to them, in order to confine her within her insular position. The phrases and style of this *exposé* have deeply wounded the national pride. The Ministers have been exposed to abuse in both Houses of Parliament on the score of weakness or of incompetency.

“ When to all this is added the reports, whether true or false, which have been received here of the extraordinary armaments

that are being collected in the ports of France and of Holland, all surprise will cease at the King's message, which has been regarded in France as so unexpected an event.

"I flatter myself, that my frankness upon this occasion will afford you a fresh proof of the confidence with which I throw myself upon your indulgence by making known to you, without the least reservation, my observations upon the present critical period.

"*Au reste* what you say to me on the continually renewed danger of an invasion, the possibility of which during a new war is offered by the extensive maritime coast of France, I would remark that this prospect is, perhaps, one of the reasons which, in conjunction with the others mentioned by me above, has at length determined the British Government upon extricating itself at once from this so critical a position, in order to place itself in safety from such apprehensions. The idea may be, perhaps, to use an ingenious allegory, that a besieged garrison, which cannot rely upon a moment's security, should at length take the desperate resolution of making a vigorous sortie, in order to free themselves from duance.

"There exists scarcely any difference in the opinions of people as to the success of an invasion, understanding only thereby the landing of a certain number of French troops upon the coasts of this country. It is believed that a landing might be effected on several points of the coast of England; but the French would be much mistaken if they supposed these landing points very numerous. It is, however, certain that upon several points the same winds which favour the departure of an invading armament from the ports of France would remove the English fleets from before them. But people flatter themselves that the hostile army, having had time to land, must soon become the victims of their enterprise, and that the event itself, by causing a momentary consternation, would only serve to render the whole English nation still more united.

"Lastly, the resolution taken by France not to increase her military force under these circumstances is, there can be no doubt, a favourable omen for the continuance of the peace. It appears to me impossible but that the wish with which you conclude your letter, viz., that this moderation of the French Government may not be interpreted as weakness, should be accomplished. The Chief Magistrate who has the supreme direction of the affairs of the French Republic is too well known

by the eminent qualities which he has hitherto displayed, and, amongst others, by his indomitable courage, for him to risk any mistake as to the motives which will inspire him with moderation in the present crisis. May his vast genius suggest to him the means of turning that crisis to the consolidation of his glory as the pacificator of Europe.

“ I purpose writing as soon as possible to the Marchioness, in order to render her an account of a few little commissions with which she honoured me. In the meantime, my Lord, permit me to pay her here my most respectful compliments.

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed)

“ JACOBI KLEIST.”

A short time previous to the date of this letter the First Consul had conceived the idea of attempting to induce Louis XVIII., who was then residing at Warsaw, to renounce all title to the throne of France : and, with this view, Monsieur de Talleyrand was instructed to communicate such a proposal to the Marquis Lucchesini, and to endeavour through him to engage the King of Prussia to transmit it to the King of France. The following correspondence will explain the nature of the propositions made, and the manner in which it was attempted to carry them into effect. The negotiation was terminated by the unequivocal refusal of the King of France and of his family to enter into any compromise whatsoever upon any question regarding their rights.

No. 14.

Translation of a LETTER from MARQUIS LUCCHESINI to COUNT HAUGWITZ.

“ COUNT,

“ Paris, 11th January, 1803.

“ I have been charged with an overture which does not admit of being transmitted to your Excellency through the intervention of any other person. A few days ago the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he had something important to communicate to me on the part of the First Consul. Having conversed with him, on Friday last, upon the matters

detailed in my despatch of this day, he requested me to return late in the evening, in order to receive a striking proof of the confidence of the First Consul in my discretion and of the attachment of the King to him and to the French Government. I kept my appointment punctually. M. de Talleyrand remarked that he was about to speak to me upon a business which, for a long time, would be known to three persons only in France,—the First Consul, himself and me, and which General Bonaparte was resolved to communicate to the King our master exclusively, who, by his probity, wisdom, and power, has gained the confidence, esteem, and respect of the General. I promised him the most impenetrable secrecy on my part, and the greatest discretion on that of the King's Cabinet. After a long preamble upon the consolidation of the Government which had replaced in France that of the Monarchy under the Bourbons; upon the sanction which in consequence of its victories and treaties of peace had been given on the part of all the Powers of the two worlds to the removal of the princes of that family from the throne of France; upon the irreparable wrong which a conduct but little worthy of the descendants of Henry IV., during the whole continuance of the revolutionary war, had done them in the estimation of a proud and warlike nation; and upon the invincible and almost unanimous repugnance of the French people to be henceforth governed by any one of them, he expatiated upon the advantage which the present Government would derive from securing its rights and its power upon a recognised basis, calming the conscientious scruples of many Catholics, reconciling what some emigrants believe they still owe to their oaths and to their honour, with the desire they almost all indulge of returning to, and serving their country; and lastly, in depriving malcontents of the pretext, and the Powers who are the rivals of France, of the instruments, of future troubles: such, he said, were the salutary and laudable objects which the First Consul was desirous of attaining. A mingled feeling of compassion and respect for the misfortunes of the princes of the House of Bourbon, united to that of a regard for the dignity of a great people which had, for a long time been governed by that family, had inspired the First Consul with his noble intention.

“The motive and the condition of this service are, as you will readily imagine, Count, a free, entire and absolute renunciation of all rights and pretensions to the throne of France, as well as

of the charges, dignities, domains and appendages belonging to that family. After having conceived this plan, the First Consul determined upon imparting it to the King only, and has directed me to request that His Majesty would be pleased to consider the best means of communicating it to the Count de Lille at Warsaw, and inducing him to authorize the King our master to undertake and effect a formal and decisive negociation upon this great object.

“As soon as your Excellency shall forward me satisfactory intelligence respecting the first essays of this negociation, no time will be lost here, in entering upon all the details as to the extent, securities, and times of payment of the different settlements which are to be made upon the head of the House of Bourbon and all the individual members of it.

“The First Consul is desirous to secure for the King all the honour and satisfaction accruing from so delicate and important an arrangement, and feels the greatest pleasure in enabling His Majesty to acquire fresh claims to the gratitude of the French Government, and in seconding his efforts for the prosperity and grandeur of the House of Brandenburg. One of the principles which the First Consul has determined upon as regards the proposed arrangement, is, that all persons composing the various branches of the Bourbon family must renounce the humiliating situation of receiving alms from the European sovereigns, must all collect together in a more distant place than Warsaw—Moscow, for instance, and there reside with the dignity befitting their name. This choice of the place of their retirement indicates the intention of associating the intervention of Russia with that of Prussia for ratifying the engagement and securing the performance of the stipulations. M. de Talleyrand, at the same time, intimated to me that General Bonaparte was dissatisfied with the prolonged stay of the Count de Lille in the King’s dominions, and that the wish to spare His Majesty the pain and embarrassment of a discourteous proceeding was the sole cause of his having hitherto refrained from giving instructions, which the one I have just now traced to you may, perhaps, render unnecessary.

“The whole of this long conversation was redolent only of the utmost confidence and friendship on the part of the First Consul as well towards the King as towards those of his servants who by their places here or at Berlin are the depositaries and may become the instruments of this negociation, so that, be the issue

of it what it may, the personal and political ties at present existing between the two Governments may not be deteriorated either as regards their durability or the satisfaction resulting from them.

(Signed)

“LUCCHESINI.”

No. 15.

Translation of a LETTER from COUNT HAUGWITZ to MARQUIS LUCCHESINI,
January 22, 1803.

“It must be confessed that although the King has taken an extreme interest in the contents of your letter of the 11th, he has not been surprised at them. From this you will judge in what manner he regards them.

“First of all, nothing appears to him more worthy of such a nation as France and of a chief so sure of his good fortune and of himself as the First Consul is henceforth, than this generous consideration for the fate of the Bourbons. In the midst of revolutions and of critical events one consideration alone absorbs all others; but victory calculates differently, and General Bonaparte has crowned his own with honour, by interesting himself with those who have been the victims of them.

“But independently of the inward satisfaction he is preparing for himself, should his intentions prove successful, there is a more general point of view, under which they should be applauded by impartial Europe. The sponge has been passed over the events which have successively excited its horror, its astonishment and its admiration. What now remains of that memorable period is a wise and firm Government in France sanctioned by success and by treaties. Its existence is the condition of peace. What enlightened man is there who would hesitate in his wishes? They must, both from interest and gratitude, be the same with those nations whose recollections are still embittered ones, whose wounds are still bleeding, and with those whom one common interest have, long since, connected with the new order of things.

“Thus whatever is calculated to render that Government firm and immovable enters alike into the calculations and wishes of the King. No doubt the formal renunciation of the ancient and celebrated family which, for so many ages, has governed France, however humiliating its fate may now be, however

impotent may be its resentments, could not be without interest, if only from the circumstance of its adding to the realities which go to build up the fortunes of the First Consul, and were it even the least essential of the forms with which he has been under the necessity of successively investing himself. It is impossible for the truth of this to be better developed than you, M. le Marquis, have done in your letter.

"I must, therefore, first of all, inform you, in the King's name, that His Majesty most heartily applauds the intentions of the First Consul, and, next, that he transmits, through you, to the first magistrate of the Republic, the assurance that here the wishes are unanimous for the success of his plan.

"But General Bonaparte, not confining his confidence to the communication of his views, is desirous that our august master should be the interpreter of them.

"You, M. le Marquis, were sure of the answer that would be given,—the First Consul must have been so before you. I feel that it is, and I dare affirm, because we have had the experimental truth of it, that it is because we have never wavered in our principles, even at a time when wisdom could not always be rewarded by results, that in one of the most important relations of Prussia, we now find, every moment, that honourable and rare confidence with which Governments are so little acquainted.

"The King fully appreciates that of which you have just transmitted to us the interesting proof. He offers to the First Consul all the good offices from which the illustrious head of the French Government can expect to derive advantageous results. It must not be supposed, however, that at present His Majesty can promise any thing certain. His Majesty knows too well the manner in which the passions judge, and the illusions which are allied to lofty recollections and great misfortunes, to flatter himself much that, in this case, self-love should, in the choice of compensations, prefer real advantages to fallacious hopes. We possess no recent data as to the expectations entertained at Warsaw. The King, compassionate and generous towards the man and the unfortunate, has always been severe towards the prince. Expressions which these principles condemn have not been carried to the throne with impunity, and, if it be desired thoroughly to appreciate his character, let not this very important reflection escape at Paris. He has granted an asylum to destitute refugees, but by doing so, he has consulted his principles as much as his heart, and has done as much for

France as for the Bourbons. To allow these last to remain in these dominions is to make ourselves the guarantees of their conduct so long as hospitality tolerates them there. Elsewhere they would, if not hatching plots by which France would be disturbed, at least be multiplying indiscretions calculated to feed animosities and prolong delusions.

“With us they are certain that the law is on the watch, and that, for them, obscurity is the condition of non-interference, and if, in this respect also the good faith of the King should not be understood as it ought, never will his expectations have met with greater disappointment.

“You may rely upon the most unassailable discretion, up to the very moment when the secret will no longer belong to us, but to the princes. From that time, you must perceive as well as I do, that all will depend upon the manner in which their pride or their dejection will receive the first overtures. If they carry their blindness so far as not to appreciate the advantages, they will not consider themselves under the obligation to remain silent. For transmitting to them the seducing offers proposed, the King has selected a person who certainly will not endanger success. The means afforded to His Majesty by the confidence of the First Consul, the situation of the princes and the obligations which the King’s acts of kindness impose upon them, will all be brought to bear upon the minds of the Bourbons.

“I hope that it may not be long before you receive some news, less quickly, however, than I should myself have wished, for the King’s agent not being at Berlin, a fortnight is required for summoning him there and giving him his instructions. The person is M. Meier, President of the Chamber of Justice at Warsaw, who being upon the spot, may, in consequence of his position, the more surely commence operations without exciting suspicion; being moreover known to the princes, speaking their language, and enjoying much consideration both on account of his post and his character, he will obtain a greater facility of access than any other person could expect.

“I say nothing to you, M. le Marquis, as to what you should add to the communications with which you are now entrusted. The spirit of your instructions has ever been the same. The relation of the two states proves in how very small a degree it has been lost sight of, and with what great intelligence you have conformed thereto. Do everything to convince the

First Consul of the principles with which he will ever find us animated.

“I am, &c.,

(Signed)

“HAUGWITZ.”

“Berlin, January 22, 1803.”

No. 16.

Translation of an EXTRACT from a LETTER addressed to MARQUIS LUCCHESINI
by M. LOMBARD.

“DEAR EXCELLENCY,

“Monday night, 14th February, 1803.

“It is one o'clock A.M., and I have just made two copies of the instructions for President Meier.

“I hope, my dear Excellency, that you will be satisfied with the manner in which the Warsaw negociation has been commenced, but I more especially wish that you may be so with the reasoning and style of the instructions. I do not name their author, for all that issues from his pen appears to me to bear a stamp which cannot be mistaken. I shall, however, tell you in confidence, that no success is here anticipated for the proceedings about to be taken; but what is much, if not all, a proof will at least have been given of good intentions. I will tell you further, under the seal of secrecy, that the Emperor of Russia has been taken into the confidence; for as it was surmised that the Count de Lille would lose not a moment in himself making known to that sovereign the propositions intended to be made to His Imperial Majesty, it was thought better to anticipate him. The copy of the instructions which will be sent you to-morrow by courier is precisely conformable to the original, with the exception of the qualification of the *Count de Lille* which has been substituted for that of *Comte de Provence*. It is expected here that you will communicate the document in question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and so great a curiosity is excited as to the ulterior measures of the First Consul, that this time economy must give way to curiosity: therefore do not spare couriers when you consider them necessary.

“I can no more, and conclude in order that I may not affect you with the drowsiness it is impossible for me to resist. Adieu, my dear Excellency; and do not forget him who makes it the glory of his whole life to respect and esteem you.

(Signed)

“LOMBARD.”

No. 17.

Translation of a LETTER from COUNT HAUGWITZ to MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“ MONS. LE MARQUIS,

“ March, 1803.

“ The President de Meier has been here for several days, and is fully instructed on the subject of the mission for which he has been summoned. The King himself has had a long conversation with him, for His Majesty takes a more than ordinary interest in the discussion, as well on account of the confidence reposed in him, as of the good results to be expected from it.

“ I can assure you that if the success does not answer the intentions of the First Consul it will not be our fault. Completely to convince you of this, and that with respect to this delicate business you may fully understand the point of view in which it is looked upon by the King, I send you a copy of the instructions which M. Meier takes with him. They were not drawn up with a view to appearing in Paris, but they are so characteristic of our august master that I thought the shortest and most instructive way would be to enclose them for you. You know better than I do the use to which they can be best applied: at all events you are authorized beforehand. I must, however, make two observations upon this paper, in order that you may more easily enter into the spirit of it. Under the form of instructions addressed to M. Meier, it is intended to be a means of working upon the minds of the Princes; and as the President of the Regency of Warsaw is authorized to read it under the seal of confidence, in this manner the King's view of the business, which cannot but have its due effect in determining the Princes, will be far otherwise enforced than it could have been by mere verbal explanations. But the very moment this document comes under the eyes of the Count de Lille it should have the effect of winning him over. This will explain to you a thousand nice shades which would not have been observed in ordinary instructions. The second observation I have to make to you is, that however general the first overtures of the First Consul may have been, our instructions are still more so. In them you will find neither the condition of removing from Warsaw nor that of renouncing the benevolences of the other Powers. Both these regard more particularly Russia, since it is to Moscow that it is intended to banish the Princes. To stipulate upon two points of which that Power is to be the judge, before its having been thought proper to invite her to the discussion, would

be to indispose her from the very commencement against an arrangement in which she would be able to effect much.

“It would besides be advisable not to alarm, at first starting, the imagination of the Count de Lille. My fear is not that the conditions will not be agreed to, if once the discussion of them can be entered upon, but that the discussion itself will not be opened. The great point is, that the Princes should authorize us to proceed further,—that they give their consent: the rest will follow more easily.

“The President de Meier sets off the day after to-morrow. I calculate therefore that you will scarcely receive any interesting news touching the object of his mission before the lapse of three or four weeks. The difficulty consists in places and things, and not, as you perceive, in a defect of good will in us. The King is very impatient to see the end of this affair, and to be better informed as to the intentions of the First Consul. I am fully aware that, through ordinary couriers, the question is not to be touched upon, except by your enveloping it in a style unintelligible for others. Notwithstanding I beg you to seize every opportunity of communicating to us the notions of which the confidence of the First Consul may have made you the depository; and have the goodness to forward me these ideas precisely as the first ones, by private letters, or if there be reports to be forwarded, by additional P.S.; but in the latter case, pray, above all, use envelopes, the better to preserve secrecy, and to answer, even in this respect, the confidence with which the First Consul honours me. I have in my turn communicated it to very few persons—not even to my *Conseillers rapporteurs*. Lombard drew up Meier’s instructions. I flatter myself that you will approve both of the reasoning and the style. I salute you, my dear friend.

(Signed)

“HAUGWITZ.”

No. 18.

Translation of the KING’S INSTRUCTIONS to the PRESIDENT MEIER.

“Although you are already informed by me and my Ministry of the object which has called you to Berlin, and of the manner in which I view it, I shall here give you, in addition to the fact, some essential observations to serve you as guides.

“The First Consul of the French Republic has made me an overture as interesting as it is delicate. As long as he had reason

to believe that the new authority was still exposed to the caprices of fortune, so long as war kept up recollections and hatreds, he could not, except with great caution, interest himself in the victims of the revolution. It cannot, however, be denied that, even in less tranquil times, he has done for the emigrants and the clergy all that prudence would allow him to do. But what is the ruin of some private individuals compared with the fate of that illustrious family who for so many years had occupied the throne of France, and whom an unheard-of destiny precipitated therefrom? Frenchmen ought not entirely to forget what those Princes had once been to them; and although carried along by one event after another towards a new order of things which cannot be overthrown without bringing back again the same horrors, sooner or later they ought to consider their honour as engaged not to abandon for ever, to the mercy of foreigners, the fate of their ancient rulers. The First Consul has now no greater wish than to discharge the debt of the nation. If it be no longer in his power to recall the past, at least he can offer the Princes independence and the means of living in splendour; he can secure to all of them handsome settlements, which, sanctioned by treaties and by legal guarantees, will place, to say no more, that unfortunate family beyond the reach of fresh reverses.

“Such is the wish of Bonaparte no doubt; these his intentions, which reflect such honour on his character, would not be pardoned him were he gratuitously to indulge them, or if the sacrifices which he is prepared to make had not for their object and their reward to affix the last seal to the new system.”

“The condition then of his offers would be the free, complete, and absolute renunciation of all the Princes of the Bourbon family to their claims to the throne, and to all charges, dignities, domains, and appanages which are established upon this first title.

“The more delicate the discussion, the more so was the First Consul required to be in the choice of means. Consistency and good faith always end by commanding confidence.

“He has not been afraid that I should abuse his; and as it is in my dominions that the head of the House of Bourbon resides at this moment, he has desired me to transmit his views to that personage.

“On some points of the question I may give my opinion; with the rest I have nothing to do.

“But whatever may be the result, it was not in my power to

refuse making the communication required of me ; for should the Princes think proper to take advantage of the offer made to them, they themselves might reproach me with refusing to become its organ ; and however distant may be the results arrived at for either party, it was not for me to render them still more so.

“ In order to perform the duty I had undertaken, it was necessary to find a person on the spot, so as to prevent any suspicions from being prematurely raised—a person moreover, who, being already known to the head of the House of Bourbon, might inspire confidence both by his situation and his character. I have selected you, being certain that you will understand how delicate this commission is in itself, and how interesting it is even for me, who am unshaken in my principles, so soon as the force of circumstances and my duties as a Sovereign have determined them. I have always felt for the Bourbons that sympathy which is their due.

“ The first proposal of General Bonaparte is a very general one, and must naturally be so, for he had first to ascertain what kind of reception would be given to more definite ones. All at present to be done therefore is to discover what the Princes think upon the question itself. If the offers made to them be such as to induce them to sacrifice some of the hopes they still cherish, or even should they not altogether reject the real advantages intended to replace those hopes, I would immediately communicate the circumstance to the First Consul, and it would not be long before he gave me further information as to his intentions : this I would transmit to you from time to time, and you in your turn would pursue the already-commenced communications.

“ On your arrival at Warsaw, you will let some days pass before seeing their Royal Highnesses or any of their suite ; for, however unlikely it may be that any one in the world would imagine the object of your journey to be at all connected with them, yet you would thereby be more certain of disappointing inquisitive people. You will after this take measures for letting the Count de Lille receive the important information now entrusted to you.

“ I leave entirely to your tact and discernment the selection of the means to be employed, as well as the choice of the agent whom you may perhaps think fit to confide in ; for under these circumstances the utmost delicacy is due to the Princes. The sensibility of misfortune is easily wounded, and the matter in question is one in which their dearest affections are involved. Perhaps it might be better to prepare the Count gradually for

the communication. You know those who possess his confidence, and it will be for you to judge what is possible to be obtained through them. What indeed I most especially fear is, that it may be difficult, for even the most obvious considerations and the most clearly-proved interests, to find access to a heart already exasperated by misfortunes; and it is highly important that the first answer should not be of a character to render resentments for ever ineffaceable and all new attempts impossible. The reasons with which you may support the offers of the First Consul are so evident and so powerful, that it appears to me scarcely necessary to suggest them. The first point must be entirely left to the Princes. There is a sentiment of honour which under all circumstances still maintains its empire, and which adversity itself does but render more intense; and this will prove the most difficult of all to overcome. There is one important reflection, however, with which it may be combated. The Government which is willing to treat with the Bourbons is not the one which despoiled them. Bonaparte is the work of the revolution, it is true, but he was its necessary production; nor is he in the category of its original creators. Far from having overturned the throne, he has avenged it; and his fortunes have swept away every faction which desolated France. If his greatest enemies, in order to judge him, start from the period when he seized the reins of government, they must own that he was then the benefactor of France. Unless I deceive myself, it would be little less than madness to listen only to blind resentments when the object of them no longer exists, and to live in the past alone when the question is to settle the future.

“And what is that future as regards the Princes? I honour that fidelity which does not compound with its duties; and if there still remain any Frenchmen who, devoted to their old masters, still contend against circumstances, still reject all reasonable considerations, and prefer delusions which flatter them to a resignation which offends them, I judge while I pity them.

“But the Princes’ duties are confined to themselves; or should they think that they still extend to the French nation, after the latter has broken every tie which formerly united them, an additional reason is thereby furnished for seeing things in their true light.

“The revolution which excluded them from the throne is, according to all human calculation, permanently established. A firm Government has superseded, in France, those ephemeral

factions among whom power oscillated to and fro. Peace reigns at home and abroad. All classes, tired with a ten years' struggle, and made wise by the evils which always accompany revolutions, have no other want than that of repose. All hold fast to the present order of things: some on account of hopes in which they could not formerly indulge, and others from the fear of losing what still remains to them. The whole system of property, as it actually exists, is the successive result of the different epochs of that stormy period; and the very idea of a fresh convulsion alarms even those who, in their inmost thoughts, may form very different wishes.

“An able hand holds the reins, an immense armed force supports it; religion has resumed its position, or having only undergone, as regards its outward display, a few modifications sanctioned by the Holy See, it has tranquillized tender consciences, it has interested even them in the new order of things, and has deprived the enemies of the Government of the last means of secretly plotting against it. But if in the interior nothing announces that there remains to the Bourbons a party and hopes, the voice of the European Powers has expressed itself more loudly. So long as the irresistible power of circumstances did not call them to the performance of other duties, they all protested in favour of that illustrious family; but they have all now acknowledged the Republic. The question therefore is not that of ephemeral relations dictated by the want of the moment. It is no longer hope or fear making terms with ambition or with danger. It is a new system united in all its parts, based upon the most solemn treaties; and unless the latter be eternally a mere mockery, the honour of the same Sovereigns who took up arms ten years since in support of the Bourbons, is itself now engaged against them. In this state of things, to flatter themselves with the occurrence of any event which might recall them to the throne would be for them a fatal delusion. If they still obstinately persist in indulging in it, they for ever deprive themselves, by their insensate conduct, of the most inestimable advantages. Besides, who can calculate to what such conduct may ultimately lead? Providence has placed upon the throne of Russia an extraordinary man who, together with the resources supplied to him by an immense empire, possesses the noblest of hearts. But the descendants of Louis may not always find an Alexander! And ought not this precarious existence to awaken the anxiety of the head of that illustrious House for the future

of those who are around him? Now while as yet his resolutions possess some value in the eyes of the French Government, while as yet time has not struck with proscription the rights of the family, he may obtain great advantages; he may insist upon their being securely guaranteed to him; he can leave to his family another inheritance than that of hopes and persecutions. And does not duty itself appear to agree with interest? Then only when the Bourbons shall have declared their sentiments respecting the duties of those whose fidelity has been repaid either by exile or by a precarious existence in their native country, the last pretext for troubles will disappear; those dark intrigues of a blind zeal—intrigues which, though for ever foiled, are nevertheless fatal to so many individuals—will cease; internal peace will no longer fear their vain assaults; and, as a compensation for the long-continued outrages with which it has been overwhelmed, the Bourbon family will have sacrificed its just resentments to these laudable considerations, and have secured the tranquillity and repose of the fatherland.

“Such partly are the arguments which you will bring to bear upon the mind of the Count, and I shall wait with impatience to know from you their effect. Should he leave the door open to negociations, you will not be the only one initiated in them, for no doubt the First Consul only waits for this opportunity in order to interest therein the Emperor of Russia; while on the other, it would rest with the Count de Lille to secure the consent of the other Princes. I shall therefore, as circumstances require, send you more detailed instructions, &c., &c.

(Signed) “FREDERICK WILLIAM.”

No. 19.

Translation of a LETTER from M. LOMBARD to the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“March 16, 1803.

“M. Cosmar received his letter two minutes after your’s reached me: I hope that he will have done justice to my zeal. Your secret despatch and letter have made the *author* of the instructions extremely happy. Unfortunately disappointed as regards an infinite number of the enjoyments of life, it is only in the esteem and approbation of men of merit that he finds any consolation,—judge then of the joy which the perusal of your letter afforded him. If the success of the affair in question has not

responded to the wishes of the King and his Ministers, it is solely attributable to the difficult position of the Princes.

“There is no doubt, my dear Excellency, that you will see the King at Vesel ; His Majesty himself desires it, but there is also another person whom this interview will make very happy.

“I know not if the Count mentions it in his letter to you ; I doubt it, and it is to supply that omission that I speak to you about this journey. The King has not yet thought fit to produce the itinerary of his route, and has a reason for not doing so—a phrase in your former despatches had given him an inkling of a certain project of the First Consul, which has alarmed the monarch. He wishes to know what he has to depend upon before fixing the time of his journey. I cannot enter into further particulars, my dear Excellency, but these few lines will, no doubt, suffice to enable you to guess the King’s wishes : all that you can possibly do to remove down there the idea of an interview will be regarded here as a service deserving of gratitude ; with any other person, I should never have risked an avowal of this importance, but I confide it to you, being persuaded you will not misinterpret my intentions.

(Signed) “LOMBARD.”

No. 20.

Translation of a LETTER from M. LOMBARD to the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI.

“I cannot tell you with what enthusiasm I have read your despatches.

“My opinion was almost fixed from the time of the first insinuations forwarded to Wilhelmsbad. It was unalterably so as soon as I knew the great man.

“Besides your memoirs alone would have sufficed, and your last despatch, that admirable record of the character of Bonaparte, would, to the blindest of men, be the complement of evidence.

“I had been convinced three months since, but the question was now that of persuasion, and if the advantages be not mistakable, undoubtedly there are sacrifices to be made which explain and justify the protracted irresolution of the King. I know no man so sure of himself when he has once made up his mind, but I also know no one who, for that very reason, consults himself so much before he determines. His delays are

the measure of his constancy, and if he *pledges* to the French the *latter*, it will not be for them to have to reproach him for the former. I dare not yet announce to you the result in a very formal manner, but I am, at this moment, writing to Count Haugwitz to repair to Potsdam, and, in a few days, perhaps, you will be summoned to a work which, of all those in which you have been engaged in your long and interesting career, will not have been the least delicate in its details, nor the least important in its results.

“ However, until the arrival of the courier, it must be understood that I have only written for your Excellency.

“ The Queen is quite heart-broken at the information given by your Excellency on the subject of the interests of her grandmother. The affair having passed from M. Talleyrand’s hands into those of the Minister of Finances, could you not do something with the latter ?

“ Lastly, is there any proceeding upon which you would still wish to advise me, and in which the Queen could be of any service ?

“ I have, &c.,

(Signed) “ LOMBARD.”

“ Potsdam, Dec. 10, 1803.”

During the time the negotiation, which had its origin in these documents, was carried on at Warsaw, the second war between Great Britain and the French Republic was commenced. The whole population of England responded to the call of the Government, and the nation armed itself to repel the invasion with which it was threatened.

The nations of the Continent abstained from all interference until the continued aggressions of France, the violation of the territory of Germany for the purpose of arresting the Duke d’Enghien, the seizure of Genoa, and the formation of the kingdom of Italy, roused the Russian and Austrian Governments to a sense of the danger with which they were menaced by the ambition of the French ruler. In the early part of the year 1805, when it became evident that these countries were

preparing for a renewal of war with France, and when the demands of Russia were transmitted to that Government, and when the First Consul (now become the Emperor of the French) had determined not to adhere to them, the following Memoir was presented to the Cabinet of Prussia by Monsieur de la Foret, the French Minister at that Court. This Memoir was the production of Monsieur de Talleyrand, who therein in the ablest manner endeavoured to induce the King of Prussia to ally himself with France by the offer of the State of Hanover. This country had been taken possession of by the French Government upon the breaking out of the war with England, and Prussia had in vain been called upon by the British Government to protect its neutrality. It was now offered to her as a bait by which to engage her sanction to the various aggressions and spoliations of the French ruler. The answer of the Prussian Government was cautiously worded, so as to avoid any compromise of its relations with France, while it intimated the hope that the States of Italy (not included in the Kingdom which had been formed there) and the Republics of Switzerland and Holland would be restored to independence. These were demands to which the French Emperor would not listen, and the mere mention of them, as they were calculated to curb his ambitious projects, was highly offensive to him; the negotiation, consequently, was put a stop to, but the offence was secretly treasured up, and the proposition was reserved for a future opportunity, when it was made only with the view of either compromising Prussia with Great Britain, or of forcing her into a war with France, which it was anticipated would prove most disastrous to her.

No. 21.

MINUTE presented by the Sieur LAFOREST, the French Envoy at Berlin, to Baron HARDENBERG, at that time, in 1805, at the head of the Prussian Cabinet ; a Document proceeding from the pen of the PRINCE DE BENEVENTO.

“ The Emperor Napoleon has paid no attention to the various attempts made to draw his Prussian Majesty into a league against France. He always relies, with perfect confidence, upon the King’s friendly feeling, upon his word, upon his interests. He has said to himself that the Sovereign who, with the view of more securely curbing turbulent passions, had declared his neutrality and his firm resolution not to allow (were it only for the advantage of his own dominions) that any portion of the north of Germany should become a battle-field, would know how to frustrate the attempts which are making to surprise his good faith.

“ The Emperor has viewed in a more serious light the intrigues which have been carried on for the purpose of inducing the King to confine his system of neutrality to the Prussian provinces. It is not that he was not very sure that such intrigues would fail, for the Cabinet of Berlin has constantly assured that of Paris that the King desired war neither at home nor in his neighbourhood. But to know what the enemy *dares demand*, when circumstances are adverse to him, is to know what *he will dare to do* when he believes he has the power.

“ What must have been the Emperor’s feelings when he learnt that the Cabinet of Berlin had just recently excepted the coasts of Hanover from among the points closed by Prussia against every attack ?

“ He was so much the less able to help being extremely surprised, because it has hitherto been asserted, in terms the most clear and the least liable to lead to this exception, that the theatre of the war could not be established in any part of the north of Germany. The Emperor had promised that his troops should be restricted to a peaceful occupation of Hanover, and the King had promised to cover them from every attack.

“ It was in consequence of his entire confidence in the guarantee of Prussia that the Emperor withdrew, a year ago, nearly 12,000 men from the Electorate ; and it is evident that his only motive in so doing was to give the King a pledge of the faith he reposed in him.

“ The Emperor does not consider an attack as an object of uneasiness, *provided that his foresight be free to act* ; on the contrary, were he to consult the interests of his glory alone, he would wish that 40,000 Russians, English, or Swedes, might arrive in the Electorate, being certain of giving them a lesson they would not soon forget.

“ But when he unexpectedly learns that Prussia has intended leaving a door open to the Russians, the English, and their Allies, he regrets having weakened his army, in the full persuasion that, as an equivalent for the inactivity in which he kept it, the King would guarantee that inactivity. Why did not the army and the coasts of Hanover contribute to the grand expedition against England but for the respect due to promises received ?

“ What pains the Emperor is to perceive a change in arrangements which he was justified in considering as unalterable ; in a word, to find that Prussia, instead of pursuing, with constant firmness, a system which she had adopted in accordance with an accurate and sagacious perception of her own individual position, as well as of the general one of Europe, appears to be awaiting events in order to regulate her policy by them ; that she begins to give way ; that the course she now pursues is somewhat retrograde ; that she has arrived at the point of supposing that a demi-guarantee would suffice under present circumstances ; circumstances so grave, which require measures the most complete, and which will not tolerate the employment of half ones.

“ Can the Emperor imagine otherwise than that the interpretation which has just been given to the explicit meaning of the assurances, so often reiterated on the part of the King, has been applied to it on the spur of the moment ? Could he foresee it when he withdrew a part of his troops ?

“ If, indeed, it be true that the guarantee of Prussia is but a partial, and, consequently, a delusive one, the Emperor’s duty will be to guarantee himself ; for such is the spirit, and such the right of war. To provide for one’s own safety is the first law.

“ Therefore, as, in the event of war being declared by Russia against France, the army of Hanover would find itself exposed to an attack, for want of that full guarantee on the part of Prussia which, up to the present time, the Emperor had reckoned upon, all he could do would be to choose one of two alternatives : either to evacuate Hanover, declining to make it his arena of battle, and abandoning it to the English, the Russians, and the

Swedes, or to despatch thither 30,000 men, seizing, in the first instance, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Swedish Pomerania, points which the enemy would not fail to make their entrepôts.

“ Now, between these two alternatives, of which honour and interest recommend the one and disapprove the other, the Emperor’s choice cannot be doubtful.

“ Nor is it a valid objection that, while a part of his forces should be thus resisting at the extremities of Germany, his enemies would collect together their own in order to effect a landing in Holland, for such a landing would be madness itself. Even supposing 100,000 Russians should disembark, they would meet with the same fate which befell their countrymen there five years ago. The amount of the French forces on the Texel and the Somme is well known. It is not one single Power that can insult France either upon her frontiers or the countries adjacent to them.

“ Generally speaking Russia is powerless against France, both on the north and the south, unless, on the former, she have Prussia for an auxiliary, and on the latter Austria. All their attempts, either with or without the co-operation of the English, would only tend to their confusion and ruin. This is a truth of which they themselves are convinced. Nothing is a stronger proof of it than their endeavours to make the King a participator in their overweening passions; to induce him, for want of something better, to restrict at least his neutrality, with the option of breaking it when his position has become deteriorated, in order that, as a last resource, they may have at their command an entrance which Prussia would no longer keep closed, knowing that one step necessarily leads to another.

“ The Emperor sees through all the designs of his enemies, and, with a rapid glance, takes in the remotest consequences. It will never happen to him to be surprised a second time, in the midst of peace, as he was by England; and he showed upon that occasion that, although treaties might be broken with him, the violators of them could not escape the activity of the military combinations which they compelled him to adopt.

“ He calculates for himself and the King the effect of the ideas which England and Russia have allowed to escape them, as well as of the latitude which Prussia has recently promised to allow to their operations. He relies upon the success of his arms, and he asks in what would a war, begun in Hanover, end? He would most certainly pursue the enemy through the States

not yet excepted from her neutrality by Prussia. Now, in the confusion inevitable both to the retreating and the advancing party, what becomes of the King's system? Thus it is that one single deviation from the first declarations made by Prussia would bring with it the destruction of her system, without, at the same time, giving her cause for the least reproach against France.

"But in the double hypothesis, either of a voluntary abandonment of the Hanoverian provinces to the Russians, the English, and the Swedes, or of a reverse of fortune which would throw all those possessions into their hands, what would then be Prussia's situation? Hemmed in on all sides by the forces of Russia, which would not act without the co-operation, promised or given, of Austria, Prussia would see her own neutrality contested, and would be reduced, even against her dearest interests, to combat France, or else to declare in her favour, with an immense disadvantage of military position.

"It therefore behoves the Emperor to have an eye upon the first hostile movements of Russia, and not to allow his enemies an opportunity of executing designs, the facility for which has been afforded them by the unexpected curtailment of the King's guarantee, and which would be productive of the most fatal consequences even for Prussia herself.

"Could the King be so unjust as to tax the Emperor with a deviation from his engagements? They rested upon a complete guarantee. It is Russia and England who have suggested a sudden distinction, the idea of which was never mooted between France and Prussia, but which has been put forward by their enemies solely from sinister views.

"The King knows well if it be the cause of the Russians he should embrace. On that side are dangers without even any possible benefit. On the contrary, an intimate union with France offers many present and certain advantages without any possible danger to counterbalance them. But few reflections are necessary to prove this.

"Let Prussia compare her resources of every kind with those of her two neighbours, Austria and Russia, and let herself decide if she possesses in an equal degree to either the actual elements of grandeur and power, and the future facilities for increasing them. It is evident she has them not.

"Austria came out of the late war not only without any diminution, but with a very considerable increase of power. She no

longer possesses, it is true, the Milanese and Belgium; but she can scarcely be said to have lost them—for disembarassed of them would be the more correct expression. Provinces separated from the body of the monarchy, Belgium especially, the perpetual cause of war for the House of Austria ever since the time of Charles V., and the defence of which has been so difficult for her, were possessions far more onerous than profitable. That they remained in the power of Austria half a century longer than was probable in 1748, was solely owing to the tempting bait which made France contract the alliance of 1756. The moment that alliance was broken they fell. And what ample compensation has not Austria received in the Venetian provinces of the Adige, at the mouths of the Cattaro, not to mention the value or the adjacent position of the indemnities she procured for herself in Germany? Nor is this the whole of her positive gain. Nothing can prevent Austria from acquiring still more on the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which, as regards her, is already almost *nil*. The services she rendered by driving out the Turks have detached from Turkey, and approximated to her, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the rest of Dalmatia. Covering her frontier they await a more intimate union with Austria, who, relieved from the necessity of employing her forces in that service, is enabled to turn them against other Powers.

“Where has not Russia been a gainer, to speak only of the last fifteen years? Courland, Poland, Lesser Tartary, the Crimea, the Caucasus, the shores of the Caspian Sea, in every direction she has aggrandized herself. Recently she has formed establishments at the mouth of the Phase, she advances towards the heart of Persia, she encircles the Turkish Empire, she dominates in Moldavia and Wallachia; and, unless we choose to blind ourselves, it is impossible not to see that the possession of the Ionian Isles will enable her to gain advantages in the Morea.

“If, in the midst of this continued, progressive, and, of late, accelerated movement, by which the greater States cease not to aggrandize themselves more and more, the Prussian Monarchy remain stationary, and, as it were, motionless, her relative power must of necessity become less and less, until at last she will find herself so reduced as to be no longer numbered amongst Powers of the first class. There is nothing around her which can be made a set-off against what Austria and Russia have already gained, and may gain, from one moment to another. Moreover,

if the means she must employ to prevent her decline be considered, means which consist in an aggrandizement proportionate to that of her neighbours, it is clear that she cannot succeed by her own unaided efforts. She would be prevented therein by the jealousy of those very neighbours whom she knows full well are her rivals and her natural enemies. This is proved by the difficulties she had to surmount, with the Russians and the Austrians, before she could obtain for herself an advantageous allotment, at least in a pecuniary point of view. Still less ought she to expect that they would be induced of themselves, in a spirit of justice, to approximate, by ever so little, her power to their own. Thus she has but one way of increasing it, and that is by a close alliance with France.

“That which others would not, and even could not do, the Emperor can, and his doing it depends upon Prussia alone. For at this very moment, when the distinction lately made surprises, afflicts, and would entitle him to the right of complaint, still faithful to his engagements, he has nothing more at heart than to give the King proofs of his friendship, and, especially, of the lively interest he takes in preserving the rank which Prussia holds among the Powers.

“The opportunity is, indeed, unique; ages will perhaps glide away before a similar one presents itself. Were it to arise, at a later period, from a combination resulting from war, it is impossible that it could be again found intimately connected with one originating in peace; and, therefore, it is particularly at a moment when a rare concurrence of circumstances constitutes it the most effective instrument for ensuring the return to the general tranquillity, that Prussia should seize and make it her own.

“It is now two years since the King desired, and he appears still to desire it, that Hanover should be placed in his hands as a deposit.

“But such a transfer would not at all have contributed to the pacification. It had, as regarded the King of England personally, the inconvenience of relieving him of a subject of uneasiness, and of prolonging his obstinacy. It would scarcely have given one pretext less to Russia, who is in the habit of exacting, and who has gradually spoken louder and louder, in proportion as she thought more attention was paid to her.

“With respect to France it would only serve to make her lose a position which, at least, is an imposing one, and to bring

still closer to her the weapons she sees preparing in the distance. It would even be a continual source of complaints as regards English merchandise, enlistments, and the exportation of weapons of war.

“It would not, besides, be laying the axe to the root of an ever renascent evil. The country of Hanover is coveted by every one, and its fate, unless it be otherwise settled, will be a continual cause of war.

“Had Paul I. lived, and Russia had had an opportunity, there might have been a suspicion that the branch of Oldenburg had a hankering after this country. The administrating Duke brought forward at Ratisbon very immoderate pretensions.

“It is difficult to believe Prussia to have been ignorant of Austria’s having openly demanded this Electorate from France for one of the Archdukes.

“Every one knows that a project once formed is, of all things, the one least forgotten at Vienna, and that this Court, ever on the watch for events, returns constantly, with the utmost address, to the wishes she has once announced. Can any one say what she would dare to ask of a coalition of which she was a member, if a Russian, English, and Swedish army should succeed in seizing those provinces? Prussia understands the language which the English at London and the Anglo-Russians at St. Petersburg hold respecting her neutrality, and how anxious they are to find an opportunity of making her repent it, since as they cannot yet compel her to renounce it in their favour.

“Had Austria obtained her object four years ago, or should she one day attain it, Prussia would be unable to avoid war, for it would be necessary both for her honour and her independence.

“On the other hand, if, in consequence of occupying the country of Hanover, and of having there contracted long indulged and ever recurring habits, it should one day happen that France wished to remain in that Electorate during the peace, war would again be inevitable, for France does not dissemble that between Prussia and her there is one point where the interests of both are incompatible, and that point is Hanover.

“The King of England and his Ministry, therefore, have, for the last two years, omitted no opportunity of protesting that Hanover shall never be received as a compensation, and this has been done, doubtless, with the view of inducing France to declare that she would keep it, and by this means compromise her with Prussia.

“ And how many more times yet will not France be compelled to seek, in the temporary occupation of Hanover, a means of infusing pacific sentiments into the reigning family of England? We must not deceive ourselves; until the Cabinet of London has had proof upon proof of the impossibility of realising her vast plans of maritime, colonial, and commercial domination, France can never rely upon any peace she may have signed with England. A respectable navy will be her only security. The English policy will always profit by continental disturbances to endeavour to destroy this navy, and France will ever have recourse to the same expedients.

“ Thus the destiny of Hanover will, on all sides, present to Prussia a threatening future. Prussia alone has the greatest of all interests for uniting that country to her monarchy; and she is seen to place her hopes in projects of barter, and in sudden changes which will be constantly counteracted by neighbours who are for ever watching her movements. She must now play a skilful game, and, while appearing to accept that Electorate, by way of deposit, must make an agreement with France to keep it.

“ The Emperor is ready to transfer it to the King in full proprietorship. It is a conquest of which he disposes. He guarantees to her the possession of it, and he will make the cession of this Electorate to Prussia, a *sine quâ non* condition of peace with England. Prussia will then approach the position which has been the object of her wishes, but she certainly will not have repaired the relative inequality which the advances of Austria and Russia have placed between the three States; she will, however, have accepted all that which fortune and personal friendship can offer her up to this moment, and will also have the means of turning the chances of the future to her advantage; she will have caused additional strength to be given to the provinces, whose future destination may cause her much embarrassment, and plunge her, at least, into costly wars. The English will no longer have upon the Continent a *point-d'appui*, whence to excite disturbances. The French, who so many times have carried their arms into Hanover, and who have contracted there so many ties, will quit it for ever. All the germs of division between France and Prussia, which might, some day or other, bud forth, will be destroyed, in order to make room for a complete community of interests. Lastly, the peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the measures which France and Prussia will employ in concert.

“ For this it will be sufficient for Prussia to say *that she will make common cause with France in every war which shall have for object to change its present condition in Italy.*

“ It would be a grave error to judge of present times by those which preceded them. A general feeling of uneasiness agitates Europe, and it appears that every Power, dissatisfied with its position, is desirous of changing it. A hollow rumbling announces a storm, and England fans the flame. If it bursts, the consequences will baffle foresight.

“ It has been already observed that Prussia must not, in that case, hope to remain a passive spectator of events. Drawn into the vortex, compelled to fight upon the ground assigned her by chance, because she will no longer be in time to choose it, she will vainly regret not having foreseen misfortunes it will then be beyond her power to prevent.

“ She may, however, contribute to counteract them in future, but not by a temporising system, by showing herself always ready to wait, but never to act; it is by measures worthy of the gravity of circumstances, by opposing to raging passions a mass which may intimidate them, in short an alliance such as is now proposed to her by France, and it is only in such an alliance that a multitude of States can find their safety.

“ On the first symptoms of agitation, which appeared on the Continent in consequence of the intrigues of England, and shortly after the declaration of war against France, the King thought that the example of a strongly declared neutrality would preserve Russia, and, *à fortiori*, Austria, in the same line of impartiality, and for a long time he succeeded in preventing an explosion. But the English were not to be discouraged. The question is known to have been debated at London and at St. Petersburg whether they could not do without Prussia, provided she were not secretly bound to France. It was, therefore, upon Austria, who, if her weakness were not strengthened by subsidies, and her ambition gratified by conquest, desired nothing but breathing time, that every effort was concentrated. Does the King doubt that, the party once formed, advantage will not be taken of the very first success, it is hoped fortune may bestow, to maintain their resolutions? were the success of this coalition within the range of possibility, would not the King be apprehensive that even the power of following the torrent may not be left him? He may read every day in twenty pamphlets, and in the English newspapers, he may learn by reports of the language

now very common at St. Petersburg, that the crippling of a Power so troublesome as his is already spoken of.

“Everything, then, shews the necessity of a new attitude in order to save Europe from very great misfortunes, upon which England, who only thinks of saving, amid the tumult, the trident of the ocean, seeks to hoodwink Russia and Austria. And the more the King will collect together into one point of view the preceding ideas, the more he will be convinced that the Emperor is now suggesting to him the only means of peace.

“A beginning must be made by adopting the principle of the actual cession of the country of Hanover to Prussia in exchange for her pure and simple guarantee of the *status præsens* of Italy, in favour of France, that is to say, of the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, as it now is, and of the maintenance of the union of *Genoa*, *Parma*, *Placentia*, and *Piedmont* with the French Empire.

“The Emperor and the King would soon agree about the details. The treaty could, besides, be kept secret as long as might be wished, and every means which should be considered necessary for rendering it palatable to Europe would be employed.

“A superficial view may induce the fear that a war would result from a public measure directed, generally, against those who might be inclined to disturb the peace of the Continent. Well, even suppose a war should result, where would be the danger for Prussia, when the Emperor would furnish her, if necessary, with 80,000 men against the Russians, and when she would have for her auxiliaries, Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, and the Electorate of Baden? The Emperor would guarantee to these the *reces* of the Empire, and to the King the possession of the Electorate of Hanover, whilst his allies would only have to guarantee the present *status quo* of Italy.

“Besides these are not the times when Frederick the Great, the ally of Louis XV. and afterwards of George II., had reason to complain of the want of energy of the two Courts, and found himself, a hero, all alone. France governed by the present Emperor offers to the King a more solid support. Why can he not consult his immortal great uncle?

“But the importance of the doubt upon the preservation of peace is too great not to deserve a serious examination. It must above all be considered that the continuation of the maritime war is essentially based by England upon the hope of

a continental one. This basis once destroyed, the maritime war has no longer any thing to rest upon; for it is now proved to the Cabinet of London itself, that the attainment of the objects it had in view in renewing hostilities with France, is impossible. And since it is equally clear that Austria would not dare, and consequently, that Russia would not be able, to declare a continental war, from the moment Prussia shall have said, that she would take part in it, in concert with France, the King will then have the glory of arranging, to his own advantage, the peace between France and England.

“It would argue but a slight knowledge of the character of the English Government to suppose that it would break off the negotiations, and make a fresh appeal to the continental passions, as soon as the time was come for notifying to it that Hanover must be ceded to Prussia.

“1. Russia and Austria would respect, both before and after the King’s declaration, a union of continental forces, which it would be rashness itself to attack.

“2. The peace between France and England will never be made by His Britannic Majesty, but by the nation, as was that of America. All the predilections of this Sovereign for Hanover are nothing to the Parliament; every good Englishman will be delighted at being politically separated from the Continent, and at no longer having to take part in the wars into which Great Britain is continually being dragged by the German possessions of its Sovereign.

“3. At the worst, there is no political combination at London, which, supported by a very great majority, does not desire to give up a country, of which France would take possession at the very first cannon shot, and which would have, afterwards, to be redeemed by maritime sacrifices.

“4. Undoubtedly some compensation must be given by France for the loss of Hanover, and as this can only be done by a greater pliability as regards the arrangements relative to the two Indies, every English ministry would consider the personal loss of the Sovereign as the gain of the nation at large.

“Thus the difficulty of peace with England in no respect becomes increased: that of the Continent is no longer problematical; England, by being strengthened, sees a necessity

for replying to the overtures of France; the Emperor is sure of the assent he will require, and Prussia obtains, at the least possible risk, if, indeed, there be even the shadow of one, all that is necessary for the maintenance of her power.

“These happy results lie wholly in that singular conjunction of fugitive events of which ability knows how to avail itself. The King will, no doubt, appreciate the disinterestedness of the Emperor, who, upon this occasion, is not actuated by any views of personal aggrandizement, or, above all, by any personal apprehensions. For, on the one hand, the Emperor does not think there is any probability of war, for the present. It appears to him that when two countries are so distant from each other as are Russia and France, intrigue, senseless prattle and insult are separated by an immense interval from actual hostilities. Should, however, war break out, he is prepared, he has calculated all the chances, and entertains not the least doubt, even supposing a union between Austria and Russia. On the other hand, the Emperor only asks for the guarantee of that which no one can deprive him of, he offers to the King, by right of acquisition, that of which the King has spoken to him merely as a right of deposit; lastly, it is for France to render an account of this transaction to England. What then can make the King hesitate?

“Is it a spirit of moderation? But the spirit of his ancestors, the glory of his family, the interest of his people, the geographical position of his monarchy, the necessity of maintaining a certain balance of power among his neighbours, the evident danger of falling into a comparatively inferior position, all these considerations should induce him to analyze the nature of a sovereign’s moderation. It does not consist in remaining stationary, when all around him is on the increase; for a prince cannot be said to preserve his dominions, when he neglects the means of keeping them upon a level with others. It has often been remarked, that a State which does not increase, decreases, a maxim which has never been found so strictly true as in the present age. No doubt, moderation proscribes wars originating in ambition; and forbids that Europe should be convulsed that some neighbour may be despoiled. But the question is now to tranquillize Europe, and, after all, it is not upon a neighbour that the expenses are made to fall; the British Empire will not be less powerful thereby, and the English are longing to be rid of Hanover, where their self pride is too often humiliated.

“Can it be a kind of point of honour attached to the preservation of a neutrality the assurance of which the King has recently everywhere renewed? But when the war commenced between France and England, Russia and Austria declared their neutrality in the same way as Prussia. Judging from the preparations being made by them, it would appear that the one is desirous of making war, while the other defends itself with difficulty against being instigated thereto. What should the King say, but this: *that he will cease to be neuter, if others depart from their neutrality.* His character would acquire additional lustre by an explanation so natural, so salutary for humanity, so conformable to the sentiments he has manifested since the very beginning of the maritime war. Of what was he then desirous but to expel from the Continent the mania for war? What is he now desirous of doing, but to show that he is always advancing to the same goal, although by a different road? It is no ordinary glory to be able to address the *quos ego* to the Powers who might differ from his pacific wishes.

“Could it be a repugnance to receive a third of the German inheritance of the family of Brunswick Lunebourg, and to nullify the rights of reversion of that of Brunswick Wolfenbüttele? A great many considerations here present themselves.

“The King may be actuated by the noble emulation of standing forth as an example, and of forgetting that even the most modern histories furnish a thousand such. But would the reigning family in England be in this case despoiled? has it not one of the splendid diadems of Europe and vast possessions in all parts of the globe? Would it have been unjust to make it contribute to the mass of the Germanic indemnifications for all that its ambition has cost the Continent during the last war? Is it unjust in the present day to make it pay for the losses occasioned by the inexcusable blockade of the Elbe and the Weser, and for all the gold of which its monopolists have drained the Continent? It is less a wrong which would be inflicted on the House of Brunswick Lunebourg than a service rendered to an unfortunate portion of Germany, which ought no longer to suffer from a connection condemned by the very nature of things. Lastly, ought not His Britannic Majesty to give a full consent to the King’s possession before signing the peace? It appears that nothing will be wanting to the legitimacy of the title which the King will have received from the conqueror.

“As to the House of Brunswick Wolfenbüttele, it must be

owned that its eventual right is so remote as to be scarcely appreciable; so considerable the difference between the great number of the heirs of the line still in possession and the small number of the heirs of the substituted one; so much uncertainty is there as to the future destiny of Hanover, should the King hesitate to determine it.

“The arrangement of the indemnities would have been an interminable business but for an unflinching appreciation of rights of this description; in addition to which the King, will be fully master to act towards the House of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel, in the way suggested by his sense of what is right and dignified.

“An opportunity may, perhaps, hereafter present itself of entering into more ample developments as regards the honourable colouring which the Cabinet of Berlin cannot fail to give to the proposition made by the Emperor to the King, as well as upon the manner of making it contribute to the satisfaction of the Electoral Courts; the facilities which the union of Hanover with Prussia would furnish for the settlement of the questions still remaining in suspense at the Diet; and the arrangements, satisfactory even for Austria and Russia, which would result therefrom. But these are subordinate details. The Emperor offers Hanover purely and simply, and it is for the King himself to determine what would be generous towards his co-Germanic States.”

No. 22.

Translation of the ANSWER of the PRUSSIAN CABINET to the MINUTE
of M. DE LA FOREST.

1805.

“The more faithful the King is to his engagements, the greater has been the regret with which he has seen that a difference of opinion can exist between himself and His Majesty the Emperor upon the guarantee of the tranquillity of the north of Germany. The King understood, in all sincerity, that this guarantee could not concern Hanover itself. At the time when the engagements which established it were entered into, that country, belonging to a Power who was the enemy of France, found itself effectively, in a *state of war*; it was occupied by the French troops; and the sole object of the guarantee was the better to secure to Prussia

and her allies, on the one hand, *the state of peace and neutrality*; and, on the other, to France, that she could not be attacked by land throughout the whole extent which surrounds the country of Hanover. There could not be a question of the peninsula between the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, because the means of Prussia would be insufficient to prevent a landing from being there effected. It is held by the French troops, and they are more than enough to oppose any similar enterprise in a country resembling Holland, presenting even greater difficulties, and offering but very few points where landings are practicable. The guarantee could not have been extended to these countries, except in the case of their having been protected by Prussian troops.

“The King has most assuredly nothing more at heart than to draw still closer and closer those happy relations, founded upon a wise policy, which subsist between Prussia and France.

“All he wishes is to give to His Majesty the Emperor proofs of his friendship and confidence; and it is with the liveliest sensibility that he received, as a fresh token of these sentiments on the part of His Imperial Majesty, the proposition which His Imperial Majesty has caused to be made to him through the medium of M. de la Forest.

“Rendering the fullest justice to the solidity of the arguments with which that proposition has been accompanied, His Majesty will willingly enter into subsequent explanations upon the important object of which it treats. He approves also, with unfeigned satisfaction, of the plan of His Imperial Majesty for making the agreement proposed, upon the cession of Hanover to Prussia, serve as a counterbalance to the guarantee of the *status præsens* in Italy, in preventing the war upon the Continent, and in even forwarding the peace with England.

“But in order to attain this object, it appears to him indispensably necessary that the independence of the rest of Italy, not included in the States which Prussia would guarantee, also of the Batavian Republic and of Helvetia, should be equally well secured and guaranteed.

“The King supposes that this is the intention of the Emperor; and if His Imperial Majesty would be pleased to give him a positive explanation thereon, His Majesty will with pleasure occupy himself with the details necessary for them to arrive at a definitive understanding.

(Signed)

“HARDENBURG.”

In the autumn of this year (1805) the Russian and Austrian Governments declared war against France, and the French Emperor (with the view of turning the position which was occupied by the Austrian army at Ulm) violated the Prussian territory by passing a corps of troops through Anspach. Every exertion was then made to induce the Prussian Government to join the allies against France. The Emperor Alexander repaired to Berlin, and the Earl of Harrowby was sent there from England, but their exertions were counteracted by the deep-rooted desire of neutrality which had so long been inculcated by Count Haugwitz, and from which he expected, amidst the crash of the falling empires which surrounded him, to secure solid advantages for his master. Notwithstanding the personal feeling of the King, and that even the day was named on which Prussia should declare herself against France, Count Haugwitz, who had been sent with the Prussian Ultimatum to Bonaparte, though he found him at Vienna, consented to allow him to quit that capital for his head-quarters in Moldavia before having entered upon the negotiation with which he was charged, so that the fatal battle of Austerlitz was fought before he had executed the purpose of his mission. From that moment the Prussian Government endeavoured to extricate itself from the embarrassment which its apparent hostility had created in its relations with France; and, although it had committed no act, had made no declaration which could prove the feelings by which it was actuated, yet its general conduct had too clearly demonstrated its secret intentions to leave a hope they could be concealed from the French Government. In remodelling the States of Europe which had fallen under the grasp of the French Emperor, the consent of the King of Prussia to the different arrangements was insisted upon, and the cession of Hanover

was now again proposed to him as an indemnity for cessions of territory to which he was required to accede. This proposition was reluctantly accepted ; but, previous to its final settlement, Bonaparte had commenced a negotiation for peace with the British Government, the groundwork of which was the restitution of Hanover to the King of England. The Marquis Lucchesini discovered and communicated this fact to the Prussian Cabinet, and the discussions which ensued upon this exposure of the duplicity of the French Government brought about the war between France and Prussia, which was immediately followed by the battle of Jena.

The total overthrow of the Prussian army in this action, which was the result of the inactivity, the irresolution, and, if it may be so expressed, the inexperience of the superior officers who commanded it, and who had not been engaged in any serious warfare since the Seven Years' War, laid the kingdom at the feet of the French Emperor. By the temporising policy of the first minister of Prussia, this contest had been brought upon his country when she stood alone against the power of Napoleon. Had it been undertaken but a few months before, while Austria and Russia were in unbroken force, the chances would have been more favourable ; had it been delayed till the Russian, auxiliaries, which were on their march, had joined the Prussian forces, or had been near enough to have afforded them support, the disaster of a defeat could not have been so irreparable ; but weakness and incapacity in statesmen are generally accompanied by vanity and self-conceit, and such was essentially the case on the present occasion. When Count Haugwitz discovered that, notwithstanding the obsequious policy he had used towards the French Government, he was betrayed by it, he plunged his country into war, and boasting the traditional renown of the Prussian army under the

great Frederic, relied upon it for the triumph of his cause. When this army was defeated and dispersed, when nearly the whole of its separated corps were captured, and when the fortresses of the kingdom, unprepared for defence, surrendered to the victors, he had no resources by which to arrest the progress of the enemy, or to stem the torrent of devastation he had brought upon his country. The correspondence which follows will prove the abject state to which the unfortunate Sovereign of Prussia was reduced, and the contemptuous manner in which he was treated.

No. 23.

Translation of a LETTER from the EMPEROR NAPOLEON to the KING of
PRUSSIA.

“ SIR, MY BROTHER,

“ I have received Your Majesty’s letter. I much regret that the one which I sent to you by an orderly officer who arrived in your camp on the 13th, failed to prevent the battle of the 14th. Any suspension of arms by which time would be given for the arrival of the Russian armies, whom you appear to have invited last winter, would be too contrary to my interests for me to subscribe to, however great may be my desire to spare humanity the calamities and victims of war. I do not fear the Russians; they are no longer a cloudy vapour for me; I saw them the last campaign. But Your Majesty will have to complain of them much more than I: the one-half of your dominions will be the theatre of war, and from that moment will have to endure all the calamities of it; and the other part will be ravaged by your allies, and will have to suffer still more.

“ I shall ever regret that two nations, who for so many reasons ought to be united, should be drawn into a contest for which there is so little cause. The chief instigators of it have become its first victims. I must however once more repeat to Your Majesty that I shall regard with satisfaction the means of re-establishing, if that be possible, the former confidence which reigned between us, and of reconciling the sentiments I entertain for you with my duty and the security of my people, which has

again, within the space of fifteen years, been endangered by a fourth coalition.

“Upon which I pray God, Sir, my brother, to have you in his holy and blessed keeping.

(Signed)

“NAPOLEON.

“From my Imperial Camp,
Oct. 19, 1806.”

No. 24.

Translation of a LETTER from the KING of PRUSSIA to the MARQUIS
LUCCHESINI.

“I forward to you annexed a copy of the letter which the Emperor Napoleon has sent me by my aide-de-camp, Count de Dönhoff, and of the answer which I have just returned to His Imperial Majesty. I have not adverted therein to the suspicion which that Sovereign appears to entertain of my having last winter invited Russia to join her forces to mine, because you will no doubt have found an opportunity ere this of convincing His Imperial Majesty how much he wrongs me in this respect, and with what repugnance it was that I decided upon taking this step even then, when events which are yet recent compelled me in fact to consider it as an indispensable one for the safety of my dominions. I understand too well how to appreciate the interests of the latter not to sacrifice, in favour of solid and permanent relations with France, those which I have contracted for no other cause than on account of the dangers with which I had reason to believe I was threatened on the part of His Imperial Majesty. The immediate dismissal of the Russian armies is a first step for which I am fully prepared, if the overtures with which you are charged be received at all, and that your reports inform me as to what I am to expect; but the uncertainty I have been in ever since your departure must be no further prolonged. It is highly important that I should know what I have to depend upon, and I therefore beg you most earnestly to put a speedy termination to the state of indecision and doubt in which your silence has kept me up to the present moment. I trust you will be able to do so, for the Emperor himself wrote to me that he would regard with satisfaction the means of re-establishing the former confidence which reigned between us. By sending you to him, I have offered him the facility of so doing. On my part no foreign engagement shall oppose any obstacle. Pledge my word, I repeat, to the Emperor, that it shall not. I most sin-

cerely desire peace with him. I wish to draw still closer my ties with France, and all that is necessary to fulfil this wish is again to find her Sovereign such as he represents himself to be in his letter. Why then do we not come to an understanding without loss of time? And wherefore does the march of the French troops, who are continually advancing, compel me against my will to avail myself of the resources still left me, and of the forces which Russia has ordered to advance in my defence?

(Signed)

“FREDERICK WILLIAM.

“Custrin, Oct. 25, 1806.

“To the Minister of State the

“Marquis Lucchesini.”

No. 25.

Translation of a REPORT from the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI and GENERAL ZASTROW to the KING of PRUSSIA.

“SIRE,

“Charlottenburg, Oct. 28, 1806.

“We consider it our duty to unite together in order to make, by your Majesty’s command, a Report in common respecting the result of the negotiation Your Majesty was pleased to entrust us with.

“I, Zastrow, shall therefore commence by informing you, Sire, that, upon my arriving at Münchenburg, the officer there in command of the French advanced post caused me to be escorted to Friedrichsfeld, where Marshal Davoust had established his head-quarters.

“I reached that place on the night of the 16th, at half-past eleven o’clock, but the Marshal absolutely refused to allow me to proceed any further before he received the Emperor’s orders, which an aide-de-camp was immediately despatched to obtain. He found the Emperor at Charlottenburg, and returned at seven o’clock in the morning to Friedrichsfeld, with the answer that Prince Berthier, to whom he had spoken, would communicate the Emperor’s intentions upon his awaking.

“On the 27th, at eleven o’clock, A.M., I at last obtained permission to depart, and arrived at Charlottenburg at 2 o’clock in the afternoon, at the very moment the Emperor was preparing to mount his horse in order to make his *entrée* into Berlin. Notwithstanding this I had the good fortune of being presented to His Majesty by Marshal Duroc, and of delivering to him my

credentials. The Emperor received me with kindness and affability, and I had reason to flatter myself that I was not personally disagreeable to him. I informed him of the object of my mission, and expressed to him Your Majesty's anxious solicitude for the cessation of hostilities and the re-establishment of peace.

"The Emperor asked me if the Russians were already on the Prussian territory. I replied, I would not conceal from His Majesty that, according to the latest intelligence received at Custrin, it was possible that the heads of columns might be, at this very moment entering Prussia by the way of Grodno, but I immediately added that you, Sire, were impatiently awaiting a re-assuring word from the Emperor, in order to cause them to march back again. 'Ah!' cried he, sharply, interrupting me, 'if the Russians make their appearance I shall march against and beat them.' 'That would be,' replied I, 'an additional glory for Your Majesty, and one misfortune more for Prussia, who would see the theatre of the war extended in her provinces.' I repeated the positive assurance that, the very moment the preliminaries of peace should be signed, Your Majesty would hasten to cause those auxiliaries to quit the Prussian territory. The Emperor being on the point of dismissing me without saying anything to me on the subject of my mission, I asked him to whom I was to address myself for that purpose, and, as I expected, he named General Duroc.

"This General had evinced towards me (Lucchesini) the same hostile feelings which the Emperor entertained against the Prussians, feelings revived by a trifling success which General Grouchy, who commanded five regiments of cavalry under Prince Murat, must have gained, the preceding evening, over the cavalry of Prince Hohenlohe's advanced guard. I had ascertained, upon this occasion, that the *corps-d'armée* of this Prince was in danger of being surrounded by several *corps-d'armée*, who had all marched against him. However, when we both met again, immediately after the Emperor's departure, for the purpose of asking General Duroc when and where we could conclude with him the Treaty for which we both possessed the full powers, as well as the most ample instructions, he desired us, in conformity with the Emperor's orders, to remain at Charlottenburg, and there draw up the draft of the preliminary articles for the bases of a Treaty of Peace, promising to call upon us the next morning, in order to commence the negotiations. He accordingly came about nine o'clock on the morning of the 28th. We laid

before him the draft of the preliminary Convention, consisting of seven articles, setting forth the sacrifices Your Majesty was ready to make for the re-establishment of peace, the conditions of the armistice which should immediately follow the signing of this act, the arrangement for the breaking up of the French troops after the exchange of the ratifications, and the engagement for the immediate opening of the conferences for the conclusion of the definitive peace. In his turn General Duroc made us read a draft of articles which the Emperor had dictated to him, and which were to serve as the bases of the peace.

“ It contained the enumeration of all the countries to be ceded by Your Majesty to France. This enumeration included, Sire, all that you possess on the left bank of the Elbe, comprising therein even the Principality of Halle. The rest of the Duchy of Magdeburg and of the Province of the old March of Brandenburg, which are also situated on the left bank of that river, was all that was reserved for Your Majesty. In naming the Electorate of Hanover it was expressly added, *and the Duchy of Lauenburg*.

“ The other article concerned the recognition of the Confederation of the Rhine, which is extended to Saxony and all the rest of Germany.

“ The article upon the cessions differed from ours by the claim we put in for the country of Halberstadt and that of Halle, with the Countship of Mansfeld as an equivalent for that of Lauenburg, situated upon the right bank of the Elbe. A detailed discussion ensued between General Duroc and ourselves upon these differences, as well as upon the reasons of our demand, and upon the principle continually advanced by the Emperor Napoleon in this painful negotiation, viz., that he required the enfeeblement of Prussia as a guarantee for the certainty that she would not attack him again within two years' time. This unfortunate principle, which I, Lucchesini, had hitherto vainly endeavoured to combat in my frequent conferences with General Duroc, both at Potsdam and here, is the sole cause of our efforts, whether single or united, to obtain somewhat more tolerable conditions, having constantly failed. Our devotedness, our honour, and the interest of the nation, have made us, Sire, strain every nerve to remove from Napoleon's mind the idea that, unless he deprive Prussia of the power of action for many years to come, the desire of vengeance will constantly arm her against France. Unfortunately, Sire, he

exaggerates the amount of the population of the States which still remain to you, and underrates it in those of which he exacts the cession. Believe me, Sire, to have insisted on the line of the Weser was to break off the negotiation. The wish to cross the Oder, in order to continue the war with 80,000 men, leaving in the Marches of Brandenburg a *corps d'armée* making together from 30,000 to 35,000 men, is a fact generally known and proved. He bears the Russians a grudge, accusing them of being the cause of the prolongation of the maritime war. Judging from the conversation which he had with me, Zastrow, and from the positive and multiplied facts and information we have made it our business to collect, there can be not the least doubt of Napoleon's extreme desire of avoiding any opportunity of being reconciled to Your Majesty, and thereby of abandoning the vast schemes he has very probably concocted, should the continuation of the war conduct him to the Vistula.

"It is certain, Sire, that the plan of causing an insurrection in Poland, and of giving the inhabitants of that country a King, is already formed, and that the persons intended to execute it are acquainted with the fact. Circumstances so grave, accompanied by means so considerable as would be able to reduce the monarchy to the very verge of ruin, have imposed upon us, Sire, the painful duty of removing the possibility of such an event by accepting the conditions offered to us by the Emperor.

"On our part we have not forgotten any of the points which Your Majesty deigned to recommend to our zeal. The fate of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick, and that of the family of the Prince of Orange, have in vain been made the subject of our most earnest appeals, until the most decided refusal deprived us of the hope even of the least success. We then thought it our duty to remain silent, lest we should irritate the Emperor Napoleon still more against those two Princes. The principal reproach made against the Duke of Brunswick is founded upon the manifesto he was obliged to sign in 1792, before he entered Champagne. The chief complaints alleged against His Highness the Prince of Orange consist in a pretended animosity of this Prince against France and her present Sovereign, which has induced him to become one of the principal instigators of the present war. It appears that the Emperor even imputes to him certain proceedings which are at variance with the submission due to Sovereigns from those who have the honour of being in their service. The hope, however, should not be abandoned that, in

the negotiations of the definite Treaty of Peace, the intervention of Your Majesty may succeed in preserving to these two illustrious families some portions of their private estates and property, nor, in order to accomplish this object, shall any exertions of ours be wanting.

“ Charlottenburg, 29th Oct. 1806.

“ In the well-founded expectation that, by the return of Marshal Duroc with the Emperor's orders and full powers, we should have been able to have completed, in the course of yesterday, the preliminaries of peace, we hastened to draw up our first humble Report of yesterday's date. Unfortunately last night passed without the General's returning to Charlottenburg, and we have been equally disappointed of seeing him this morning. Impatient that the end of so urgent an affair should be deferred, at eleven o'clock, A.M., we wrote him a letter, in which we expressed to him our surprise at so prolonged an absence, the more especially as the entire acquiescence of Your Majesty in the conditions demanded by the Emperor ought to have ensured the termination of the negotiations last night.

“ General Duroc replied by the very humble letter annexed in the original. Surprised at finding therein the assurance that, although the Emperor had been exactly informed of our conversation the preceding evening, and had, moreover, been spoken to on the subject in the morning, he had, notwithstanding, left the Imperial head-quarters without giving any subsequent orders in the matter: burning with impatience to forward to Your Majesty the news of the signature of the preliminary Convention; fearing also that warlike spirit which impels the Emperor to seek for opportunities of prolonging wars, we lost not a moment in drawing up the annexed very humble note, a copy of which was forwarded before 5 o'clock in the afternoon to the French negotiator. The object of its contents was, in fact, to induce the Emperor to keep his word, and, as he had no longer any pretext for tergiversation, to urge him to authorise Marshal Duroc to conclude, and to furnish us with the means of executing the suspension of hostilities. In the mean time, the city of Berlin, and all the country occupied by the French troops, are treated with an unexampled cruelty, and the excessive irritation arising from exorbitant claims will soon drive the inhabitants to a state of despair. Contributions and requisitions are accumulating every instant, and it is easy to suppose that, being desirous of doubling the

impositions upon the Prussian States, the Emperor delays signing a Convention which Your Majesty took the generous and indispensable resolution of charging yourself with.

“Charlottenburg, 30th Oct. 1806.

“General Duroc has, at last, arrived at Charlottenburg, this day, at eleven o'clock, A.M. : he commenced by confirming the intelligence which had reached us last night, that the whole of Prince Hohenlohe's corps had been made prisoners on the 27th, and that those of General Blucher and of the Duke de Weimar, followed and surrounded, could not fail falling into the hands of the French corps who are pursuing them. After these disagreeable preambles he declared to us that the Emperor only waited for the acceptance of the three points destined to serve for the basis of the peace, in order that the negotiations for the definite Treaty should be immediately commenced, but that he could not consent to the cessation of hostilities by an armistice which would arrest his successes before the Treaty of Peace had put an end to the war. General Duroc gave us to understand that the Emperor, absolutely refusing any diminution whatever of the sacrifices exacted from Prussia, availed himself of our delays in signing to defeat, one after another, Your Majesty's *corps d'armée*. The overtures expressed the most positive refusal to sign a preliminary Convention, by which the French army would be compelled to stop its march at the place wherever it might be when the signature of this act was announced to it. They also left no alternative between the hope of immediately commencing the negotiation of the definite Treaty of Peace and the prospect of seeing, on their march hence towards the Oder, seizing every place on the road, and advancing thence to the Vistula, 100,000 Frenchmen, reinforced by the Polish insurgents; against all which forces 15,000 Prussians, assembled on the right bank of the Vistula, and 50,000 effective combatants, would probably make but an ineffective resistance. We presume to flatter ourselves that Your Majesty will not suspect us of being wanting in zeal, energy, and firmness, when we endeavoured to obtain from General Duroc, in exchange for our acceptance of the proposed bases, the engagement that, during the course of the negotiations, the French troops should undertake no enterprise either against Magdeburg or Stettin, and that they should remain on the left bank of the Oder. We declared ourselves ready, on our part, to engage that Your Majesty should, in your turn, cause the

auxiliary Russian troops also to halt in the place wherever they might happen to be. General Duroc protested he could not take upon himself such an engagement, but he promised to propose it to the Emperor; and, supporting it by all the reasons we had advanced, obtain, without loss of time, his orders respecting it. There now remained the crushing article of the contribution, upon which there are no kind of arguments, no calculations or comparisons with the population of Austria, no protestations, no prayers, but what have been vainly exhausted in order to diminish the exorbitant sum of 100 millions of francs to a less unreasonable amount. General Duroc declared to us that we could not obtain peace but by burdening ourselves with this enormous contribution, for the paying which the Emperor pretended to assert that more than sufficient specie was to be found in the Treasury and the Bank. Aware of all the advantages of his present position, Napoleon admits neither arguments nor remonstrances; and, as the chances which the lapse of time may bring with it cannot but tend to his advantage, we have no other means of preserving the monarchy from a dissolution, urged by more than one ambitious man, than by affixing our signatures to the act very humbly hereunto annexed, and of which the immediate effect would be the opening of the overtures for the definite Treaty of Peace. This Treaty, Sire, besides the articles of mere formality, will stipulate the manner and the periods for the respective evacuations of the fortresses and countries occupied or ceded, as well as the conditions of the payments of the contribution. As upon the full execution of this last article will depend the entire evacuation of the Prussian States by the French troops, it appears to us very important that we should not be delayed, in the drawing up of the articles, by the want of instructions or of positive information. We, therefore, entreat Your Majesty to take the necessary measures for raising the funds, either for the payment in cash of a part of this contribution, or for meeting the engagements entered into by foreign bankers for the other conditions of the said contribution. The person empowered by Your Majesty for this operation will have to treat here with M. Daru, the Emperor's comptroller of finances, and with M. Esteur, his private treasurer.

“ At the close of our long conference with General Duroc we again insisted upon the necessity and the propriety of the suspension of hostile movements in the direction of the Oder. We pressed these new solicitations, presuming that Your Majesty

might be desirous of approaching the seat of the negotiations by re-establishing your head-quarters at Custrin. In fact, if that were possible, not only should we possess the incalculable advantage of being nearer to the source of orders and instructions, but we are persuaded that the Emperor Napoleon would consider this return as a fresh proof, Sire, of the more complete separation, on your part, from the hopes, the views, the counsels, and the armies, of the Emperor of Russia. Under this point of view it might prove of some utility to you, Sire, to receive, on the return of Major De Kauch, some information as to the march of the Russian *corps d'armées* destined to serve as your auxiliaries. Their force is already known to Napoleon, but that monarch pretends already to possess the information that the whole Russian army placed upon a war footing menaces the Porte. General Dowbroski is in the suite of the Emperor of the French. All the instructions prepared by me, Zastrow, for announcing the suspension of hostilities can only be forwarded at the moment of the signature of peace. General Duroc has led us to hope that we shall have, this evening, the passport and the necessary orders for the posts for the departure of the couriers. In this expectation we have the honour to be, with respect, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ LUCCHESINI.

“ ZASTROW.”

No. 26.

Translation of a REPORT from MARQUIS LUCCHESINI and GENERAL ZASTROW to the KING.

“ SIRE,

“ Charlottenburg, Nov. 5, 1806.

“ We resume, with sorrow, the thread of the narratives transmitted to Your Majesty on the 13th ultimo by Major de Kauch. In the evening of the 1st November Prince of Benevente, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived at Berlin. We addressed to him, the same day, a note, a copy of which is very humbly hereunto annexed *sub litt.* A, and, in consequence of the friendly relations existing between that Minister and me, Lucchesini, I added to the official document, a confidential letter for the purpose of interesting his private sympathies in favour of the object of our common request. The next day a carriage was sent from the city by the Prince of Benevente, bringing me a friendly invitation to proceed immediately to the hotel formerly occupied by the Sieur Laforest, where the Minister was

residing. Receiving me in a manner so friendly as to leave me nothing to wish for in this respect, he gave me so much the less cause for satisfaction in his quality of Minister of the Emperor Napoleon. He began by excusing his silence upon the official questions which we had addressed to him the evening before, alleging the want of instructions from the Emperor. He then told me that, as regarded the object I had so much and so justly at heart, he must absolutely confine himself to declaring to me that the Emperor had not yet made up his mind either as to the time or the mode of the pacification with Prussia. He did not conceal from me, as General Duroc had constantly done, that the Emperor was unfortunately resolved to weaken the Prussian monarchy as much as possible, for the purpose of depriving her, for a long time to come, of the power to injure France; for, he added, that having constantly found the ill effects of treating the Powers whom he had vanquished with generosity, and being unwilling to expose himself any longer to the necessity of combating, on each return of spring, a new Coalition, Napoleon was considering the means by which he might establish, in the north of Europe, such an order of things as might henceforth guarantee him from similar enterprises. From these avowals, I necessarily inferred that the bases and conditions of the peace proposed and accepted on the 30th of October, would not yet lead us to the cessation of hostilities and to the signature of a treaty of peace. If the force of justice and of our arguments could have combated with success the determinations of the Emperor, my zeal and the goodness of our cause would have furnished me with the means of triumphing over the unforeseen opposition which the opening of the negotiations for the conclusion of the peace met with. The Prince of Benevente, however, assured me that the Emperor was endeavouring to reconcile Your Majesty's wish for peace with his own security and interests, and he protested that if that Sovereign intended to weaken, he was very far from wishing to humiliate you. Then changing his diplomatic discourse into a familiar conversation, this Minister did not conceal from me his regret at finding the Emperor excessively indisposed towards Prussia, less on account of the war which she had waged against him, with such melancholy results, than from the conviction he had acquired, since he had entered the dominions of Your Majesty, that the enemies of his power and of the grandeur of France had, for a long time since, been planning and organizing the schemes of

which, according to Napoleon, the present war is the result. M. de Talleyrand assured me that at Charlottenburg, as well as at Berlin, the royal residences occupied by Your Majesty and your august family had rewarded the search and curiosity of the persons belonging to the Emperor's Court with an immense harvest of correspondence, memoirs, plans and statements, which, while compromising a great number of persons, appear to have discovered to Napoleon the causes, no doubt only apparent ones, of the change in the system of the Cabinet of Berlin. In the conversation which the Emperor had at Charlottenburg with me, Zastrow, he likewise informed me of these discoveries, whilst General Duroc was directed to shew to me, Lucchesini, a memoir, the object of which was to engage Your Majesty to make common cause with Russia against a usurper, a memoir the style of which appeared to betray the pen of the Sieur d'Autraignes. These papers, which seem to be very numerous, were divided among the Cabinets of the Emperor, Prince Berthier, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their contents (our duty obliges us to declare to Your Majesty) appear to have inspired the Emperor with still more unfavourable sentiments and more sinister views as regards the prosperity of the Prussian monarchy. We are compelled to think that the discontent kept up by their daily perusal has had as much influence as the continued successes of the French arms upon the suspension of the opening of negotiations for the definite peace. M. de Talleyrand gave me, Lucchesini, to understand that the future fate of Prussia might be less unfortunate, could we succeed in inducing Russia to make peace speedily with France, which, in his opinion, would be a sort of feeler as to that with England. All that he said to me on this subject confirmed me in the idea that, after the reduction of Stettin and Cüstrin, and the capitulation of the corps commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, Napoleon would not easily allow himself to be diverted from going in quest of the Russians in Poland. My first conversation, therefore, with the Prince of Benevente, was not productive of any favourable result for our negotiation. The 3rd passed over without our receiving at Charlottenburg any intelligence from Berlin. In the evening, it was agreed that I should send a friendly note to Prince de Benevente requesting him to receive us at his residence, the next day. On the 4th he invited me to pay him a confidential visit. He spoke to me of the discoveries made in the room containing plans of Prussian

as well as foreign fortresses, of a portion of the public documents belonging to the Aide-de-Camp General and of several acts of the Military College. He listened with some interest to the expressions of surprise and regret manifested by General de Zastrow and myself, at finding that, notwithstanding the full consent of Your Majesty to the conditions exacted by the Emperor for the return of peace, this Sovereign refused to give his assent thereto, and was preparing for fresh enterprises beyond the Oder. But, upon my expressing some doubts as to the sincerity of Napoleon's intention with regard to peace and the preservation of the Prussian monarchy, he repeated to me that this Sovereign wished to weaken, not humiliate Prussia, and that it would not be long before he came to a decision. In the meantime, we heard on all sides, that General Dabrowski, at the head of the Poles that were at the Emperor's head-quarters, was moving heaven and earth to persuade that Sovereign to despatch a part of his forces into Poland, and that the movement of Marshal Davoust's *corps d'armée* towards Posen had actually commenced. Not having obtained any conclusive result from the second conversation which the Prince de Benevente had with me, Lucchesini, the critical state of circumstances rendered it our duty to repeat to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an official note, a copy of which is hereunto, very humbly annexed, *sub litt. B*, our urgent request to be admitted to a formal conference with him, and, at the same time, to request of him a courier's passport, in order to communicate to Your Majesty the sudden and unexpected change in the negotiation for peace after the departure of Major de Kauch. To this note, dated 5 o'clock A.M., the Prince de Benevente replied, in the evening, by an invitation to a conference and dinner, this day, the 6th instant, and we now interrupt our very humble report in order to join that Minister at Berlin.

“November 7, 1806.

“If the conference which we had yesterday with the Prince de Benevente and the information which we obtained during our visit to Berlin, have neither advanced the negotiation confided to us, nor ameliorated the state of our affairs, we think that we have at least gained a positive knowledge of the causes which have hitherto nullified the effect of the engagements Your Majesty authorized us to enter into, in order to obtain from the Emperor Napoleon the preservation of the rest of the monarchy.

When the Prince de Benevente found himself hard pressed by the unanswerable arguments brought forward by us for the purpose of proving to him the right acquired by Your Majesty, according to the formal engagements of the Emperor Napoleon, to the immediate opening of negotiations for the speedy conclusion of the definite treaty of peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not dissemble the communication made to him by the Emperor that he was endeavouring to discover the means whereby the present state of Prussia might be made subservient to secure the peace he was anxious to obtain, as well as the acceleration of the general pacification. He told us that so long as England did not make peace with France, she would be for ever seeking to form new coalitions, and to agitate the Continent: that the experience of many years had convinced the Emperor that so long as England had not entirely disarmed, there would not be, either for himself or for the other States of Europe, any well founded hope of repose; that if at the time of the Treaty of Presburg, France had made the pacification of England one of the articles in the treaty of peace with Austria, the Continent would be in the most perfect tranquillity; that in the present day, Russia, forgetting Austerlitz and having refused to sanction an honourable peace, still found herself hostilely disposed towards France, and intimately connected with England: that the Emperor, therefore, was occupied in selecting the means he considered as most efficacious for fixing the irrevocable bases of the general peace: that not having yet been able to decide upon this choice of means, and having to provide for the subsistence of his army, without entirely crushing the provinces in which they were stationed, His Majesty had been under the necessity of causing them to advance, in order that they might occupy a wider extent of ground; but that, notwithstanding this, the Prince de Benevente had not perceived any change in the Emperor's intentions with respect to the subsequent re-establishment of peace and good harmony between France and Prussia. This disclosure, which proved that the acceptance of the bases by the act of the 30th of October would not conduct us so soon to peace, and that the successive forward movements of the French armies would indefinitely extend the ravages of war, demolished all our hopes: but, after having vainly tried to dispute the equity of such measures, and even the utility of them for France herself, we desired the Prince de Benevente himself to point out to us the means and the

conditions by and on which Your Majesty could, at least, interpose with the Emperor Alexander for accelerating the moment of the pacification of Russia, upon which, as it now appeared, that of Prussia must depend. We thought ourselves authorized to assure him, Sire, that you would act in the same way with England, if there were any likelihood that your intervention would have any weight with the Cabinet of St. James's. The Minister replied that he could give us no information on the subject, but should confine himself to repeating that the Emperor was decided upon finding in the result of the battle of Jena the means of arriving at a general pacification. Despairing of obtaining a syllable more favourable from him, alarmed at the prospect of the misfortunes which a negotiation beset with difficulties would, in the interim, heap upon Prussia, and perceiving traces of a secret disorganization of the present Government wherever the French troops presented themselves. General Zastrow and myself used all our efforts to represent, with effect, to the Prince de Benevente, the incontestable justice and urgent necessity for the immediate settlement of an armistice which might stop, within certain limits, the march of the French armies for the space of time indisputably required for carrying out the plan for the general pacification. We did not conceal from him even, that, disappointed in the just expectation of concluding peace after the signature of the act of the 30th October, we needed something more positive than mere hopes for us to depend upon the pacific sentiments which, according to this Minister, the Emperor would not cease to indulge towards Your Majesty. The inflammatory proclamation hereunto annexed *sub litt.* C, of General Dabrowski and of Sieur Wiebyski, inserted in the Berlin Gazette, and which appears to be nothing less than a signal for revolt to all the subjects of the three co-dividing Courts of ancient Poland, furnishes us with a just subject for astonishment and complaint, however ambiguous may be the expressions regarding it which are attributed to the Emperor.

"The Minister replied to us, as usual, that he had no knowledge of such a document, and that the Emperor had never expressed to him any opinion with regard to it. He therefore restricted himself to promising us,—

"1. To apply to His Majesty the Emperor to grant the armistice which had been proposed to him by me, Zastrow.

"2. To communicate immediately to us the Emperor's reply to this proposal.

“ 3. To prevail upon Prince Berthier to grant us the passport for the courier whom we were so anxious to despatch to Your Majesty this very day.

“ Having been kept to dine with him, we found among other guests General Duroc, who told us, both separately and together, that it was truly the Emperor's wish to arrive at a general peace by means of the situation in which Prussia is at the present moment placed. This fatal determination exposes the monarchy to certain destruction, unless the well-understood interest of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should create a firm and prompt resolution to become reconciled with France, and to employ all its influence in England, in order to induce into a similar line of policy that insular Power, whose gold and whose Continental connections have rendered so colossal the power of Napoleon. The House of Austria, suspected of having only awaited a favourable event, in order to issue hostile instructions to the forces concentrated in Bohemia, with the avowed object of causing her neutrality to be respected, being compelled perhaps at this moment to disarm, must, it appears to us, participate in the interests and anxieties of Your Majesty for quickly re-establishing peace in the States bordering upon her own.

“ We are but too well persuaded, Sire, that one moment's irresolution or false calculation, especially on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, would prepare a sinister future for Prussia and serious embarrassments for Russia. If, by the most disastrous fatality, the two armies should come to an engagement, and victory declare itself in favour of the French, we say, and say it with the greatest horror, such a victory would perhaps overturn the throne of Prussia.

“ *Au reste*, we foresee that the experienced sagacity of Your Majesty, instead of compromising the Prussian troops in an open country, whether with or without auxiliaries, will prefer dividing them among your fortresses of Graudenz, Danzig, Königsberg, and Pillau—a purely defensive measure, and one perfectly reconcilable with your efforts for the general pacification. It appears that Napoleon's departure for Southern Prussia is no longer doubtful. Marshal Davoust, who has preceded him, is already perhaps at Posen. The report at Berlin is that the Guards are on the point of marching there. Troops from Darmstadt are to form the greater part of the garrisons of Stettin and Custrin. It is asserted that the Bavarians who were at Dresden are quitting that city, and extending their lines through Lusace towards the

frontiers of Silesia. Magdeburg must be still holding out. General Blucher, who has been joined by General Lecoq from the country of Hanover, is defending himself as far as this place, although hard pressed, but we do not know his exact position. General Savary, with a small number of cavalry, had pushed on to Strelitz, into which Prince Charles of Mecklenburg had retreated. General Savary, who found the Prince ill, compelled him to declare himself a prisoner of war; but sent him to the Duke, his father, upon condition of his not serving against France and her allies, and of his not keeping up any correspondence with his august family.

“ There is a point, Sire, upon which a very remarkable concurrence of opinions, counsels, and pressing entreaties, both of French officers of distinction and of many of Your Majesty’s most faithful subjects, does not allow us to remain silent any longer. In the former a desire for peace and a knowledge of the Emperor’s character, in the latter the alarming situation of the State and its august head, have originated, disseminated, and accredited the opinion, that had Your Majesty before requested, or should now request, an interview with Napoleon, this bold and confiding step would arrest the sinister projects which lead him to Posen. The more this departure, so imminent, dissipates the hopes of peace, the more we are called upon, from every quarter, to urge you, Sire, to try this last resource for arresting, above all, the Polish insurrection. Some pretend to say that His Imperial Majesty expected this step, and had even appeared to desire it. Before imparting it to Your Majesty, General Zastrow and myself thought it our duty to speak of it, both separately and together, as well to General Duroc as to the Prince de Benevente. Both absolutely declined giving any opinion upon the propriety or the utility of the interview—both appeared equally to doubt that the Emperor had ever signified his expectation or wish of such a step; but General Duroc, on the other hand, said nothing that should cause it to be given up. M. de Talleyrand went further. He discussed the object, and reduced the motives of similar interviews either to an opportune occurrence produced by chance—as for instance the next day after a battle—or to the movements of a spontaneous sentiment which might suit all circumstances. Thus he rather approved than dissuaded us from inserting *this town rumour* in our very humble report of this day. We perform, Sire, this task; but not being able to calculate the consequences which such an interview might have, we cannot from this place

hazard a decided opinion thereon. We only venture to supplicate Your Majesty, that, if the almost entire absence of any other resource should determine your Majesty to essay this one, Your Majesty would despatch, without delay, Count Donhoff to Posen with a letter to the Emperor, in order to propose a conference at Gnesen or any other place His Imperial Majesty should think fit. We suppose Your Majesty would be accompanied by your Cabinet Minister Count de Haugwitz, of whom the Emperor has spoken several times at Berlin with respect and esteem.

“We were expecting the passport and the answers from the Minister for Foreign Affairs—to whom indeed we had addressed the note, a copy of which is hereunto very humbly annexed, *sub litt.* D.—when General Duroc came to propose to us, on the part of the Emperor, a treaty of armistice. He told us that regarding the battle of Jena as now terminated by the successive capture of the Prussian *corps d’armées*, which had hitherto escaped the pursuit of his own, the Emperor Napoleon thought seriously of re-establishing peace with Your Majesty. The contents of our very humble report of this day, together with its annexes, are sufficiently explicit to justify our eagerness to accept and sign the treaty which has been proposed to us. General Duroc is destined to proceed to effect the exchange of the ratifications with Your Majesty, and the Prince de Benevente will lose no time in commencing the negociations of peace. The conditions of this treaty might be a little softened down, if the state of truce in which your Majesty will shortly find yourself appear to afford you an opportunity of carrying out the project of an interview, concerning which we have taken the liberty of speaking to you previously. The epochs of the payment of the contribution will naturally be one of the difficulties of the conclusion of the treaty. Article 5 of the armistice ought to preserve Southern Prussia from the dangers of an insurrection. The presence of General Duroc at Graudenz will furnish Your Majesty with the facilities which we do not possess, of making public in Silesia the conditions of the armistice, which will have the effect of preserving the greatest part of that province from the ravages which the presence of the enemy causes elsewhere.

P.S.—DOCUMENT No. 3.

“SIRE,

“Charlottenburg, Nov. 9, 1806.

“Marshal Duroc returned this morning at ten o’clock to Charlottenbourg. He was provided with the full power, a copy

of which will be annexed to the treaty of armistice, of which likewise we transmit you in copy, *sub litt.* E 1, a transcript. The desire of saving Magdeburg, had it not fallen in the meantime, prevented our consenting to its evacuation, which was required as an addition to yesterday's conditions. The same difficulty has not prevented us from giving, agreeably to the Emperor's demand of this day, a greater extent to the armistice as regards Silesia. It was yesterday agreed that the line of demarcation, beginning from the mouth of the Bartsh in the Oder, and passing within two leagues of Glogau, should nearly join the Sprotta, and thence follow it as far as its mouth. Some military considerations very favourable to Austria have caused the extent to be given to this article which it has acquired in the treaty. Article 4 has likewise undergone some alteration. In the copy hereunto annexed, *sub litt.* E 2, of the rejected draft treaty, Your Majesty will find Article 5, of which you will appreciate the intentions. The Emperor refused its admission, saying, that if its object were to arrest the insurrectionary flame in Poland, it was both useless and insufficient; that, once determined to make peace upon the bases and conditions agreed upon, the Emperor could have no interest in causing a few hundred Poles to be shot after the restitution of this province to Prussia; and that the mere report of the armistice would calm there all the excitement which the too famous proclamation had caused. We have proposed a modification, circumscribing our demand within the limits of a simple protection for the civil authorities, and of a guarantee for the property belonging to individuals. Marshal Duroc having gone back to Berlin in order to receive the Emperor's orders upon the two proposed additions, had led us to hope that we should be able to sign the treaty in the evening. We had drawn up our very humble report, when, in reply to the urgent request I addressed to him in a friendly note, he let me know by a verbal message that he would the next day communicate the last resolves of the Emperor.

“November 13.

“Having in vain waited for General Duroc until four o'clock this day, and anxious respecting a delay which, considering the urgent necessity of the business, alarmed us, we addressed to him the letter very humbly annexed *sub litt.* F. Our letter crossed that of the General, which we annex here, *sub litt.* G. Its contents justified our apprehensions, and again placed the cause confided to us in the midst of hazards from which we hoped we

were about to extricate it. The news of the fall of Magdeburg, which had for twenty-four hours been spread about the town, made us even fear that the reduction of that place was only the pretext for the unforeseen refusal to sign the armistice which the Emperor himself had proposed. We replied without delay to the Grand Marshal's letter by that which we submit to you, Sire, *sub litt.* H. One hour afterwards we received a second letter from General Duroc, which will be found annexed to the others, *sub litt.* J. Obligated to render an account to Your Majesty of so many variations, we find a difficulty in deciding which of two feelings affects us most—despair at never succeeding in anything, or shame at being continually made the victims of deceitful promises. But after the fortunate arrival of Major Rauch with the letter Your Majesty entrusted to him for the Emperor, and after what General Duroc said to us respecting the agreeable impression which this letter had made upon Napoleon, the hope returns to us of at length attaining our object—the signature of the armistice. However, according to the advice of the Grand Marshal, we have determined to send off the chasseur Harpe with this voluminous draft despatch. We believe that the knowledge of the conditions of the armistice which must be immediately signed, and of which General Duroc is to carry the Emperor's ratification to Graudenz, will enable Your Majesty to give your commands at Danzig before those for the evacuation of the troops reach there, after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. We suppose moreover that if any Prussian troops be still to be found in Southern Prussia, you will cause them, Sire, to fall back from the left to the right bank of the Vistula, or, should the proximity of the countries admit, behind the frontiers of Silesia.

“ We now pass on to the contents of the three gracious despatches with which Your Majesty honoured us on the 7th October, If, on the one hand, we are fully convinced that the auxiliary forces destined by the Emperor Alexander cannot make head against the immense number of troops which Napoleon is ready to oppose to them, we have, on the other, every reason to believe the determination of stopping the former, announced in the letter of your Majesty, will have made a favourable impression upon the French monarch. But the extreme jealousy which he feels respecting the intimate relations existing between Prussia and Russia will be certain to make him find fresh subjects of irritation and animosity against the Prussian Government, if, on the

return of General Duroc from Graudenz, he could be able to infer, from the presence of Russian officers at Graudenz, a secret correspondence with Russia for the continuation of the war. These suspicions would cause him to listen to the project of making Poland rise in insurrection; and having already perhaps prompted him even to deliberate whether or not he should accomplish the total subversion of the Prussian monarchy, we ought also to fear the erroneous judgment which Napoleon might form upon the motives which may have induced Your Majesty to repair to the Russian army. The dangers to which the State is now exposed make it our duty to be frank, even to boldness. The Emperor Alexander might one day, Sire, restore you your crown; but under present circumstances its preservation depends solely on the power of Napoleon. We therefore supplicate Your Majesty, in case you shall have gone to Osterode before the arrival of General Duroc at Graudenz, to give him to understand that you had gone there solely with the intention of ascertaining in person if your troops had halted at the place where they had arrived.

“The crisis is so grave a one that the least incident might produce the most dangerous explosion.

“In the hope that the signing of the treaty of armistice may soon present us a fresh occasion for addressing to Your Majesty another very humble despatch, we beg your permission to defer until our next report the further answers to the orders in your very gracious despatch which Major Rauch delivered to us this evening.

“We have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

(Signed)

“MARQ. LUCCHESINI.

“ZASTROW.”

No. 27.

Translation of a LETTER from the KING of PRUSSIA to the EMPEROR
NAPOLEON.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,

“Nov. 7, 1806.

“In asking for peace at Your Majesty’s hands, I have not only consulted my reason, but also the feelings of my heart. Notwithstanding, Sire, the dreadful sacrifices which you have just imposed upon me, I do not the less anxiously wish, that this peace, already secured by my formal acceptance of its bases, may soon enable me to renew with Your Imperial Majesty those friendly relations which a moment of war has suspended.

"It is highly gratifying for me to shew, from this very instant, my anxious desire to cultivate those ties, by a proof of confidence which I think I shall be giving Your Imperial Majesty in stopping the march of the Russian troops, even while the Treaty of Peace remains as yet unsigned.

"I am particularly anxious that Your Imperial Majesty should be received and treated in my palaces in the manner most agreeable to your wishes, for which purpose I have hastened to make all the arrangements which circumstances would permit of, and I hope I may have succeeded. In return permit me to recommend to the magnanimity of Your Imperial Majesty, my capital and the Marches of Brandenburg. Both are but little favoured by nature, being, in some degree, the creation of my immortal uncle. Deign, Sire, to consider them as a monument he has raised to his own memory! The numerous traits of resemblance to be found between Your Imperial Majesty and that illustrious man will, I am convinced, be so many additional motives for your cherishing a generous regard for his work, as they will also be for my expressing to you, Sire, this my wish.

"Upon which I pray God to keep you, Sir, my brother, under his holy and blessed protection.

"Your Imperial Majesty's good brother,

(Signed)

"FREDERICK WILLIAM.

"Graudenz, Nov. 7, 1806.

"At the same time, I have no hesitation in expressing the wish also that Your Imperial Majesty would, at least, be pleased to except from among the cruel sacrifices you impose upon me, the country of Halberstadt, and the dependencies of Magdebourg. I shall esteem your acquiescence as a most precious token of your personal sentiments for me, and as one, for which, believe me, Sire, I shall be most desirous of making a just and grateful return."

No. 28.

Translation of a LETTER from the KING of PRUSSIA to MARQUIS LUCCHESINI and GENERAL ZASTROW, Nov. 7, 1806.

"I have received, through Major Rauch your Report of the 22nd—30th October. To the misfortunes I have already suffered, has since been added the reduction of the fortresses of Stettin and Cüstrin. This event, so inconceivable that I could

not possibly foresee it, renders the necessity of peace still more urgent than for me ever. To blind one's self to this fact would be to lose the Monarchy without resource. My own means for continuing the war are now reduced almost to nothing, and it is only on the assistance of Russia that I can rely with any degree of certainty. But the 70,000 men which the Emperor Alexander has marched to my assistance, are, under present circumstances, evidently insufficient. Time would be required for a fresh Russian army to reach my frontiers, and its arrival, even were it much accelerated, would but offer me the terrible alternative of either a success bought at the price of the total destruction of my States, in the very heart of which the theatre of war would be established, or else of new reverses. Ruinous, therefore, as may be the terms which the Emperor Napoleon has dictated as the fundamental conditions of the peace, I owe it to my people not to reject them, and consequently, I approve of your having signed the provisional act containing them.

"But will Napoleon, now, be satisfied with this basis,—and will not the advantages recently gained by the French arms induce him, perhaps, to exact supplementary conditions by which my sacrifices would be increased? Judging from the letter which you, the Marquis Lucchesini, addressed to Count Haugwitz on the 23rd October, I have to fear this; at least, I imagine I see the possibility of it. In order, therefore, to prevent the chance of a fatal delay, I think it necessary to inform you, at all events of the last means, which, in a case of extremity, I should resolve upon adopting in order to bring about a speedy conclusion of peace; but this is supposing that it is not yet signed, and that the delay is caused by fresh demands founded upon the unfortunate maxim adopted by the Emperor of the French—that in order to prevent Prussia from ever again raising the standard against him, he must carry out to the utmost his plan of weakening her.

"I know that you will have neglected nothing to combat this principle. But there is one argument which ought to have weight. It is but too true, Napoleon has in his hands the means of weakening Prussia so effectually that, for a long time to come, she will be unable to take the field even in her own defence, and that it now depends upon him alone to secure for himself this kind of guarantee. But is it really as solid as he imagines it to be? Must not Prussia, from that moment, depend equally upon Russia and Austria? Has the recollection

of past times no value in the eyes of Napoleon? Can he have forgotten that not more than a year ago the Prussian troops marched against the Russians in order to prevent them from traversing my dominions in order to fight the French. In my opinion, the recollection of this fact alone suffices to prove how completely illusory is the principle that in order to obtain a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, Prussia must be weakened.

“But if, in order to put a stop to the calamities of war, an absolute necessity exists for offering an additional guarantee, let it, at least, be of a different description.

“In this case, but in this case only, propose my accession to the Confederation of the Rhine, under the express condition, however, that the object of this Confederation, now become that of Germany, far from being one of offence against any Power, exclusively confines itself to maintaining peace upon the Continent. In thus resolving to give in my accession, by doing which I should unite, by indissoluble bonds, my interests with France and the ancient Germanic Empire, I consider that I should be giving to the former the surest of all guarantees, and the most convincing proof that I only look for mine in my friendly relations with her.

“But in order that the two empires may themselves derive from such a political union all the advantages it promises them, it is clearly indispensable that the Emperor of the French should renounce all idea of weakening Prussia still further, and that, commencing by immediately stopping the onward march of his troops, he should spare the resources still left me, evacuate my territory, without loss of time, and diminish generally, as much as it may be now possible, the burden of the enormous exactions imposed upon me. It is to this important end that all your efforts should be directed, and I think your success will not be difficult to achieve, if circumstances permit you to reduce to the form of an article the proposition as regards which I have just given you my eventual authorization.

“I have too great a reliance upon the personal friendship and enlightened sagacity of the Emperor Alexander, not to be certain that he will be far from being displeased with me, for having taken a resolution dictated to me by the imperious circumstances of the moment. Therefore, never, and under no circumstances, excepting only the case (a very improbable one) of aggression on his part, can I resolve to enter, with

whomsoever it may be, into any offensive treaty against him. I know nothing of the projects attributed to him, against the Ottoman Porte. In vain, however, would the Emperor Napoleon desire, as you, Marquis Lucchesini, appear to suppose he would, that I, in concert with him, should oppose such a scheme by force of arms. The utmost I can do is to promise to employ the most energetic and urgent remonstrances against these projects, the moment they are brought forward; and this promise you are both of you authorized to give in my name, in a manner the most solemn, whether verbally, or even, if required, by making it the subject of a formal article of the Treaty of Peace.

"I send to Berlin, the Privy Councillors L'Abbaye and Stegemann in the capacity of Commissioners for regulating all that regards the payment of the contribution. They are instructed to consult with you on the subject. I need not repeat to you how extremely desirous I am that you may agree upon some modifications calculated to render this cruel burden less onerous to the State, and above all, obtain that the payment of the first instalments be immediately followed by the evacuation of the rest of my territory, as, in like manner, that of my Capital will be effected I hope after the ratification of the Treaty.

"Agreeing with you upon the utility which might result from another letter to be written by me to the Emperor Napoleon, on the occasion of Major Rauch's return, I have just addressed to him the one, a copy of which is hereunto annexed for your information. You will see that I therein make a fresh attempt to induce the Emperor to except from my sacrifices, at least Halberstadt and the dependencies of the Duchy of Magdeburg. I include in it, as you know from the instructions with which you, General Zastrow, have been provided, the Countship of Hohenstein, and the country of Mansfeld. The preservation of these provinces would be for me of the greatest interest, and I cannot too strongly recommend to you to support, by every means in your power, but without prejudice to the prompt conclusion of the Treaty, the last attempt I have considered it my duty to make in order to obtain the before-mentioned objects.

(Signed)

"FREDERICK WILLIAM.

"Graudenz, Nov. 7, 1806."

No. 29.

Translation of a LETTER from the KING of PRUSSIA to MARQUIS LUCCHESIN and GENERAL ZASTROW, Nov. 23, 1806.

“ The more I have endeavoured to facilitate the attainment of peace the more I must have been painfully affected by the unexpected difficulties which have prevented its conclusion upon the bases proposed and accepted on the 30th of October, however onerous these might be for me. The long silence observed by you since that day had already created doubts in my mind. I was apprehensive lest the Emperor might also have conceived some upon the sincerity of my intentions, and, therefore, to offer to him, together with the last guarantee I had in my power, a convincing proof of the confidence I reposed in him, I commissioned you, by my orders of the 7th of November, to give in my accession to the Confederation of the Rhine, while, at the same time, I stopped the march of the Russian troops. The hopes which so much sincerity and good faith on my part justified me in entertaining, have, unfortunately, proved but too fallacious. At the moment when the first of your said Reports reached me at Graudenz, on the 17th inst., the French army, hotly pursuing its successes in spite of the negociations for peace, had already pushed its advanced posts beyond the Vistula. From that instant vanished my every hope of being ultimately able to arrest the march of the Russians, who, believing that the frontiers of their own empire were menaced, thought only of their duty to protect them, and, consequently, advanced with a celerity and with a mass of forces surpassing all preceding anticipations.

“ On his part the Emperor Napoleon, completely ignoring the first bases solemnly agreed upon for the pacification between Prussia and France, now establishes entirely new ones, insisting, above all, upon the ratification of the armistice, the draft of which you forwarded to me by Major de Rauch. I shall not enlarge upon the hardness of the conditions he would have imposed upon me, it being no longer in my power to fulfil the first of them, that of compelling the Russians to quit my dominions. This obstacle alone renders it impossible for me to ratify this document, as I have explained to Marshal Duroc himself, who has this morning returned to the head-quarters of the Emperor, his master. With regard to the new bases proposed for the future peace I shall not now allow myself to form an opinion as

to how far they may be adopted; but, under all circumstances, they suppose a previous concert with the two Powers who are to take part in it with me, and particularly with Russia. I shall inform them of the present state of affairs without loss of time. While awaiting the explanations which these bases will require, my wish is that you, Major-General Zastrow, return to me. You, Marquis Lucchesini, will alone suffice for carrying on, up till then, the thread of the negociation, and for cultivating the kind intentions of the Prince de Benevente and of the Grand Marshal Duroc, in order that those able Ministers may avail themselves, in my favour, of any intentions less rigorous for Prussia which their Sovereign may hereafter manifest. Made the confidants of the deep regret I feel at being placed by circumstances in the deplorable impossibility of coming to an understanding with France, either as regards the peace, which I was ready to purchase at the price of such great sacrifices, or even for a suspension of arms, I have no doubt but that the Grand Marshal of the Palace will inform the Emperor of all my sentiments on this matter, and I charge you, Major-General Zastrow, to repeat the same to that Sovereign at the audience which you must apply for before your departure. Represent to him how ardently I desire that it may not be long ere my former friendly relations with France be re-established. In the interim the fate of my subjects rests in the hands of that Prince. That, waiving the rights obtained by victory, he may be pleased to inflict upon my subjects, as little as possible, the calamities of war is the dearest wish of my heart, and the magnanimity of Napoleon is a guarantee that you will not have made it known to him, in my name, in vain.

(Signed)

“ HAUGWITZ.

“ Osterode, 23rd Nov. 1806.

“ By the express order of the King.

“ To the Minister of State Marquis de Lucchesini,
and to Major-General Zastrow, at Berlin.”

No. 30.

Translation of a PRIVATE LETTER from COUNT HAUGWITZ to the MARQUIS LUCCHESINI, Nov. 23, 1806.

“ Although, my dear friend, the annexed despatch will sufficiently inform you as to the determination the King has thought fit to adopt under existing circumstances, and respecting which

His Majesty has already explained himself to the Grand Marshal Duroc, I cannot allow your son to depart without saying a word or two to you on my own account. The events of the day have distressed me to a degree I know not how to express. My health has suffered from them. Our never-ending journeys to and fro, and the frightful climate we are in, are, very probably, the cause of the gout, from which I have been suffering for several years, mounting upwards and attacking my eyes. I am almost blind, and am incapacitated from continuing to discharge the duties of my post. Maurice will tell you the condition I was in when he left me. I hope he may arrive at Berlin in perfect health. It needed but a closer acquaintance with him for me to love him as my own son, a feeling which the circumstance alone of his being the child of my true friend would have sufficed to produce : and, as to the word friend—it is one which both of us will be equally desirous of claiming at all times, and in all places, where-soever we may be.

“ You tell me, my dear friend, that my house has been searched, and that in one of my bureaux papers have been found which excited some attention. It occurs to me that there were still there some documents belonging to the negociation entrusted to me in 1794. The results have been printed in Marten’s Collections, and appertain to the history of that period. But there is no doubt that a letter from the Queen must also have been found, and the recollection I still retain of it recalls to my memory the most unhappy period of my life, for it was after the death of my son that she gave me the most affecting proofs of her sensibility. That letter, together with several others received by me about the same time, were all locked up in one and the same bureau, and if the parties who had come to open it could have had any idea of what it contained I venture to believe that, overcome by a feeling of reverence and pity, they would have refrained from violating its sanctity.

“ It would have been impossible for me to have sent off Maurice alone, or to have confided him to the care of a stranger. I have, therefore, entrusted him to the hands of Kuhnert, and should have done the same for my own son. Kuhnert will return to Krappitz, where he will probably find me. It is you who will judge me ; but, without needing even the judgment of friendship, I can confidently appeal to that of the just, upright, and enlightened man who is accustomed to consider, above all, in the statesman the confidence of the master, swayed to a certain

extent by the mistrust (the most concentrated, perhaps, of which there has ever been an example) on the part of a foreign Court. Of that mistrust I am myself an object, and that is enough for me to say to you about it. The sentiments of personal regard with which the King honours me, and of which he has given me proofs, the recollection of which I shall ever retain, would suffice for my individual tranquillity, did not the idea of quitting His Majesty at the present moment afflict me beyond my power to express.

“Pray salute for me our friend Zastrow, and never forget, during the remainder of your days, the sentiments with which you have inspired me.

(Signed)

“HAUGWITZ.

“Osterode, 23rd Nov. 1806.

“P.S.—Have the goodness, my dear friend, to remember me to the Prince of Benevente and General Clark.”

No. 31.

Translation of MEMORANDUM presented by MARQUIS LUOCHESINI to
BONAPARTE, Nov. 13, 1806.

“This Memorandum, without signature, was presented on the 13th Nov. at Berlin, to the Prince de Benevente, and by him to the Emperor Napoleon, who kept it by him for several days.

“‘Is it advantageous to France to weaken Prussia to such a degree that, ceasing to be able to take part in the quarrels of Germany, she no longer possesses the means of resisting Russia? Will the state of vassalage into which Prussia is about to fall, under the Russian Empire, hasten on the general peace of Europe? Will this peace be facilitated by the spread of victorious armies throughout the Prussian provinces bordering upon the frontiers of Russia? And might there not be such a political combination that, by placing Prussia in a constant antagonism of views and interests as regards Russia, would render her the defender and guarantee of the independence of the Ottoman Empire?

“‘Such are the questions which appear to deserve the entire attention of the Sovereign who is now the arbiter of the fate of the Prussian Monarchy.

“‘That which is in preparation for it will, without doubt,

deprive it of the means of annoying France, but it will also place it in absolute dependence upon Russia.

“ ‘ An ambitious Emperor will seize all its provinces one after the other, and will extend his empire as far as the mouth of the Elbe and the mountains which separate Bohemia from Silesia. A prospect such as this could not render the Cabinet of St. Petersburg more inclined now to make peace with that of the Tuilleries.

“ ‘ The progress of the French armies towards Lithuania at the commencement of the winter may lead them beyond the Dwina ere they encounter the Russians. Neither the season nor the distances would permit them to reap the fruits of the least disputed success. Should it be wished to demand the cession of some province, what forces will remain at hand to defend that conquest?

“ ‘ Russia, however, strong in her remoteness, feels not the want of peace with France, and, perhaps, delays even that of England. The proximity of Moldavia furnishes her with the means of keeping the Turks quiet by menaces : she has but to associate, with views of aggrandizement upon the Ottoman Empire, the ancient desires of the Court of Vienna, in order to be certain of the latter’s placing no obstacles in the way of her projects. If Prussia, cooped up behind the Elbe, and ceasing to form part of the Germanic Empire, were sufficiently strengthened in Poland to be able to revive the name and the hopes of that nation : if she could extend herself in the Palatinates of Cracow, Scadonia, Lublin, and Chelm, so that a fortress in Scadonia itself enabled it to defend Kotchin and Moldavia against Kamimie and the enterprises of the Russians in that Principality, then become an intermediary one between the two Imperial Courts, Prussia (the rival of both and the protectress of the Ottoman Porte,) could no longer be in opposition, either as regarded her interests or her ambition, to the French Empire, without whose friendship and assistance she could not hope to support the attacks of her two powerful neighbours. Then the battle of Jena would have a permanent influence upon the destinies of the Empire of the East, and the Prussian Monarchs, annexing to their own Crown *that of Great Poland*, would, for a long time, be protected from the intrigues which may have contributed to kindle the war that now awakens the powerful resentment of the Emperor Napoleon against that State. As the employment of the forces of Prussia must henceforth be in oppo-

sition to the two neighbouring Imperial Courts, her political existence could find no other guarantee than in the grandeur and protection of France. The latter has a direct influence upon the destinies of the south and the west of Europe; but she may stand in need of an intermediary State towards the east of Europe for the purpose of hereafter restraining the enemies of the Ottoman Empire. The frontiers of that Empire, on the side of Kotchin, might then be brought to within the distance of eighty leagues from the new limits of Prussia if, by the exchanges to be effected in Germany at the end of this war, the House of Austria could be induced to renounce the Palatinates of Chelm, Lublin, Scadonia, and Cracow. The revenge of great Sovereigns cannot be personal: if Prussia, vanquished, and ceasing to be a German Power, should at some future time be able to serve those projects for the conservation of the Ottoman Empire which the Emperor Napoleon has in his wisdom formed: if the tendency of Russia gradually to approach the centre of Europe, should be so distinctly pronounced for it to become necessary that all should think of the means of arresting such advance, it must be deduced therefrom that a wise and provident policy would now be, to place Prussia in such a position as for her to answer this double purpose, instead of delivering her up, in consequence of her impotency, to the absolute domination of Russia. This latter Power will be better inclined to listen to proposals of peace when the King of Prussia is settled more firmly upon his throne by the conqueror, than when the future existence of this monarchy is still left an unsolved problem.'

"Upon reading this political dream the Emperor Napoleon said to the Prince de Benevente, 'These are the only rational ideas which a Prussian Minister has offered to my notice for a long time—let the King ratify the Treaty of Armistice, before I enter Poland, and we shall then see.' The Armistice was not ratified, and Napoleon gave his sanction at Koben and Warsaw to the Polish insurrection.

"I have, however, heard since (and Baron de Dalberg, Minister of Baden, who had accompanied the Emperor to Poland, confirmed it to me in the month of August in this year (1809), that, when in January, 1807, my arrival at Cracow, on my return to Italy, was known at Warsaw, the Prince de Benevente said officially to some minister in his confidence, 'If the Marquis Lucchesini comes here with full powers he will make peace upon more favourable terms than he expects; the Emperor is tired of this war, and

owns that it regards not Poland, but the interests of a few Poles.' But the Cabinet of Königsberg was already in complete tutelage under the dependence of the Russian Minister. It shut its ears to the suggestions of the Prince de Benevente, so that, when the King granted me permission to retire to Italy, he annexed thereto the express condition that I should not approach, within several leagues, the posts occupied by the French troops."

These documents display the history of the negotiation which was attempted under the guidance of Count Haugwitz for the re-establishment of peace with France. It failed, as from all the circumstances which attended it, it might have been expected to do. Yet it is a singular fact that the signature of the armistice proposed by Marshal Duroc on the 7th of November, and which was to have been signed on the 10th, was prevented by the delivery of the despatch announcing the surrender of Magdeburg to Napoleon himself instead of its passing through the regular channel of the Minister of War, to whom it was directed. The Emperor Napoleon had authorised Marshal Duroc to propose and conclude the armistice which has been alluded to, and this officer, together with many of the generals and ministers composing the French Court (including M. de Talleyrand), was anxious to act accordingly. Having received the necessary orders, had Marshal Duroc been aware of the arrival of intelligence which was likely to have counteracted his views, it is now matter of history that he would immediately have signed the document. His anxiety, as well as that of the persons above referred to, was to prevent the further extension of the war in which the Emperor was engaged. He conceived that the project of advancing into Poland and engaging in a contest with the Russian empire was too vast and dangerous to be undertaken at that moment; he was therefore opposed to that party of the French ministers, of which M. Maret was one,

who, in conjunction with the Polish officers about head-quarters, were recommending the advance of the French army. By the immediate delivery of the despatch to the Emperor by the aide-de-camp who was charged with it, he was enabled to retract the orders he had given, at the very moment when the Marquis Lucchesini had arrived, by appointment, at M. de Talleyrand's apartments in Berlin for the purpose of completing the armistice; and from that moment the determination to carry the French army to the frontiers of Russia was irrevocably fixed.*

From this time also the ambitious projects of the Emperor Napoleon seem to have taken a wider range, and after the Peace of Tilsit, by which he dismembered Prussia and in part re-established the kingdom of Poland, he conceived the vast project of closing the Continent against England; of employing the fleets of the North Sea, in conjunction with his own, in hostility against her; of extending his power over Spain and Portugal; and of establishing an uncontrolled dominion in Europe. In the progress towards the completion of this gigantic enterprise he was met by impediments he had never calculated upon,—the seizure of the Danish fleet by the British Government; the resistance of the people of Spain and Portugal, supported by the armies of England; the war with Austria in 1809, when his principal force was for a moment compromised after the battle of Aspern; the war which he undertook against Russia in 1812, and which annihilated his immense and magnificent army; and the great and splendid victories of Lord Wellington—turned against

* Mons. de Talleyrand recounted this anecdote to the Author, stating that he had met the aide-de-camp, bearer of this despatch, on the staircase leading to the Emperor's apartment, but that he (the aide-de-camp) had not mentioned its contents; if he had done so, M. de Talleyrand stated that he should have accompanied him to the Emperor, and he believed he might have prevented the decision which was taken upon it.

him the tide of success and fortune which for so long a period had constantly been with him.

During the time in which these events took place the British Government had carried on the war from its commencement in 1803, as far as British objects were concerned, with unremitting success; the fleets of the enemy had been destroyed, the battle of Trafalgar had triumphantly secured the unrivalled superiority of the British navy, the greater part of the enemy's colonies had been captured, and the land-forces had in almost every contest given proofs of their unequalled discipline and valour. But the triumphs of the British army had been obtained in contests of too desultory a nature, undertaken for the attainment of objects too limited and too distant from the immediate seat of war in Europe to have tended to any of those decisive advantages by which that war might be brought to a close, and by which the great question of European independence, for which England was struggling, might be established. The seizure of Alexandria in 1806, of Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, which were afterwards abandoned, the capture of the Cape of Good Hope and of Madeira, the victory over the French force at Maida, could in no way be instrumental in forcing the enemy to peace or in materially crippling his vast resources upon the Continent. The expedition under Sir A. Wellesley, which was sent in aid of the Peninsular patriots in 1808, and which, after having secured the independence of Portugal by the victory of Vimeiro, was reinforced by the troops under Sir John Moore which were withdrawn from Sweden, was the first step towards the establishment of a system of operations on the Continent upon a scale more commensurate with the means and power of England. Yet the forces thus brought together were only a small part of the great army which England at that time could dispose of; and in the

following campaign under Sir John Moore in Spain, however brilliant their achievements, they were unequal to oppose the overwhelming numbers of the French Emperor. With the view of pointing out the impolicy of the divided efforts by which the operations of the British army had been characterised, a memoir, which will be found in the Appendix,* was submitted to the British Cabinet in February, 1809, by the Author. In it he endeavoured to show that England might confidently look for the most successful results in the present contest by a proper concentration of the greater part of her force (the whole of which then amounted to nearly 250,000 men, including the regular militia) in one operation upon whatever point should be judged most accessible and promising to ourselves, and most vulnerable as against the enemy—whether in Spain and Portugal, where, to a certain extent, we were already engaged; or in the north of Germany, where in 1806 we had assembled a considerable army; or on the soil of France itself, where our great force might be brought to bear upon the unprotected provinces of that country whilst its army was on the banks of the Danube.

The views set forth in this memoir were not entirely acted upon. It was resolved to maintain the contest in Portugal and Spain, and at the same time to bring a force of nearly 80,000 men, including both the army and navy, to act on the enemy's territory against Antwerp; the British force in Sicily was still kept up at its original numbers, and the distant garrisons were maintained upon their accustomed footing to protect the colonies, but this was the last time the forces of England were destined to be employed in the attainment of distant and separate objects. The failure of

* See Appendix, No. 32.

the expedition to Walcheren, and the inability of the British army in Spain to contend against the overwhelming forces of the enemy after the brilliant victory of Talavera, were decisive proofs of the inefficiency of divided exertions; and henceforward the power of England, with trifling exceptions, was brought to bear upon the great contest which was established in the Peninsula.

The triumphant results of this system, by which the British arms were brought into the heart of France, and the Duke of Wellington became the arbiter of her destinies, have fully proved the wisdom of that decision. By it the Government of England was enabled to combine its exertions in the field with those of its allies, when the great disasters which had annihilated the French armies in the north of Europe called forth the energies of the Continent, and placed them in military array against the fortunes of Napoleon.

The political events which marked that period were influenced by England in proportion to the high station she had thus assumed among the nations of the world. It is a grateful task to assist in handing them down to posterity; they will redound to her honour, they will mark the moderation and evenhandedness with which she bore her sway at that eventful period, and they will remain an imperishable monument of the worth and talent of the great General and of the Ministers by whom they were directed.

A P P E N D I X.

No. 32.

London, February 28, 1809.

THE state of Europe at this moment leads us to expect events of unexampled importance. Great Britain, from her position and the energy of her people, may be considered the most powerful, because the most firmly-established, Power in Europe. Her naval superiority is uncontested, her troops are unrivalled in the brilliancy of their achievements, and her military force is of larger amount than it has ever before attained.

Spain has revolted from the yoke of France, and, although beaten in some of her provinces, yet holds out a resistance which, supported by the increasing enmity of her people, may be considered as requiring at least a force of 200,000 Frenchmen to keep possession of the provinces she now occupies.

Austria, the only continental Power which can at this moment be balanced against France, is in a position which must awaken the anxiety of all those who wish well to the independence of Europe. She has made herself powerful by armaments, but she has drawn upon herself the jealousy of the most tremendous enemy that has existed. She may fight successfully, but to succeed she must struggle against an army which has struck terror into her own, and which for several years past has proved itself so superior as to make the most sanguine admirers of the Austrians tremble for the event of every action. I will not now enter upon the question from whence (whether from superiority of numbers or of skill) the French have gained this ascendancy; but, melancholy as is the fact, it must always be duly weighed in considering the power of the two countries.

Russia is powerful, and the present appearance of her political transactions would lead a common observer to suppose that, although she is allied to Bonaparte, yet she would be more willing to remain the idle spectator of the contest in Europe, than to become active in the destruction of all balance between its States. The conduct, however, which she may adopt at the present moment it would be difficult to foretell. Her army, though powerful, is destitute of the means of immediate action; and, with so much preparation on the part of Austria, one would argue that a want of it in Russia looked like an unwillingness on her part to act powerfully in the impending contest.

France, with all the nations under her command, would appear irresistible. Her means seem always to increase with the difficulties of her situation; and the energies her Government puts forth upon every occasion astonish even those who were prepared to expect the most. Against such a Power what prospects of success we may derive from any contest, even from the alliance of the greatest Powers of Europe against her, it would be a difficult task to foretell. But as I think that all our expectations of success must rest upon the

exertions of Great Britain, it is with this view I shall offer a few considerations upon the application of the British army in the contest which appears to be on the point of breaking out upon the Continent.

In all the wars in which France has been concerned since the reign of Bonaparte, the whole of her military force, however great and powerful, has been actively engaged against the immediate enemy. At the epoch of 1805 the whole of the regular force of France, with but few exceptions, was marched into Germany and the North of Italy, and the provinces of her own country were left unprotected. In 1806 and 1807 the same system was pursued, and the same beneficial effects attended the concentration of force. The conquests of France between the date of the first war of 1805 and the present time are beyond what any man could have foretold. By some of these conquests her power has been increased; by some, such as Spain and Italy, which are a constant drain of troops, diminished; and in point of real strength she has of late perhaps been weakened by the extension of her dominions.

With respect to Austria, who now seems bravely to have resolved to arm every man she can command, and to make a determined struggle for her existence, whether her army be as considerable as at former periods or not, still she is now, relatively to France, as powerful as she has appeared at any former time, and it is evident that she will require from France to oppose her the same means as were formerly made use of, namely, the march of the whole disposable force of the French Empire into Germany and the States opposite to her frontiers. Supposing, therefore, that this statement is correct, we know already what will be the general system which will be pursued by France in the war we are expecting; and we may proceed to consider what application will be the most wise for the army Great Britain can bring into the field.

Without pronouncing that the military system which has generally been adopted for the last fifteen years by the British Government has or has not been a correct one, it cannot but be observed that it has in no instance led to great results; and although the different expeditions sent out have been composed of the best troops the world can boast, yet we at this moment remain almost without one instance of any great and essential benefit derived to England. It can hardly be disputed that if the British Empire is to continue as powerful as it has hitherto maintained itself, it must be by a contest fought in Europe. With the whole Continent under the dominion of Bonaparte, what chance has England in a prolonged struggle of twenty or thirty years? Sooner or later, if all Europe be against her, her situation must be materially altered. The only line, therefore, of real policy for England, is to support with all her power those States of the Continent that still are able to fight for their independence, to aid them by every active measure she can command, to copy the policy of the man who has conquered Europe, and to bring to bear upon the most vital parts of her enemy the whole force she is able to collect. To continue in the system of striking blows in every corner of the globe, to be able to garrison every post in the West Indies, or in the Mediterranean, and *to be but England against all the continent of Europe*, will prove to be of no real advantage. Great indeed would be the sacrifice of our colonies, and bold the Minister who in England would dare recommend the measure, but let the system of acquiring power at a distance, and leaving England by itself against the Continent at home, be balanced against

it, and surely there can be no doubt on which side the preponderance of advantage will be found. It seems evident, therefore, at present that the only policy of England is to concentrate the whole military force she possesses to secure the success of the continental Powers against the overbearing despotism of France. To effect this, it is not the interest of England that Austria should go immediately to war. We are not able at this moment to assist her. It will require some time to bring our forces together on any one point, but it is the duty of Government, seeing that the contest is inevitable, to take such measures as will enable us, when that contest begins, to act with vigour and effect against France, or such parts of her possessions as may be considered the proper points for an English army to attack. Under these circumstances, the attention of England must naturally be turned to a variety of objects. The Mediterranean, Spain, the Baltic, and France herself, seem equally to hold out objects well worthy her consideration; but to determine to which the preference should be given, it is necessary to examine what is the amount of force which England is able to employ. The estimates of the present year fix the number of troops in the pay of Great Britain, exclusive of those in India, and including the embodied militia, at 339,408 men. But as this calculation of necessity allows more than can be called effective, let us take the returns of rank and file from the Adjutant General's Office, and, deducting again even from that statement, let us call the efficient force, exclusive of what is stationed in India, 245,000 men, of which 75,000 are militia. There remains, therefore, at the disposal of Great Britain on the lowest supposition (*i. e.* 15,604 men below the returns of the Adjutant General's Office) 170,000 effective regular troops. It is evident, from the conduct Bonaparte has always pursued, that in his opinion, if he grasped at maritime and continental conquests at the same time, his force would not be equal to his attempts, and he would necessarily fail. The facts will prove still more, for, as is collected from his different movements, were he to retain troops in all his conquests, were his forces in every province he has vanquished to be kept equal to the defence of it, were he not even to evacuate some of them entirely, as Hanover, Holland, &c., &c., in 1805, his armies would not be sufficient for the service they would have to perform.

By defending everything he must necessarily become weak in any particular quarter to which he brings but the surplus of an extensive army; by the contrary system he overpowers all that attempts to resist him wherever it is to be found embodied, and then as victor returns into the possession of his former conquests with double security. This line of policy is surely worthy the serious attention of the Government of England. With her superiority at sea, no Power can with more security put in practice the maxims of Bonaparte. The position of England is strong beyond all calculation; she bids defiance to attack by the superiority of her navy, her distant possessions are still more secured by it, and with all these chances in her favour, there certainly can be no reason why she should hesitate to leave some of them without all the force which might be required to defend them in presence of an enemy. If there could be any doubt that, if Austria is again beaten, the balance of power in Europe will be totally overthrown, or that, if the Continent is subjected to the will of Bonaparte, all its powers will be directed against England, I would still further push my arguments for great and powerful measures on the Continent. But surely nothing more can be wanting to prove that this is the moment which requires the greatest and most powerful efforts of which England is capable.

Having said so much, I will leave it to others to decide how great a portion of 170,000 regulars and 75,000 militia England can afford to employ effectively and in a body upon the present contest. But what I wish more particularly to inquire into is, in what part of Europe an effective British force of 100,000 men can be employed to the greatest advantage both to England and to the cause of European independence.

It may be laid down as a principle that, so far as it is possible, every attack that is made by Great Britain should be directed either against France herself, or in direct support of the Powers of the Continent. All operations undertaken against either the allies or the conquests of France are of themselves but of a secondary nature. We know that Bonaparte considers them so, and that he would quietly allow England to possess herself of Hanover, of great part of Italy, and of many other points that could be mentioned, without detaching a single man from his main army, and this upon the broad principle upon which he has always acted, that if he is successful against the heart of his great continental enemy's possessions, which he will effect by leaving his conquests to a certain degree unprotected, he will, as conqueror, re-establish himself in his former dependencies.

Under this view of the subject, therefore, the British army (destined to the present contest) can only be employed, either in conjunction with the Austrians, to support and strengthen their armies, or in a direct attack upon France and Holland, or in the powerful support of Spain and Portugal, with a view to the invasion of the south of France. By the adoption of the first plan you strengthen *the Power* on the destruction of which alone Bonaparte hopes to found the subjugation of Europe; and it is only by adopting one of the two other measures that you can force the Government of France to detach from her main army to secure herself, and is therefore the only operation, next to direct assistance, which can in any way relieve Austria from being attacked alone by the whole and entire force of France. It has been rumoured that a different system from this has been proposed, namely, that, when France shall have weakened herself in the *North* and in *Spain* for the supply of her main army, both these points should engage the attention, and both at the same time receive the assistance of England. Let us consider this proposition. In the first place, by operating upon these two points at the same time, all hope of being of any direct assistance to Austria must be given up. In the next place, we must, by adopting these two measures, give up also the hope of being of service to Austria by causing such a diversion in her favour as will reduce the force of the enemy in her front. For as long as the concentrated power of England is not brought to bear upon the present contest, so long will Bonaparte pursue his accustomed policy, and, by pouring everything he can command upon one point, endeavour first to overwhelm his principal opponent. It may therefore be conceded that the proper application of a considerable British force has been reduced to the choice of one of the courses which have been pointed out. To decide the preference due to either of these will require serious discussion. In the first place, it may be laid down as a general maxim in war, that to act but at a small distance from your resources is a most material advantage. Upon this ground, therefore, an attack from England upon France would be much more to be preferred, from the shortness of the communication, than any operation to be carried on at a distance in the Mediterranean or in Spain. But in discussing the measures to be pursued at the present moment we must take into consideration

the actual "*emplacement*" of the British troops, and endeavour as far as possible to arrange the proposed military undertakings according to the situation in which the army stands. It is argued by those who urge an operation in the Adriatic in direct support of the Austrian army in that quarter, that England has at this moment, by the possession of Sicily, and by the number of men she has now in that country, a great facility of acting (by reinforcing that army from Spain and England) with vigour and rapidity upon Trieste or the Venetian States. It will appear, however, that these reasonings fall to the ground when confronted with those which go to press an operation from England direct upon France.

In the first place, even if infantry can be carried to a large amount to so great a distance as the Adriatic, how is this to be effected with the cavalry and the necessary equipments to make the army moveable? The points also from which the troops to form the armament are to be collected, such as the West Indies, America, the Cape of Good Hope, Gibraltar, Spain, and England itself, must be taken into consideration; and all that are here mentioned are nearer to England than to Sicily. With the exception, therefore, of those troops which must either come from Sicily or go from England, as the place of rendezvous should be fixed, the assembling of the army would be undoubtedly rather expedited by making choice of England as their point of meeting. We must also recollect the great disproportion in number of the troops to be sent from the respective countries; if from Sicily to England, ten or twelve thousand men would be the utmost to be conveyed, but if from England to Sicily, forty or fifty thousand at the least. In regard, therefore, to the facility of bringing an English army into the field, I conceive there cannot be a doubt that the operation should be undertaken from England direct on France. With respect to the danger of withdrawing the British troops from Sicily, it certainly must be allowed to be a critical undertaking, so long as the French continue strong in the kingdom of Naples, yet, with the British superiority at sea, any undertaking against Sicily on the part of the French would be a most hazardous enterprise. It may also be affirmed that while the navy of England is as triumphant as it now is, she may always consider any country unconnected with the Continent as within the reach of her conquest wherever she chooses to sacrifice the means necessary for undertaking it. Upon this view of the subject, of how little import to England is the momentary occupation of Sicily! Of how little weight in the balance of advantage, when compared with the great object of securing the independence of Europe! It may therefore be concluded that the partial diminution of the British troops in Sicily, although an inexpedient measure while the French are in force in Naples, would yet become a perfectly wise one, if, as in 1806 and 1807, they reduce their forces in that country.

With regard to the arguments which press the formation of an army in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of being prepared to make conquests in case Austria should fail, they are quite of a secondary nature. Our object is to break down the colossal power of France. To effect this, or indeed to have even a chance of effecting it, it must be our *only* object. If we succeed in it we shall be powerful in every corner of the globe; if we fail, not all the conquests we can make will add one iota to our strength.

So far, then, there appear no reasons which should determine England to prefer operations in the Mediterranean to a direct attack upon France. Far otherwise. For if we are to be decided by the amount of force we can bring

into the field, we must among other things remember, that if to leave Sicily without a garrison would be dangerous, so would it be to abandon England. If the British army were to act in the Adriatic, its distance from Sicily would make a garrison there quite as necessary as if it were acting in any other part of the world. It follows, therefore, that if the British Government decide to act in support of the Austrian army, they must deduct from the amount of the army so employed both the garrisons of England and Sicily, and, as the operation would be at such a distance from Great Britain, the garrison to be left in it must be very considerable. On the contrary, if the operation against France should be decided upon, the British army would be so immediately in front of England as to make a garrison there, except the dépôts of formation, quite unnecessary; and as to Sicily, a small garrison would suffice. But even if the whole force now employed there was to be left in Sicily, still, by choosing a line of operations which would liberate the garrison of England, the active army would be always so much stronger as the excess of force to be retained in Great Britain surpasses that to be left in Sicily. As this must be considerable, so are the advantages of the latter operation. It is evident, therefore, that, as well from the extent of the army you will be able to employ, as from the equipment you can give it, and from the facility and vigour with which it will act so close to its resources, the operation from England, either direct upon France, or through Portugal and Spain upon that country, is preferable to that proposed in the Adriatic.

But it is argued that France is so strong that she cannot be attacked. This is a proposition totally untenable; for the force of France consists in the number of troops she can command. With the French army, therefore, at Boulogne, there would be no prospect of attacking her with success. But if her army is away, where is then her strength? Surely her inhabitants are not more powerful than those of Great Britain. Nor would her defence without an army be more formidable than the resistance of any other people. It is when she is in such a state, when she is left without any other means of defence than what her inhabitants can afford her, that it is proposed she should be attacked.

Suppose two English armies, forming together a force of 100,000 men, landed in the neighbourhood of Calais and Boulogne, the remainder at Dieppe, their first object being to take the above towns and Havre, and then, with the large force of cavalry England could afford, to advance upon and menace the capital of that country, can any man believe that such a movement would not be a most serious evil to France?—that it would not call for a most powerful detachment from her main army to oppose it?—or that even if Bonaparte could afford to detach a corps large enough to drive back the invading army (always not a very easy task against 100,000 Englishmen), would not France have received a most severe blow, and Austria a considerable relief? These are positions which cannot be denied. There would be no serious danger to the British army, for, when in possession of the works of Havre, Boulogne, and Calais, the re-embarkation would always be secured, and, with a large force of cavalry, the knowledge of the movements of the enemy might always be insured. There is not, therefore, in this movement anything so alarming as some persons are willing to suppose. Whenever an army is to meet an enemy, there is always danger to be apprehended, and particularly from the French, who, next to our own, are the best soldiers in Europe. But is such a consideration to deter the British

nation? Is it not below the character of Englishmen to shrink from such a contest, when at the same moment we are reproaching the Governments of Europe (who have no medium, if they do fight, between victory and annihilation) for not coming forward to fight, with smaller means, the same enemy? Surely our own doctrine to other nations applies most properly to ourselves:—"To remain inactive is ruin; not to fight the enemy of Europe will be your destruction; and not to use every effort and every exertion your country is capable of, is to seal with your own hands the decree of destruction which is already issued against you." Let us, therefore, derive from the very lesson we have dictated to others, a rule to guide ourselves. Let us remember that the last contest we can calculate upon in Europe is fast approaching, and that the last chance of interposing between the independence and the subjugation of Europe will soon be open to us.

The estimates of the present year, as I have before stated, return as in the pay of Great Britain, excluding the force in India, and including the embodied militia, 339,408 men. Call them only 300,000; and is it possible that with such a force England is so positively weakened by her colonies and distant garrisons as not to be able to afford, by the voluntary aid of her militia battalions and her army of the line together, 100,000 men to fight for that cause on which her existence depends? It seems impossible; but if it be the case, surely it is the strongest argument for the pursuit of a new and different system.

The conclusion which results from all the above reflections is, that the duty of the present Government is to prepare the means of great and unprecedented exertions, to enable them to act, at the moment Austria shall declare herself, with all the force Great Britain can command; that, to effect this, all objects but one must be abandoned, and to that one all our powers directed; that the garrisons of some of our colonies must be reduced, and of others almost entirely withdrawn; that our active army must be increased by every man that can be supplied to it; that (as, when the British army is in front of England, no garrison is required) the militia should be allowed and encouraged to volunteer their services for offensive operations; and that all the force of Britain, thus collected, should be applied in a direct attack upon the most vulnerable points of France, be they her southern provinces, her capital, or her arsenals at Antwerp. The results we are to expect from any of these operations are, first, to strike a severe blow upon France herself; secondly, to force her to reduce the army with which she would fall upon Austria; and, lastly, by these efforts to render the war between France and that country more equal, and thus to take an active part in seeking to avert the fall of continental Europe.

With the hope, therefore, that Great Britain will see the necessity of making every exertion of which she is capable in the contest that is approaching, and under the conviction that with a proper application of her concentrated force she will eventually succeed, these suggestions are submitted to the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

BURGHESH.

CHAPTER II.

PEACE AND SETTLEMENT IN PARIS, 1814.

AFTER the close of the war between France and Austria in 1809, the Emperor Napoleon appeared to have attained to the utmost limit of conquest or control over the continent of Europe to which the ambition of a sovereign could aspire. There remained no semblance of opposition to his will but in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal, and to the overthrow of this last resistance he now appeared determined to bend his undivided exertions. The powerful armies which he marched into these countries extended his conquests in 1809 to the southern extremities of Spain; and in the year 1810 the immense preparations which he directed for the conquest of Portugal seemed to afford him a justifiable expectation of the realisation of his views. The unparalleled exertions and triumphs of the British army under Lord Wellington, the spirit and valour of the troops and people of Portugal, and the uncompromising hostility of the Spanish nation, drove back this tide of war, and thus secured a spot upon which to plant the fulcrum of a power which, in the end, overthrew the vast dominion which at that moment seemed so firmly established. The Emperor Napoleon throughout the year 1811 continued to pour fresh troops into the Peninsula. He withdrew Marshal Masséna from the command of the army of Portugal, and replaced him by Marshal Marmont; but whether he was influenced by the difficulties of the warfare in these countries, and by the obstacles which were opposed to the concentration

for any length of time of a large army in the field, or whether, in his vast projects of future conquests, he considered the war against Spain and Portugal as of minor importance, it does not appear that he ever entertained any serious intention of assuming himself the command of the armies employed in it. Fortune had so long been favourable to him, he had obtained such immense successes, and he was possessed of such powerful means with which to continue to press forward these advantages, that the resistance he met with from England and her allies became at once irritating and hateful to him. He saw with disappointment that the vast project he had conceived of closing the Continent to the commerce and manufactures of Great Britain was failing; and while he was himself obliged to modify his system in France by the special licences which he conferred with no parsimonious hand, he complained loudly of other sovereigns (and particularly of the Emperor of Russia), who, in consideration of the distresses of their subjects, had adopted a line of policy similar to his own. His power and authority had been established and nurtured in conquest, and his government was founded upon that basis. The institutions he had established, the immense armies he had raised, the direction he had given to the spirit and enterprise of the French people, all tended to encourage him in the continuance of the same system. A feverish desire of bringing the immense power he was possessed of into action outstripped the formation of any settled plan for the disposal of the conquests which might result from his successes; and the Emperor Napoleon, when he declared war against Russia in 1812, and passed the frontiers of that country, does not appear to have contemplated a limit to his enterprise, or to have fixed upon any system by which he would bring it to a close. That he undertook this gigantic expedition for

the sole purpose of obliging Russia to close her ports more effectually than they had been against England is not to be believed ; that he contemplated, in addition to this object, the establishment of the kingdom of Poland is contrary to his declarations, and is a scheme of too limited a nature in the advantages which might accrue from it, to justify a belief that this was the ultimate object to be attained. Whatever were his real expectations, whether the dismemberment of the Russian Empire, or the future conquest of Turkey, or whether it was in the extent which might be given to the successes he anticipated that his future plans were to be decided, it is now impossible satisfactorily to ascertain. There exists no document, bearing date anterior to the reverses he suffered, in which those plans are set forth, and whatever has since been stated upon the subject is more or less modified by the feelings which his reverses engendered. In the two last wars in which he had been engaged, against Prussia and Austria, his astonishing successes had enabled him to dictate terms of accommodation which left these countries more his vassals than independent states. He now marched against Russia, having at his disposal all their forces, combined with those of the rest of subjugated Europe ; and it is natural to suppose he looked forward to results as great, if not more extensive, than any he had hitherto obtained.

Soon after the commencement of the war, however, and particularly after his advance from Smolensko, he seems to have been impressed with the magnitude and risk of the enterprise he had undertaken. He had been accustomed to follow up his enemies with such rapidity and success, and to strike such terror into their armies and their councils, that, before they had had time to reflect upon the dangerous position in which he himself at various times was placed,

they sought for peace at his dictation. This was more particularly the case after the battle of Austerlitz, when the whole Austro-Italian army was ready to fall upon him on one side, and the Prussian army on the other—when the Tyrol was in insurrection, and the British and Russian forces collected in Hanover were menacing Holland, which at that time was without defence. The terror of his arms and fortune had neutralised the menaced effects of the dangers and difficulties by which he was then surrounded. In the advance, which he determined upon, against Moscow and the centre of the Russian Empire, he trusted to the same results, yet he was no stranger to the greater difficulties and obstacles he was likely to encounter. In the battle of Borodino his refusal to engage his reserves at the close of the action, and thus to hazard his last resources in completing the victory he had obtained, was contrary to the policy he had ever before pursued, and which in any less dangerous situation he undoubtedly would have adopted. But he was restrained by the consideration of the immense distance he was removed from his resources and supplies, and the uncompromising bravery and hostility of the troops and people by whom he was opposed and surrounded. Upon his arrival at Moscow the destruction of that city by fire, whether by accident or design, was not calculated to diminish the feeling which he entertained of the danger of the position in which he had placed himself. Yet the recollection of the former good fortune which had attended him kept alive the expectation that some negotiation would be entered into—that the terror of his arms would blind his enemies as to the difficulties by which he was surrounded, and would extricate him from the false position in which he was placed. The mode in which his various attempts to open a negotiation with the Emperor Alexander were

received by the Russian Generals was not calculated to deprive him of the hope that they might be successful; but if he once gave evidence of his weakness by a retreat, all these expectations would vanish. He lingered on, therefore, still clinging to the false but flattering hope which he entertained; and when at last he gave it up and determined to fall back, it was too late, and his army was crushed in the attempt. From this moment he had to strive against an adverse fortune: he did it with a brave and unbending spirit. He was the idol of that immense portion of the population of France and of Europe who gloried in his triumphs, and whose fortunes were bound up with his power and dominion. Upon his return to his own country, no discontent was manifested at the immense disasters he had occasioned, and in the course of a few months, notwithstanding the separation of Prussia from his cause, and her declaration of war against him, he again appeared in the heart of Germany at the head of a powerful army, and the victories of Lützen and Bautzen crowned with success the vast exertions he had made, and which had been supported by his subject-people.*

Immediately after the achievement of the last of these victories, which had been obtained over the combined Russian and Prussian armies, a general armistice was negotiated and established at Plesswiz on the 4th of June. It was brought about by the intervention of Austria, was negotiated on the part of the Allies by the Russian and Prussian commanders, and was consented to by the Crown Prince of Sweden. Up to that period Austria had been seeking to disentangle herself from

* The account of the defection of the Prussian troops under General Yorck, and of the conduct of the Prussian Cabinet till the rupture between that country and France, together with the official documents relating to these events, is given in the first volume of the 'Manuscrit de 1813,' by the Baron Fain, part 1, chap. 9, and in the Supplement. They are here referred to as giving a complete history of this most important event, the consequences of which were the retreat of the French army to the left bank of the Elbe, and the concentration of the forces of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden against the power of France.

the alliance which at the breaking out of the war between France and Russia she had been forced to contract with the former of these powers. She had marched her armies against the Russian Empire, the unwilling auxiliaries in the attempt to break down the last remnant of an independent state upon the Continent ; but when it failed, and the French armies were driven back or destroyed, she availed herself of the altered circumstances in which she was placed, and of the necessity of providing against the danger by which she was menaced by the advance of the Russians upon the frontiers of her empire, to enforce the urgency of new arrangements with France, and to declare the abrogation of those treaties which under different circumstances she had agreed to. Having clearly established her right to this construction of the stipulations she was bound by, and having obtained for it the sanction of the Emperor Napoleon, she offered her mediation between the contending powers, and arming to support it, she called upon them to meet in Congress to settle the general pacification of the world. This offer was readily accepted by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, but the Emperor Napoleon reluctantly agreed to it, and in the first notification of his acceptance clogged it with the conditions that plenipotentiaries should be sent either to Prague or Vienna from all the powers at war, among whom even the Americans were included, and that the Congress so assembled should continue its labours although the armistice should be put an end to, and that it should treat under the armed but perfectly disinterested mediation of Austria. These conditions were peremptorily refused, and after some delay the Emperor Napoleon accepted the original proposition ; but it does not appear that he ever seriously contemplated any adherence to it. On the part of England it was declared in a despatch from Lord

Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart (who, being the ambassador to Russia, was instructed to communicate with the Austrian Cabinet) that her acceptance of the proffered mediation was placed at the entire disposal and decision of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. But at the moment when this instruction was received, the delay in the arrival of a French plenipotentiary at Prague till the armistice had nearly expired, and the captious discussion then raised by the French plenipotentiaries as to the forms by which the negotiation was to be carried on, so entirely precluded all hope of arriving at any favourable result from the labours of the Congress that the adhesion of England was not declared, and Austria, allying herself with the powers in hostility to France, announced the termination of the negotiation which she had in vain attempted to establish.* However—

“ There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune :
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.”

The Emperor Napoleon, by his conduct at this juncture, appears to have let go the golden opportunity, which was offered him, of recovering from the disasters which he had suffered, and of remaining the greatest power in Europe, and the eventual arbiter of her destinies. At this time he commanded the resources of France, of Italy, and of Germany, with the exception of the states of Austria and of Prussia; Spain and Portugal had been wrested from him by the great achievement of Vittoria, and the French armies had been driven into their own country; but as a counterpoise to

* The history of the transactions and negotiations alluded to in the text, together with the official documents relating to them, are given in the Supplement to the 1st part of the ‘Manuscrit de 1813,’ by Baron Fain; in the 8th and 9th chapters of the 2nd part and its Supplement; and in the 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th chapters of the 3rd part and its Supplement.

this disaster, the Danish troops having co-operated with the French under Marshal Davoust in driving the Russians from Hamburg, the Emperor Alexander had withdrawn his minister from Copenhagen, and this country thus became involved as an ally of France in the general war which now raged throughout Europe.

In such a position, with an army in great part but lately raised to which he might trust his fortunes, with a large proportion of his best and veteran troops shut up in the fortresses in the rear of the allied armies, and therefore affording him no chance of their being made available in the approaching campaign, with a general disinclination to his cause in the Governments and people of Germany, with every reason to distrust the fidelity even of his brother-in-law, the King of Naples, who at the very time was in secret communication with the Court of Austria, and who a few months later, after the battle of Leipsic, separated himself from his alliance, it is difficult to understand upon what grounds he determined to meet again the chance of war, to bring upon himself the combined hostility of all the great powers of Europe, and to risk the fate of his empire, a dominion which it had cost such years of triumphs to establish. It appears not to have been in the character of the Emperor Napoleon to bend to circumstances. In the whole of his career his will was law, or he withdrew himself from the scene in which he could no longer dictate to all around him. When such was the case at Fontainebleau in 1814, and at Paris after the battle of Waterloo in 1815, he retired from a position in which he could no longer hope to retain an uncontrolled dominion, abandoning it with a precipitancy which was hardly warranted by the circumstances in which he was placed, or consonant with the unbending character of his previous conduct. At both these periods he still retained considerable forces at his

disposal, he still might have had a chance of maintaining a prolonged and vigorous defence; but he could no longer hope to be the sole arbiter of the destinies even of his own country; he must have yielded to the feelings and sentiments of those who were embarked with him in his arduous undertaking, and in 1815 he must have submitted to the dictation of the Legislative Chambers which he had himself assembled; but rather than do this he preferred the immediate abandonment of all the apparent chances of future dominion or command; he withdrew the resources of his own talents and superiority at a moment when they were the most necessary to the brave men who had committed their lives and fortunes to the furtherance of his cause, and he seemed to acknowledge no middle course between dictation or surrender. He stated that he made these sacrifices of his own personal interests to the peace and prosperity of France, not choosing to expose her to civil war; that he therefore rejected the proposals of some of the partisans by whom he was surrounded at the Palace of the Elysée Bourbon, and particularly of his brother Lucien, to march a body of troops upon the Legislative Chambers (who were proposing to him to abdicate), to disperse them, and to declare himself Dictator. He did as he had done at the rupture of the armistice in 1813, when he faced the dangers by which he was surrounded rather than submit to terms by which the three great continental powers would have been re-established as independent states, and the uncontrolled dominion he aspired to limited and circumscribed. He spurned to calculate the immense resources he would have retained if peace had then been established. His commanding position he would still have held; but he must have retrograded from the high estate he once had occupied, he must have bent to circumstances, and must have acknowledged co-equals in

that dominion which he had aspired to occupy alone. When once the die was cast, although fortune seemed for a moment to smile upon him at the relief of Dresden, yet in every other rencontre she abandoned his cause, and by the great defeat at Leipsic he was driven back upon France, and at once deprived of all the resources of the German Empire; the second army he had raised within the year was broken and dispirited, and the magic of his name apparently destroyed. During the period in which these events were taking place, his letter to the Emperor of Austria, together with the answer to it, and his conversation with General Meerfelt on the day preceding his overthrow at Leipsic, are the best evidences of the feelings and expectations he entertained; and although these documents, as well as the letter of the King of Bavaria upon his rupture with France, and the answer of the Emperor Alexander, have been already placed before the public in the author's work on the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814, they are of so much interest to the history of these transactions that they are here inserted:—

No. 1.

Translation of a LETTER from the EMPEROR NAPOLEON to the
EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

“SIR MY BROTHER AND DEAR FATHER-IN-LAW,

“I am desirous of surrendering to you the fortress of Zamose, and of concluding with you, for this purpose, a little treaty. Your being pleased, therefore, to order Count de Bubna to receive overtures on the subject would afford me great satisfaction. As it appears that General Count de Bubna is intended to command a division of observation, I should wish that Your Majesty would have the goodness to authorize him to be the channel of the correspondence which, notwithstanding the present hostilities, Your Majesty and myself are desirous of maintaining with each other.

“ I informed Count de Bubna, by the officer who carried my letter, that I was very pacifically inclined.

“ I cannot bring myself to think that Your Majesty can find your interest in the continuation of a war, the results of which, should it be prolonged, would be disastrous to France, Germany, and Austria, and advantageous only to England and Russia.

“ The last communication I had from the Empress is dated the 18th. She had returned to St. Cloud, and was in the enjoyment of good health, although, as Your Majesty will readily imagine, much grieved at a contest like the present.

“ From Your Imperial Majesty’s good brother and son-in-law,
(Signed) “ NAPOLEON.

“ Dresden, 25th September, 1813.”

No. 2.

Translation of the ANSWER of the EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA to the
EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

“ I have received the letter of Your Imperial Majesty dated the 25th September.

“ As the fortress of Zamose is not besieged by my troops, I cannot interfere in its capitulation, which can only be settled by the respective officers in command.

“ Your Imperial Majesty cannot doubt the sincerity of my wishes for peace. Of the twenty-one years I have reigned, ten have been lost, so far as the happiness of my people is concerned. The official document addressed, on the 18th of August last, by the Duke de Bassano to Prince Metternich, seems to prove that Your Majesty shares my conviction, equally with that of my allies, that Europe can no longer be only partially pacified, and that it would be better to exhaust all the chances of a commenced war than terminate it at the risk of new and inevitable convulsions.

“ At the same time with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, I forwarded to England Your Majesty’s overtures. I expect in a few days the answer of the Prince Regent, which I shall hasten to communicate to Your Imperial Majesty.

“ Your Imperial Majesty’s good brother and father-in-law,
(Signed) “ FRANCIS.

“ Toplitz, 29th September, 1813.”

No. 3.

Translation of a MINUTE of a Conversation between GENERAL COUNT DE MEERVELDT and the EMPEROR NAPOLEON, at the Camp near Leipsic, October 17, 1813.

“The Emperor Napoleon sent for me on the 17th at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and, after paying me a compliment upon the efforts I had made to pass in the rear of his army and attack his communications, told me that, as a mark of his esteem, he would send me back on my parole. After a few questions upon the strength of the allied armies, which he assured me he did not imagine had been so considerable, he asked me if his presence at the army was known to us. I assured him that it was. ‘Did you then intend giving me battle?’—‘Yes, Sire.’—‘You are in error as to the forces I have collected here: how many men do you think I may have?’—‘At the most 120,000.’—‘I have more than 200,000. I think I have underrated your numbers: what are they?’—‘More than 350,000, Sire.’—‘Shall you attack me to-morrow?’—‘I have no doubt we shall, Sire: relying upon the superiority of their means, the allied armies will attack Your Majesty day after day, hoping thereby to secure the result of a decisive battle and the retreat of the French army—advantages of which Your Majesty’s proved talents might disappoint us at first.’—‘Must this war last for ever? It is high time to bring it to a termination.’—‘Sire, it is the general wish, and peace is in Your Majesty’s power. Had Your Majesty pleased, you might have concluded it at the Congress of Prague.’—‘But the Allies were not sincere: they finessed. A peremptory term was fixed for me to decide in, as if so important a business could be concluded in ten days. Austria has lost the opportunity of taking the lead in the affairs of Europe. I would have done for her whatever she desired, and we two would have dictated the law to the other Powers.’—‘I cannot conceal from Your Majesty that the opinion in Austria is, that your dictatorship would have ended by dictating the law to Austria herself.’—‘Well, but after all, some one must be spokesman. Let it be Austria then! If you give ear to Russia, she is under the influence of England, and England has no wish for peace.’—‘I am in nowise informed as to the views of my Government, Sire; and therefore I beg that whatever I may have the honour of saying to Your Majesty may be considered as merely my own private opinion; but this I know as a certainty, that the Emperor, my master, is deter-

mined never to swerve, in the negotiations, from the strictest union with the allied Courts, for he feels convinced that to this union must be attributed the present fortunate position of affairs, and the well-founded hope of a durable peace. Your Majesty knows how greatly desirous all the allied Courts are of bringing about this peace as soon as possible.'—'Well, then, why are not my proposals for negotiating accepted? You see very clearly that England is not inclined for peace.'—'Sire, I know it for a fact that an answer was daily expected from England, to whom Your Majesty's propositions for commencing negotiations had been forwarded, and whose consent thereto was considered as certain.'—'You will find she will refuse.'—'England, Sire, is too much in need of peace not to desire it most anxiously; but what she does desire is a peace, and not an armistice—a peace for the stability of which the guarantee is to be found in its conditions.'—'And in what, do you suppose, such a guarantee might consist?'—'In a balance of power in Europe which shall set bounds to the preponderance of France.'—'Well, let England give me back my islands, and I will restore Hanover to her; I will re-establish the departments which have been annexed (to the Empire), as well as the Hanse towns.'—'I believe, Sire, that England will insist upon the re-establishment of Holland.'—'Oh! Holland shall cease to be, for no flags would be respected by her; besides which, isolated and alone, she would be dependent upon England.'—'Sire, I consider the maritime principles established by England as merely provisional, which, as they were caused by the war, so they will cease with it; in which case the reasons Your Majesty has alleged for wishing to retain Holland will fall to the ground.'—'Be it so; but then we must come to some understanding about this same independence, and this the principles adopted by England will render somewhat difficult.'—'It would be a generous resolve, and a great step towards peace.'—'I ardently desire it, and will make sacrifices—great sacrifices; but there are things in which my honour is concerned, and from which, in my present position, I cannot depart—the Protectorate of Germany, for instance.'—'Your Majesty knows too well how much your influence in Germany is opposed to the re-establishment of the balance of power in Europe, to suppose that it may be still further consolidated by a peace. Our alliance with Bavaria and several other members of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the possession also of Saxony, which we hope to obtain ere long, deprive moreover Your Majesty of one part of

your allies; and, as to the other, we make sure of its soon succumbing, as a consequence of the success promised us by our great superiority.'—'Oh! as for those who are unwilling to have my protection, I give them up. They will repent it, but honour does not allow me to divest myself of the character of Protector for the remaining ones.'—'I recollect that upon a former occasion Your Majesty told me yourself, that it was necessary for the tranquillity of Europe that France should be separated from the other great European Powers by a *cordon* of small independent States. Let Your Majesty be pleased to return to these just principles, which, in the moment of calmness and reflection, your sagacity prompted, and the happiness of Europe will be secured.' The Emperor did not give a negative reply to this observation, and a momentary silence ensued, which he interrupted by the exclamation,—'Well, we shall see; but all that will not bring about peace. How is it possible to negotiate with England, who insists upon binding me down not to build more than thirty sail of the line in my ports? The English are themselves so convinced of the utter inadmissibility of this condition that they have not as yet dared to propose it formally, but I know it to be their intention.'—'Sire, from the very commencement of this conversation, I have supposed that the object of this war was, with the Allied Powers, the re-establishment of the balance of Europe. England cannot blind herself to the fact that, possessed as Your Majesty is of such an extent of coast from the Adriatic to the North Sea, you would soon have a navy double and triple that of Great Britain; and that, considering the talents and activity of Your Majesty, the results would not be difficult to foresee. Now, how can a superiority so near at hand be prevented, but by fixing the number of ships of war which shall henceforth be built in French ports—unless indeed Your Majesty return to the conditions you established when constituting yourself the head of the Government of the kingdom of Italy, namely, the intention of restoring independence to that country, upon the establishment of a Continental and general peace. I am not aware that Your Majesty has ever published anything in revocation of this law which you so imposed upon yourself. It would indeed be a splendid act to do that for the tranquillity of Europe which Europe would regard as a generous sacrifice, instead of incurring the dishonour so justly attached by Your Majesty to the condition which would limit the number of the ships of war of France. Your Majesty would acquire all the

credit of this peace ; and after having attained the highest degree of military glory, peace would enable you to complete all the magnificent establishments you have begun in France, and to achieve the happiness of your Empire, which, it must be confessed, is made to pay somewhat dearly for your glory.'

"The Emperor admitted that this condition was more admissible. 'At all events,' added he, 'I will never listen to the idea of re-establishing the old order of things in Italy. That country, united under one and the same Sovereign, would accord much better with one general system of policy in Europe.'—'With regard to the Duchy of Warsaw, Your Majesty, I suppose, renounces it?'—'Oh yes, I offered it, and they have not thought fit to accept it.'—'Spain might still prove an apple of discord.'—'No,' replied the Emperor, 'Spain is a mere object of dynasty.'—'Yes, Sire, but I think that the belligerent Powers have not all the same interest for the same dynasty.'—'I have been compelled to abandon Spain, and this question is thereby settled.'—'It appears, then,' I rejoined, 'that peace may be possible.'—'Well, then, send me a person in whom I can have confidence, and we may be able to come to terms. I am accused of always proposing armistices ; I do not propose them now, but you must allow that humanity would be a great gainer by them. If it be required, I will take up a position behind the Saale ; the Russians and Prussians will be behind the Elbe, you in Bohemia, and poor Saxony, who has suffered so much, will remain neuter.'—'We could scarcely do without Saxony, were it only on the score of supplies ; but I think that—even supposing we had reason, considering the superiority of our means, to indulge our hopes so far as to contemplate seeing Your Majesty cross the Rhine this very autumn—it could never be compatible with the interests of the allied armies that Your Majesty should, by means of an armistice, be established on this side of that river.'—'For this not to be the case, I must lose a battle, which may happen, but it has not happened yet.'"

No. 4.

Translation of a LETTER from H. M. the KING of BAVARIA to
H. M. the EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"SIR MY BROTHER AND BROTHER-IN-LAW,

"I have received the letter which Your Imperial Majesty has had the kindness to write to me, and which has afforded me

the greater satisfaction, on account of its containing those express assurances of your regard for my person and dominions which you were pleased to repeat to me more than once, and to which I have never ceased to attach the highest value.

"Inspiring me, as those assurances do, with entire confidence and due gratitude it very naturally follows that I should make no difficulty in relying wholly upon Your Imperial Majesty in all that concerns my own interests, and those of my people.

"Opposed, in every respect, to a war which, by counteracting my personal inclinations, could only occasion me danger and expense, I have not, on that account, the less fulfilled, with scrupulous fidelity, those engagements which, in concert with almost the whole of Europe, I had, in other times and under other auspices, contracted. Now, when all circumstances combine to release me from those obligations, I cannot but congratulate myself upon being enabled to re-establish relations which I could so sincerely have wished never to see interrupted. I have but one wish, and that is the speedy re-establishment of a solid and lasting peace, the urgent necessity of which is felt by my subjects, as much, and even more, than by others—and the preservation, in their entirety, of the States which I possess. I shall concur, with zeal and perseverance, and by every means in my power, in all that can lead to the attainment of this twofold object. I have already sent orders to General Raglawich's corps to return to Bavaria. Up to the present time, no hostilities have occurred between my troops and the Austrian army under the command of the Prince de Reuss: and General Wrede has long had precise orders to abstain from every offensive movement. It would be easy to prolong the state of tranquillity thus naturally established, until a further understanding be arrived at as regards the subject of those new relations upon which the support and intervention of Your Imperial Majesty will exercise so powerful an influence.

"Be pleased, Sir my brother and brother-in-law, to rest assured that I shall anticipate so happy a moment for me with an impatience which is but the very natural result of that sincere attachment and profound respect with which I am, &c.,

(Signed)

"MAXIMILIAN JOSEPH."

"Nymphenbourg, 10th September, 1813.

"To Sir my Brother and Brother-in-law

"H. I. M. the Emperor of All the Russias."

No. 5.

Translation of the ANSWER of the EMPEROR OF RUSSIA to the
KING OF BAVARIA.

“SIR MY BROTHER,

“The reply of Your Majesty has just been delivered to me, and I am deeply affected by the sentiments it conveys and by the flattering confidence of which it assures me. Your Majesty shall never have cause to regret so implicit a reliance upon my friendly dispositions towards you. United to the Emperor of Austria by the most indissoluble ties, I hesitate not a moment in acceding to all the proposals he is about to make to Your Majesty and in guaranteeing the transactions resulting therefrom. The object to which all our efforts are directed is the restoration of an order of things which shall secure to Europe a long interval of peace and happiness. I regard the power and independence of the intermediate States as the best means for attaining this desideratum. So important a consideration renders it indispensably necessary that the frontiers of Austria should be strengthened in a military point of view, but this cannot be accomplished without making certain arrangements with Your Majesty. The point of view from which Your Majesty contemplates the actual state of things, is, doubtless, too elevated for you not to be convinced of this, while, as for myself, I am too candid not to give Your Majesty the most unreserved explanations upon so delicate a subject. The most complete indemnification, however, computed upon the geographical, statistical, and financial proportions of the ceded territory, shall be formally guaranteed to Your Majesty in order that such an exchange cannot but turn to your advantage, since you would only be relinquishing provinces which scarcely amalgamate with the other portions of your dominions, and where the desire of returning beneath the sway of their old masters, is too strongly rooted in the breast of each inhabitant, for the revolutionary spirit not to cause the Government never-ceasing alarm.

“Far from wishing that the power of Bavaria should thereby suffer the least diminution, my attachment to Your Majesty will, on the contrary, prompt me to find the means of aggrandizing it, in the changes which may be required by circumstances. It would be difficult to give you at the present moment, stronger

proofs how much I have your interest at heart, and as soon as the preliminary arrangements with Austria shall have been signed, I am ready to conclude* with any person Your Majesty may think fit to send to my head-quarters, engagements based upon the principles I have just developed. In return I expect an active and immediate coöperation on the part of Your Majesty. The moments are precious, but the positive promises you have made me authorize my reliance upon your sincerity. Should the contrary be the case, and the fairest chance for the deliverance of Europe be lost, Your Majesty cannot but perceive that I should no longer have it in my power to realize, on your behalf, the intentions dictated by friendship and confirmed by the liberal policy of all my allies. The military arrangements about to be proposed to Your Majesty are such as should inspire you with the utmost confidence, affording as they do, an additional proof in favour of the principles by which we are guided.

“I repeat to Your Majesty the assurances,

“&c., &c.,

(Signed)

“ALEXANDER.

“Toplitz, 1/23 September, 1813.

“To Sir my Brother, H.M. the King of Bavaria.”

The position of the Emperor Napoleon on his return to Paris after the eventful campaign in Germany was far different from that in which he stood before the rupture of the armistice; the tide of his success, which had hardly ceased to flow even at the moment of his conversation with General Meerfelt in front of Leipsic, had now gone back for ever. On the arrival of the Allies at Frankfort the whole of the German Confederation quitted his standard, and united with the allied sovereigns; the states of Europe which were freed from his dominion were at once joined together by one common bond of union; they raised again the standard of their ancient independence, and proclaimed their unmitigated hostility against the power which had for so many years sacrificed and oppressed them. The

Emperor Napoleon, however, still appears to have entertained the hope of being able again to resume offensive operations. On his passage through Frankfort, after the success he had obtained over the allied corps commanded by General Wrede at Hanau, he recommended the municipal body of that city to be cautious in their conduct at the arrival of the Allies, and that if it was marked by any imprudence it might hereafter be severely retaliated upon them. The Allies, on the other hand, were still desirous of peace. The successes which had brought them to the frontiers of France had not eradicated the apprehension which the power, the talents, and fortune of the French Ruler had for so long a time established; the general armament of the French nation was anticipated, and the recollection of the triumphs of the republican armies when attacked upon their own soil created an anxious and very general desire to avoid the alternative of invasion. The accident of the capture of the Baron de St. Aignan, the French Minister at Weimar, was converted into a means of opening a négociation with the French Cabinet. He was charged with the delivery of a *note verbale*, purporting to be an answer to the propositions made by the Emperor Napoleon to General Meerfeldt, and which declared the terms upon which the allied sovereigns were willing to negotiate for a general peace. The terms proposed were that France should return to her *natural* limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; Spain to independence under Ferdinand VII.; and Italy, Germany, and Holland be re-established as States independent of France or of any other preponderating power. The particulars are stated in detail by Baron de St. Aignan, in the following note :—

No. 6.

Translation of the COPY of NOTE minuted by BARON DE ST. AIGNAN of the Conversation held by him with PRINCE METTERNICH, Frankfort-on-the-Main, November 10th, 1813.

“ Prince de Metternich has done me the honour to inform me that the circumstance which brought me to the head-quarters of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria might require me to be the bearer of the answer to the propositions which His Majesty the Emperor of the French had caused to be made through the Count de Meerfeldt.

“ In consequence I have been charged by Prince de Metternich and the Count de Nesselrode to make known to His Majesty,—

“ That the Allied Sovereigns were united by indissoluble ties which formed their strength, and from which they would never depart. That the reciprocal engagements they had entered into had caused them to adopt the resolution of making no peace but a general one. That, at the time of the Congress of Prague, a Continental peace had not been thought of, because circumstances would not have allowed the time necessary for coming to a reciprocal understanding on the subject of a general peace; but that since that time the intentions of all the Powers, as well as those of England, have become known; that consequently it was useless to think either of an armistice or of any negotiation which had not for its first principle a general peace. That the Allied Powers were unanimously agreed upon the power and the preponderance which France ought to preserve in its integrity, and by confining itself to its natural boundaries, which are the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees.

“ That the principle of the independence of Germany was a *sine-quâ-non* condition; that France must consequently renounce, not the influence necessarily exercised by every great State over one of less power, but all sovereignty whatsoever over Germany; that this was besides a principle established by His Majesty himself, when he said that it was advisable that great Powers should be separated from each other by weaker States.

“ That, as regarded the Pyrenees, the independence of Spain and the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty were equally a *sine-quâ-non* condition.

“ That in Italy, Austria ought to have a frontier, which must be the subject of negotiation; that Piedmont presented several lines open to discussion; as did also the state of Italy—with the

proviso, however, that like Germany it should be governed in a manner independent of France, or of any other preponderating Power.

“ That in the same way the state of Holland should be a subject of negociation, starting always from the principle that she should be independent.

“ That England was prepared to make the greatest sacrifices in favour of the peace established upon these bases, as well as to acknowledge the freedom of commerce and navigation which France had a right to claim.

“ That if these principles of a general pacification were agreed to by His Majesty, such place on the right bank of the Rhine as should be considered convenient might be declared neutral, and thither the Plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent Powers might immediately repair, without, however, the course of military operations being suspended by the negotiations.

(Signed)

“ ST. AIGNAN.”

The proposal of these terms had mainly been brought about by the Austrian Government, and had been consented to by Russia, Prussia, and by Lord Aberdeen on the part of England. It was conceived by many persons of considerable influence at the head-quarters of the Allies to be highly advantageous to France, and therefore objectionable, as being in no way warranted by the general posture of affairs. The Crown Prince of Sweden complained that he had not previously been consulted upon it. He appeared to be more influenced by the desire of seeing Napoleon dethroned than France invaded, and accordingly he began to take measures upon his own authority which were not in accordance with the general plans which had been adopted by the other allied Governments. The orders he issued to Count Walmoden, who commanded a corps in observation of Hamburg, and by which he directed him to negotiate a convention with Marshal Davoust, allowing that officer, with the corps he commanded, to return to France, were strongly objected to; the declaration of his

intention to occupy Holstein and to administer it in the name of the King of Sweden, as well as his attempt to get himself named protector of the Hanse Towns, were equally found fault with; and the measure of sending back to France a number of French officers prisoners of war at Stralsund, which he endeavoured to carry into effect, was openly resisted by General Borstel, who refused to allow them to pass through his army.

During these transactions a great advantage was gained to the Allies by the general insurrection against the French Government in Holland and the Low Countries. It was anxiously desired to aid this movement as early as possible by a powerful army; and in addition to the Prussian corps of General Bülow, it was hoped the Crown Prince of Sweden might be persuaded to carry his army to its support. But he again counteracted on this occasion the views of the Allies by concluding an armistice with the Danes, to last till the 6th of January, until which period he stated his inability to break up from the positions he occupied. He employed himself in a negotiation for peace with the Court of Copenhagen under the mediation of Austria, with whose conduct he was dissatisfied, as he conceived she was endeavouring to conclude it upon less favourable terms (the acquisition of Drontheim instead of Norway) than he was entitled to by treaty. The Emperor of Russia supported his pretensions, and approved of his conduct, and on the 14th of January the treaty was brought to a conclusion upon the conditions he required.

On the 24th of November a letter was received at Frankfort from the Duke of Bassano, communicating the Emperor Napoleon's acceptance of the proposals to treat for a general peace, which Baron St. Aignan had been charged to communicate to him; but the language in which this decision was conveyed gave little hope

of its sincerity. In the answer of Prince Metternich, dated the 25th of the same month, it was remarked that no mention being made of the bases upon which the Allies had proposed to treat, it was their desire that the Emperor Napoleon would distinctly explain himself with regard to them, which would be the only means of avoiding those insurmountable difficulties which at the commencement of the negotiation might impede its proceeding. At the time this letter reached its destination the news of the general insurrection of the Dutch and of a part of the Belgian people against France had arrived at Paris. This event had very considerably altered the situation of the French Government; the limits of that empire which had been consented to in the proposals of the Allies were now no longer within the control of that Government; the whole of the Low Countries was evidently escaping from it. The Emperor Napoleon therefore decided upon accepting the bases which he had at first evaded, and having removed the Duke of Bassano from the direction of foreign affairs, he entrusted it to the Duke of Vicenza, who addressed a letter to Prince Metternich on the 2nd of December, and declared the Emperor's acceptance of *les bases générales et sommaires* which had been transmitted by the Baron St. Aignan. This communication was forwarded to England by Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the mission of Lord Castlereagh to the general head-quarters of the allied sovereigns was the consequence of it. During the time which elapsed previous to the arrival of this statesman the preparations for the invasion of France were actively carried on. The plan which was proposed by Austria made it necessary that Switzerland should be occupied by her armies, as it was to serve as a basis for their future operations; but this measure was strongly opposed by the Emperor of Russia, who was desirous of

seeing the neutrality of that country respected. He feared that by attempting to violate it a war might be the result, and he declared that he would never force any nation to side with him against its will. The Emperor was strongly inclined to favour the democratical party in that state, and as the Austrian Government was decidedly hostile to it, there was much difficulty in preventing the discussions upon this subject from disturbing the harmony which existed between these Powers. Fortunately the Canton of Berne had declared its intention of not adhering to the neutrality which through French influence had been proclaimed by the central Government at Zurich; and the persons who were invested with the government of that state being opposed to France and the constitution of 1805, the Austrians upon their invitation entered Switzerland, and sent Count Senft to that canton as their Minister. This gentleman was accused of having openly excited the aristocratic party to the revolution which took place shortly after his arrival, by which the settlement of the country, which had been effected under the influence of France, was overthrown, the ancient form of government re-established, and its former possessions, including the Canton de Vaud, declared to be incorporated with it. The democratical party, supported by the Emperor of Russia, exclaimed against this measure, and Prince Metternich recalled Count Senft, and agreed that the organisation of Switzerland should be deferred till a more convenient opportunity. In the meantime the most positive guarantee of the independence of that country was given in the name of the Allied Powers.

The military occupation of Switzerland was considered by the Austrians as of great importance, as in case of any reverses in France, it secured the retreat of their army; and even under such circumstances, it gave

them the means of moving a powerful force into the north of Italy, by which their peculiar objects in that country might be promoted. The allied armies having entered France upon various points, the head-quarters of Prince Schwarzenberg were placed at Lorrach on the 20th of December. He soon after moved them to Basle, where he was joined by the Allied Sovereigns, and Lord Castlereagh reached that place on the 24th of January. At the moment he arrived there, very considerable differences of opinion existed. The Duke of Vicenza had reached Luneville for the purpose of meeting the ministers who were to enter upon the negotiation for the peace which had been offered by the Allies and accepted by France. But as that town was menaced by the advance of the invading armies, he was invited to repair to Châtillon. The Austrians were anxious for immediate negotiations; and Prince Schwarzenberg had formed his plan for the opening of the campaign upon the hopes of dictating the terms of peace from the position of Langres, to which the march of the different columns of his army was then directed, and where he arrived on the 17th of January. He was unwilling to undertake the task of encountering the immense resources which he conceived the Emperor Napoleon would put forth in case the French nation should be roused and the war become national; and with the advantages he possessed in the situation he then occupied, he was not willing to risk them by a further advance unless a necessity for doing so was made evident. With this view he was desirous, before undertaking any further operations, that the sentiments of the French Government as to the propositions about to be made to it should be clearly ascertained. The King of Prussia in great part accorded with this opinion, but the Emperor of Russia, taking a different view of the means which France could oppose, and of the power

of the Allies, was anxious to push the military operations with the utmost vigour. He had a strong conviction that Napoleon would not be able to resist the allied armies, or maintain his power in France; and he was satisfied that if any chance of his overthrow existed, it was for the interest of the world to make every effort for its attainment. Lord Castlereagh found the Emperor in this disposition, yet while he was already looking for the dethronement of Napoleon, his mind did not appear to be made up as to the person who was to succeed him. He had given hints of his desire to see Bernadotte fixed upon as that person, although he declared he had in no way committed himself upon the subject—yet he did not deny that it was his own opinion that there was no individual of the Bourbon family who was competent at that moment to govern France. Lord Castlereagh, in reply to these observations, endeavoured to impress upon the Emperor that, if the Bourbons were not re-established, the probability would be that some military adventurer would succeed in placing himself on the throne of France, who might as little suit the rest of Europe as Napoleon; that it would be difficult for the Allies to decide upon the merits of the different pretenders who would probably start up; and that the authority of the successful candidate would not for a considerable time be sufficiently established to enable the allied powers to place any reliance upon the engagements he might enter into with them. Lord Castlereagh was decidedly of the Emperor's opinion as to the necessity of pushing with the utmost vigour the military operations, but he recommended that the present opportunities of treating should not be sacrificed for a crusade against Paris, and that the allied ministers should enter upon the proposed negotiation. He declared that he was authorised by the British Government to adopt that measure, and that he could

take no engagement which would impede it. Prince Metternich coincided with these views, and submitted a memoir to his sovereign, in which they were forcibly put forward. By the answer of the Emperor of Austria to this memoir, Prince Metternich was directed to commence a negotiation with the existing Government in France, but subject to the treaties by which he was bound to his Allies. The Emperor gave as one of his reasons for this order, that he too much respected the independence of nations to dictate as to the dynasty which was to govern them, or as to the forms of the constitution they might chose to adopt. He at the same time directed Prince Schwarzenberg to attend to nothing but *la raison militaire* till the conclusion of peace. The Emperor of Russia yielded to these opinions, and directed his minister to repair, with those of the Allies, to Châtillon. It was at the same time decided, according to the proposal of Lord Castlereagh, in consideration of the vast successes which had been obtained since the propositions of Frankfort had been transmitted to Paris, that the terms of peace to be required of France should be her return to the limits of the ancient monarchy. The form of the negotiation was to be between the whole of the allied powers and France, but she was not to be excluded from taking her part in the discussions which might relate to the interests of other states. It was declared by these Powers, that if the case should arise, there existed no repugnance to the return of the Bourbons to the throne of their ancestors. The Emperor of Austria indeed went further, by declaring that if Napoleon was dethroned, he would recognise no person to succeed him but Louis XVIII. ; and Lord Castlereagh announced that while he was entering upon a treaty with the Emperor Napoleon, he reserved to himself a power, if any circumstances should tend to weaken the Emperor's authority so

as not to afford security for the maintenance of the engagements he might enter into, to withdraw himself from the negotiation. With instructions founded upon these views, the allied ministers repaired to Châtillon on the 3rd of February. On entering upon the discussions which were to occupy the Congress which was thus assembled, the only Power that had any conquests to give up was Great Britain. It became therefore an object of the first importance that she should explain her views upon this subject. With this intention Lord Castlereagh produced the following statement of the situation of the colonies he was authorised to surrender :—

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Population of the captured colonies | 434,882 |
| Cultivated land, <i>acres</i> | 2,168,000 |
| Value in private and public property .. | £75,220,000 |

In making an offer of these valuable acquisitions, Lord Castlereagh required that the States of Holland and Sicily, for which Great Britain was more particularly anxious, should be re-established, and that the Allies should make such arrangements amongst themselves as should preclude them from pursuing any separate interests, the tendency of which might be to allow France to raise herself into a situation to menace Europe after she had been reduced to a proper standard.

The first proceeding of the allied ministers at the Congress of Châtillon was to state their ultimatum, namely, the return of France to the limits of the ancient monarchy. M. de Caulaincourt in his answer neither accepted nor refused this proposal, but expressed his belief that some concessions and arrangements would be agreed to, and that he should expect a communication of them from the Allies. All further discussion was, however, put an end to for the moment by the declaration of the Russian minister, Count Razoumoffski,

on the 9th of February, that he had received orders not to continue the negotiation. This measure was taken by the Emperor of Russia in consequence of the victory of Brienne, as a result of which he expected to reach Paris, where it was his wish to assemble the representatives of the French nation, whom he would call upon to form a new government, not excluding Bonaparte if their choice should devolve upon him. He had lately been joined by M. de la Harpe, who was supposed to have had some influence in bringing him to this decision; and the near approach of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who was about to enter Flanders with his army, and with the corps of General Winzingerode, created some alarm amongst the Allies lest the plan should have been concerted with him. Lord Castlereagh argued with the Emperor against the measure he had thus adopted, and in some degree succeeded in changing his views; he at the same time declared that if Napoleon was dethroned, no person ought to be thought of to replace him but the Bourbons. He objected, however, at that moment, to any change in the objects of the war, from which he conceived the Allies were precluded by their public and avowed declarations.

The results of the battle of Brienne induced Napoleon to authorise his minister at Châtillon to agree to the basis of ancient France, if the Allies would grant an armistice, to obtain which he consented to give up some of the fortresses France was to surrender. The allied ministers required that this should be arranged by the signature of preliminaries, and that Besançon, Befort, and Hanningen should be added to the list of fortresses to be immediately given up as a deposit. These terms M. de Caulaincourt refused to agree to, and the advantages Napoleon obtained over Marshal Blücher at Montmirail, &c. determined him to withdraw from his

minister the full powers with which he had entrusted him. By this proceeding, although the Emperor of Russia had from Châlons-sur-Seine directed his minister to continue the negotiation, yet no progress could be made; and after several conferences, and the presentation of the French counter-projet on the 15th of March, which was declared to be inadmissible, M. de Caulaincourt not being authorised to accept the basis proposed by the Allies, the Congress was broken up on the 19th.* During the period this Congress had been assembled, a variety of fortune had attended the military operations. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had reached Fontainebleau and Melun when the corps of Marshal Blücher's army were defeated and separated, retired his forces to Troyes, and afterwards to Bar-sur-Aube and Chaumont. Before he carried this movement into execution, he wrote to Marshal Berthier, on the 17th of February, to propose an armistice, giving as his reason for so doing, that the allied ministers had received orders to sign the treaty which had been proposed by M. de Caulaincourt at Châtillon. As this measure was taken when the French arms had been triumphant at Nangis and Provins, and the corps of Marshal Victor had driven the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg upon Montereau, it was little to be expected that any favourable result should arise from it. It was adopted with the hope of arresting the advance of Napoleon, at a moment when the Allies conceived themselves to be in a situation of considerable embarrassment; but its object was too apparent to deceive, and the French armies, with the expectation of bringing the Allies to a general action, continued their advance to Troyes. This object having failed, Na-

* The account of the negotiation of Châtillon, together with the official documents, is given in the 'Manuscrit de 1814,' by Baron Fain, 3rd vol., 2nd part, and the Supplement.

pooleon was here induced to accept the proposal to negotiate for a suspension of hostilities, and he sent Count Flahaut to meet the Allied Commissioners appointed for that purpose at Lusigni. This officer proposed as the basis of the negotiation the terms which had been offered by the Allies at Frankfort, but these were peremptorily refused; and the Commissioners separated in consequence of the operations having taken a more favourable turn by the march of Marshal Blücher towards Trilport and Meaux, whence he moved across the Marne to effect a junction with the reinforcements he was expecting under Generals Winzengerode, Langeron, and Bülow. While these negotiations were going on, considerable despondency prevailed amongst the Allies. The retreat of Prince Schwarzenberg had induced an erroneous suspicion that he had secret orders not to fight a battle. The disorder which had been occasioned by this movement, and the great uncertainty which appeared to exist as to the operations of the allied armies, brought about a desire of accelerating the conclusion of peace, which was partaken of even by the Emperor of Russia. Lord Castlereagh used his utmost exertions to counteract this feeling, and by declaring that he would be no party to a peace lowered in tone from what had been decided upon, he prevailed with the different powers to agree to the treaty of Chaumont, by which the four contracting States bound themselves to prosecute the war till their objects had been attained, and stipulated for that purpose to bring into the field a force of not less than 600,000 men.

The contingent for each power was 150,000, and at the moment it was entered upon, Lord Castlereagh produced the following statement as the amount of force Great Britain was at that moment maintaining and employing against the enemy :—

| | | |
|---|---------|---------|
| British force in Spain, Sicily, and Holland | .. | 90,000 |
| Subsidized— | | |
| Spanish troops | | 60,000 |
| Portuguese | | 50,000 |
| Swedish | | 30,000 |
| Hanoverians | | 15,000 |
| Danish | | 10,000 |
| Sicilians | | 10,000 |
| Total | | 265,000 |

This treaty produced the most beneficial effects. It put an end to all doubts as to the objects for which the different Powers were contending, and in a moment of hesitation and alarm it changed the scene and secured their cordial and mutual co-operation. At a later period it became the groundwork of the alliance by which the resumption of power by Napoleon after his return from the island of Elba was met and overthrown, and the reconstruction of the political state of Europe consolidated.

During the time in which it was negotiated, the Duc de Beaufort and the Marquis Chastelet arrived as deputies from the Netherlands at the head-quarters of the Allies. The object of their mission was to ascertain the sentiments of the Allied Sovereigns as to the future destiny of their country. The desire they expressed was, that it might return under the dominion of Austria, or that the Belgians might be placed under an Austrian prince; but they yielded to the argument, that to be independent they must be strong, and that to effect this object they must be united to Holland.

At the moment the Congress of Châtillon was dissolved, M. de Vitrolles arrived at Bar-sur-Aube, where the Allied Sovereigns were assembled, as an agent from the Royalists in Paris, and communicated their desire to see the Government of the Bourbons re-established, and, if such should be the intention of the Allies, their anxious desire to co-operate with them for

that object. To facilitate this purpose, M. de Vitrolles was instructed by his friends in Paris to require that a declaration should be issued by the Sovereigns, that they would not treat with Napoleon, that the French princes in France might be allowed to declare their objects, that the provinces which should support them might be relieved from all contributions, and that their taxes might be made over to those princes to be employed as they should think fit; that if any corps of the French armies joined their cause, they should be allowed to range themselves under their banners, and that the means of communicating with their partisans should be afforded them. If these measures were agreed to, M. de Vitrolles gave an assurance that a great part of the National Guard of Paris would pronounce in favour of the Royal cause, and that five departments of La Vendée were ripe for insurrection. If these measures were not taken, there would be no movement in the country.

Nearly at the same time Lord Castlereagh received a letter from Lord Liverpool, communicating the declaration of the city of Bordeaux in favour of the Bourbons, and the enthusiastic reception there of the Duke of Angoulême, and directing him after the receipt of that letter not to sign any treaty with Napoleon, and, if the negotiations were still pending, to discontinue them.

The decision which was taken upon the communications of M. de Vitrolles was, that although the moment was fast approaching when an ultimate resolution as to the recognition of a new Government in France would be forced upon the Allies, yet for the present they would confine themselves to the simple measure of furnishing that gentleman with the result of the negotiation of Châtillon, and their consequent proclamation, and with authority to state to his party that the

Count d'Artois had been requested to establish himself at Nancy, which would become his head-quarters, independent of those of the Allies, and where he would have the means afforded him of paying any force which might join him, or which might be raised in support of his cause; that all persons declaring for him would be protected, and that the Allies would engage, under any circumstances, to stipulate an amnesty in their favour; that the taxes in the conquered provinces which should declare in his favour (the amount of which was already calculated at 142,232,800 francs) would be given up to him, and that the efforts of the Allies would keep pace with the exertions of the Royalists; but that if this party did not declare themselves in sufficient force to make it evident that they represented a great national feeling, the Allies would not undertake more efficiently to support their cause.

M. de Caulaincourt, after quitting Châtillon on the 24th of March, passed through Paris on his way to join the Emperor Napoleon, who was at that time engaged in the operations against Marshal Blücher which terminated in the defeat of the French army at Laon. In the retreat which followed, the Emperor was fortunate enough to obtain an advantage over the Allies by the recapture of Rheims, and the defeat of a Russian division under General St. Priest, after which he marched towards Arcis-sur-Aube, where he was opposed by the army of Prince Schwarzenberg, and, after in vain attempting to force its position, he commenced the movement by which he expected to turn the right flank of that army, to fall upon its rear, and cut off its communications with the Rhine and Germany. With this view he marched upon Vitry and St. Dizier, and from thence pushed forward his detachments on Bar-sur-Aube and Chaumont, which they entered on the 24th of March, on which day the Emperor of Austria

had quitted those places for Dijon. The Emperor Napoleon whilst engaged in these operations was for some time under the firm persuasion that the allied army was following him; but on the 26th of March he attacked the cavalry under the orders of General Winzingerode, and ascertained that the whole of the allied forces had marched upon Paris, that they had gained a signal advantage over the two corps of Marshals Marmont and Mortier near Fère Champenoise, and that they were already so near Paris that it would be impossible for him to reach that capital before they would be in a situation to attack it.

Under these circumstances he set off for Paris, but before doing so he directed M. de Caulaincourt on the 25th of March to address a letter to the Emperor of Austria, in which that minister stated that, having reached the head-quarters of Napoleon, he had received his orders for the signature of the treaty of peace which had been proposed by the Allies at Châtillon, and full powers to conclude it, and that he was therefore ready at any moment to proceed to the Emperor of Austria's head-quarters to fulfil that object. Prince Metternich replied to M. de Caulaincourt on the 27th from Dijon, that he would communicate his letter to the other Allied Powers, and he at the same time despatched Count Bombelles, who was then at Dijon, to the Count d'Artois at Nancy, to convey to him the despatches which he had just received from Prince Schwarzenberg, and which had been transmitted to Lord Castlereagh by Lord Burghersh, detailing the successful entry of the Allies into Paris, and the almost universal adoption of the white cockade, and also to recommend to him to accept immediately the treaty of peace which Napoleon had hitherto rejected, but in which he had now expressed his readiness to concur.

In the instructions given to Count Bombelles as to

the language he was to hold to the Count d'Artois, it was stated that the Emperor of Austria connected himself entirely with the Allies;—that the marriage of his daughter had never in any way either altered or influenced his views or sentiments as to public affairs;—and that the moment appeared to him to have arrived when the ancient royal family might be re-established in France. These instructions then went on to say that the Emperor in conjunction with his allies recommended the immediate issue of a proclamation by the Count d'Artois, stating the engagements which had already been taken in England by King Louis XVIII. to establish a constitutional Government in France, under which all the present interests of the country would find protection, and by which the sale of the national property, which had been sanctioned by a succession of Governments, would be maintained.

At the time at which these transactions took place Lord Castlereagh received from England intelligence of the successes which had attended our arms under the Duke of Wellington, together with the capture of the city of Bordeaux, and also the despatches of Lord Liverpool, communicating the determination to which the Cabinet had come, that under these circumstances the terms of peace which had been proposed at Châtillon could no longer be accepted, and that he was to take no part in them until the arrival of further instructions.

The battle of Paris, fought on the 30th March, which had been followed by the capture of that capital, and the enthusiastic reception of the Allied Sovereigns, and the friendly bearing of the inhabitants towards their troops, had decided the great question of the future independence of Europe, and its emancipation from the thralldom under which it had been held by Napoleon. The capitulation of the city was signed

during the night, by which it was stipulated that the French troops of the line should evacuate Paris on the morning of the 31st with the artillery which belonged to them, that the arsenals and all military magazines and establishments should be given up to the Allies, and that all the French wounded, marauders, &c., found in Paris after nine o'clock were to be considered prisoners of war. Early on the morning of the 31st the municipality of Paris arrived at the head quarters of the Allies at Bondy, where the Emperor of Russia was established, and upon whom they waited with the view of obtaining whatever alleviation could be granted them in the future occupation of their capital.

Amongst the persons present upon this occasion was Monsieur de Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence, who had arrived with Bonaparte at Formenteau, three posts distant from Paris, where the Emperor was informed of its capitulation, and whence he immediately despatched Monsieur de Caulaincourt to offer to the Emperor of Russia the same terms which had been proposed to Prince Metternich at Dijon, or to accept such other propositions as the exigencies of the moment might seem to require.

The Emperor of Russia, however, cut short all discussion upon these subjects by the declaration which he made to the municipality—"that he did not make war on France, but against one man, whom he had once admired, but whose ambition and want of faith had obliged him to pursue him even to the heart of France; that his intentions and those of his Allies would soon be known; that he meant not to conquer or rule in France, but to learn in Paris (the focus of French feeling) what was the wish of the French nation, and then to give it his support."

The entry into Paris having taken place on the 31st of March, on the following day the Prince of Benevento

(Monsieur de Talleyrand) called together the senators at that time residing in Paris, who unanimously came to a vote by which they invited to the throne of France the ancient dynasty of the Bourbons, and established a provisional Government under the presidency of the Prince of Benevento, which was composed of the Abbé Montesquieu, Count Jaucourt, the Duke d'Alberg, and General Burnonville. General Dessolles was appointed by them Governor of Paris, and General Dupont Minister of War. The Corps Législatif in the course of the same day adhered to these measures.

The transactions at Paris from this period to the signature of the peace have been repeatedly described in so many works, that it is needless here to recapitulate them. When they terminated a general expectation prevailed that the tranquillity of the world was permanently re-established. That it was not so is well known, and that it was not until after an effort which called forth the resources of nearly every state in Europe that the great conqueror of former years was again vanquished, and that the independence of Europe and its delivery from the dread of that universal subjugation with which it had been at one time menaced were finally secured. The object of the following chapters is to show under what circumstances that readjustment of the balance of power amongst the states of Europe was eventually effected, of which the result was an almost uninterrupted continuance of peace for nearly forty years.

CHAPTER III.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

By the peace of Paris the States of Europe were rescued from the general overthrow with which for the last ten years they had constantly been menaced. The power of France and the character of Napoleon had been alike calculated to keep up the fear of such a catastrophe; and even those States which were the most submissive to the dictation of the Imperial master, had been called upon for sacrifices of money and of soldiers, the demand for which was only limited by his apparently boundless ambition; while those who sought to maintain their independence, had been, in turn, thrown down and trampled upon, by his superior force, subtilty, and talent. After the battle of Borodino the work of conquest seemed to have reached its utmost limits in Europe, throughout which no real independence could be considered to exist, except in England, and in those States to which she was enabled to afford her immediate protection.

From this moment, however, the scene was reversed by a change, which, from its rapidity and the extraordinary successes with which it was accompanied, was totally unlooked for. The different States of which Europe had formerly been composed, were re-established in power and independence, and their representatives were now in the Congress of Vienna about to discuss their general interests, and to reconstruct the then almost forgotten system of a balance of power.

During the period in which these vast disturbances had taken place, the States of the Continent had divided themselves into two great classes, namely, those which (now that their independence was established) were likely to reap some benefits from those changes, and those which had suffered by them and had opposed them. There was also scattered through those States a numerous class of persons who, wishing to profit by the constitutional principles of government which had been proclaimed at the commencement of the French Revolution, but which in the sequel had been abandoned, were now desirous of seeing them established in their respective countries. These persons formed an obstacle, which in the late contest had considerably thwarted the views of the French ruler, and in his decline tended, particularly in the States of Germany, to precipitate his fall. The great exertions which their respective Governments were enabled to make, and the spirit with which the call to arms was answered by the people, were chiefly to be attributed to the feelings of patriotism and independence which these persons had kept up and spread among their countrymen. The general prevalence of these sentiments, while they seconded the efforts of the Governments opposed to the French armies, had a still stronger effect upon those Governments which were in alliance with France. For it enabled such of them as were anxious to deliver themselves from the subjection in which they were held, to effect it with the general approbation of their people, and it forced along with it those Sovereigns who would have maintained a different policy. At the arrival of the allied armies upon the Rhine all Germany was united in one mass against the common enemy.

The interests of all these different Governments, and the objects of those of their subjects who held opinions supposed to be in opposition to them, were now to be

represented and discussed at Vienna. Every State in Europe, and each supporter of every principle that had been put forth, looked to the Congress which was assembled there for the recognition of their objects and the consolidation of their views, and the hopes of all were fixed upon the issue of its deliberations. Under such circumstances the task imposed upon the representatives of Europe was one of no ordinary difficulty. The uniting together of those ties which had been so rudely torn asunder, and the moulding into a form of peace those materials which had seemed to build up a system of military dominion, was an herculean labour from which it was difficult to rise with general approbation. Impressed with these feelings, the statesmen assembled at Vienna undertook the task imposed upon them, and the best comment upon the result of their labours was the prolonged period of peace and tranquillity which succeeded.

The great points to be first discussed at the Congress were the arrangements for Poland, Germany and Italy. With respect to their discussion it was decided that until the four great Powers were agreed among themselves upon these questions no other Power should be admitted to the Conferences, although a favourable modification was made for the admission of France and Spain under any particular circumstances that might arise. Upon the question of Poland the Emperor of Russia at once declared his intention of retaining his conquests in that country as far as Kalisch, of incorporating with them the Polish provinces already belonging to Russia, and of forming the whole into a kingdom under his government, but with a separate and national administration. This determination created the utmost alarm in the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets, and Lord Castlereagh in the strongest terms represented to the Emperor that it would be disapproved of by all Europe ;

that it was odious and alarming in the extreme ; that he opposed it more as a Russian than as a British Minister ; that if he wished to see His Majesty in constant troubles he should recommend it to him ; but that the British Government desired to promote peace and the glory of the Emperor ; that the most anxious wish of England would be to see Poland re-established as an independent kingdom, and that Austria and Prussia would be ready to consent to that measure ; but that the proposal His Majesty had made would place him in a menacing attitude towards both these Powers, and would revive the principle of the preponderating military power which had lately been put down. The Emperor declared in reply, that he could not make the sacrifice of restoring Poland to independence, and that he conceived that raising that country into a kingdom, although under his sceptre, would act as a check even upon Russia itself ; and lastly, as he was in possession, the question could only be decided as he desired. Lord Castlereagh answered to this, that he was entirely unprepared for such a declaration on the part of His Majesty ; that England had acted upon a very different principle in giving up her conquests ; and that he could in no way give his sanction to it. In opposition to this project Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring the Austrian and Prussian Ministers to an understanding as to the arrangements they were desirous of establishing in Germany and Italy, that they might afterwards concur with him in his representations to the Emperor Alexander. Prussia desired that the whole of Saxony should be ceded to her, and a line of frontier upon the Rhine, including the fortress of Mayence. In case this should be agreed to, she required that the provisional government of Saxony should be placed in her hands, upon which being done, she would unite with Austria and England against the Russian propo-

sition. Prince Metternich yielded generally an acquiescence in these views, as far as they regarded an arrangement respecting Saxony, but upon the express condition that Prince Hardenberg should at once join him upon the Polish question; with regard to the fortress of Mayence he could not agree, as he felt that it must belong to the system of defence for the south of Germany, as it was the only fortress which could oppose the advance of a French army upon the Danube; that it was not necessary for Prussia, who ought not to come south of the Moselle, and who had a perfect line of defence, protected by Belgium, Holland, the fortresses of Luxemburg, Juliers, Wesel, and Ehrenbreitstein, and the line of the Lahn, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder. Lord Castlereagh under these circumstances recommended that the two Powers should at once state their views upon the Polish question to the Emperor Alexander, declaring that if the sacrifices they were ready to make were not agreed to, they must bring the question before the general Congress, founded upon existing treaties, by whose decision they were determined to abide. The propositions which Lord Castlereagh recommended, and which were agreed to by Austria and Prussia, were :—1st. That Poland should be reconstructed as she existed before the first partition; 2nd. Her re-establishment as she existed in 1791; 3rd. That Prussia should keep the line of the Vistula, and that she should not object to the formation of the provinces which fell to Russia into a kingdom under the title of North or East Poland, Austria always reserving the right of forming the provinces which belong to her into a kingdom under the denomination of Southern Poland. Lord Castlereagh was to have been the bearer of these offers, but previous to his seeing the Emperor, a note was received from Prince Hardenberg by which he withdrew from the concert

which had been established, and advised the giving up the point of Poland to Russia.* He stated that this question was not worth a war, and that Europe was not in a state to undertake one. The consequence of this transaction was, that a new proposition was made to the Emperor of Russia, by Prince Hardenberg, and communicated to Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich, according to which Prussia was to receive Thorn and the line of the Wurtha, and Austria the circle of Zamoze, Cracow, and the line of the Nidda. The Emperor agreed generally to this arrangement, with the exception, however, of Thorn, and with a stipulation that Cracow should become a free town, and upon condition that, as a compromise for the abandonment of a part of his pretensions, Saxony should be given *in toto* to Prussia, and Mayence be made an imperial city. Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich, in the embarrassing position in which they were now placed by the concert of the other two Powers, felt themselves compelled to yield their consent to the proposals with regard to Poland, a consent they were the less able to withhold, as the frontier of the Vistula which they had wished to establish was more particularly essential to Prussia, who had now abandoned it, but the cession of Saxony they absolutely refused to agree to. Lord Castlereagh pressed upon Prince Hardenberg the arguments which had been suggested to him by the British Cabinet, showing how much more it would be for the advantage of Prussia to abstain from pressing a claim which would be so unpopular, and how much more satisfactory it would be for her to obtain an equal extent of territory under a different arrangement, and which might have the assent of all the Powers assembled in Congress.

* This abandonment of the policy agreed to by the Prussian Cabinet was the effect of the personal influence of the Emperor with the King, which Lord Castlereagh had long been aware of, and the effects of which upon this question he had always dreaded.

Prince Hardenberg, in the first instance, violently opposed this reasoning, declaring that Prussia ought not to be thwarted in her views, and that he would run all risks rather than agree to it; but he afterwards was induced to consent that Austria should make a proposal such as she might conceive it would be fitting he should accept. With this view Prince Metternich transmitted a note to Prince Hardenberg, in which, after expressing his desire to see Prussia strengthened as much as possible, in order that (allied with Austria) the two together, using their influence in Germany, might be a barrier against the power either of France or Russia, he declared that he opposed the cession of the whole of Saxony, as being a barrier to that union between the two Powers which he was desirous of seeing established; that such a measure would be objected to by all the States of Germany; that it would oblige them to look for protection to France, who had declared against it; and that it would entirely destroy every hope of establishing a permanent settlement of Europe. Prince Metternich yielded upon the point of Mayence, and proposed a territorial arrangement by which the population of Prussia would be raised to 9,688,890, being an augmentation of 217,200 above what she possessed in 1805.

No. 1.

Copy of the CONFIDENTIAL LETTER of PRINCE METTERNICH, Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs, to PRINCE HARDENBERG, Chancellor of State of His Prussian Majesty. Dated Vienna, October 22, 1814.

“ I have received the confidential letter which your Highness did me the honour of addressing to me on the 9th of October; and having submitted the same to the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty has authorized me to give the Prussian Cabinet the fullest explanation of his views upon the subject in the following answer:—

“ No further assurances are necessary, on the part of His

Imperial Majesty, to prove the interest he takes in the prosperity of Prussia, because, from the very day when His Imperial Majesty took upon himself to advise the King still to continue to yield to the noble incentive which, about the close of the year 1812, had impelled him to prepare the means of seconding the exertions which the Emperor of Russia had declared he would make for maintaining the cause of the independence of Europe, the determination of His Imperial Majesty not to separate his interests from those of Prussia could no longer admit of a doubt. Resolved either to save Europe by uniting himself, both in views and efforts, with the Powers confederated for that purpose, or else to share, with Prussia, all the chances of disaster, the Emperor has never for one single moment deviated from the line he had marked out for himself. The enterprise of the Allies having been crowned with complete success, His Imperial Majesty availed himself of every opportunity of proving to all Europe, not only the absence of every personal consideration on his part, but also the confidence he reposed in his friends the Sovereigns, his regard for their interests, and his solicitude for those of Prussia.

" Convinced that the sole result worthy of efforts so vast, of sacrifices so immense, would be the establishment of a system of peace founded upon an equitable re-distribution of power among the crowned heads, the Emperor accepted, as one of the primary bases of that system, the reconstruction of the Prussian Monarchy upon a scale commensurate with its former fullest dimensions, nor does he hesitate to declare, that he should view the aggrandizement of that kingdom, even were it to exceed those limits, without the slightest degree of jealousy.

" It was the Austrian Cabinet with which originated the idea of a system of intermediate power, based upon the closest union between Austria and Prussia, and strengthened by that of a German Confederation, itself placed under the equal influence of the above two States, without, however, Germany ceasing on that account to constitute one entire political body. The whole line of policy pursued by Austria, and every treaty concluded by her, are stamped with the impress of this idea, which, in its development, no less than by the close union of the Central States naturally resulting therefrom, would offer to Germany a guarantee of tranquillity, and to the whole of Europe a pledge of peace.

" So salutary a system has, however, found itself directly traversed by certain pretensions which have lately been advanced.

“ Three objects more particularly awaken, at the present moment, the anxious solicitude of the two Cabinets.

“ One of these is how to prescribe bounds to the views which Russia develops in a manner as threatening for the peace of Europe, as they are contrary to the text of the treaty of alliance with Austria and Prussia. The fate of Saxony, and the redistribution of the territories provisionally occupied by the Allies, form the two others.

“ The Emperor considers the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw as too intimately connected with the direct interests of the two participating Powers of Poland, as well as with those of entire Europe, for it to be confounded with that of any other.

“ Prussia has motives at least as powerful as those which influence Austria for preventing Russia from overstepping certain limits, and for not allowing her to take possession of certain points of defence necessary to the two Monarchies.

“ The Emperor is not less desirous than is the King of having it in his power to cement, still more and more firmly, the relations most in accordance with his sentiments of attachment and personal gratitude to the Emperor of Russia ; but he cannot persuade himself that such relations can continue to exist, if they be not based upon principles founded upon the maxims of a sound policy.

“ The Emperor entertains not the least doubt that his sentiments and principles are shared by the King, and he relies upon his aid in support of a cause involving their dearest interests, which is supported by the highest Powers of Europe, and in favour of which the express terms of treaties pronounce,—as well as the principles which have guided the Emperor Alexander himself throughout his brilliant career.

“ The Emperor has authorized me to come to an understanding with your Highness and Lord Castlereagh upon the immediate effect to be given to the luminous views laid down in the Minute of that Secretary of State.

“ The pretensions of Prussia to an entire incorporation of Saxony in her monarchy have been to the Emperor a real cause of regret. Without entering into any discussion of right with reference to such an act, His Imperial Majesty sees with concern that, under a system professing to be one of reparation, it should be possible for one of the most ancient dynasties of Europe to be threatened with the loss of all its hereditary patrimony. Austria is, for many reasons, directly interested in the preserva-

tion of Saxony, besides which, very intimate family ties exist between His Imperial Majesty and the Royal Family, On the other hand, the Emperor foresees that very angry disputes may arise on the part of many other Powers. He regards the execution of this scheme of total incorporation as a source whence will infallibly arise, among the other German Powers, a sentiment of direct mistrust towards Prussia and of prejudice against Austria; and he is convinced that the whole of Germany will censure the concurrence of the two Courts in a question, the very nature of which is so contrary to the general feeling upon that subject.

“Weighty as these reflections undoubtedly are, the Emperor cannot, however, but regard them as secondary to a consideration of still greater importance; one, indeed, so intimately connected with the general interests of Europe as is the increase of the power of Prussia upon the scale contemplated by the treaties.

“The interest taken by Russia in the total incorporation of Saxony by no means diminishes the regret of His Imperial Majesty, and he earnestly desires the King would in his wisdom be pleased to sum up the inconveniences resulting from the total annexation of the Kingdom of Saxony to his Monarchy, and then compare the amount with that of those which both Prussia and Austria would avoid by the preservation of a part of that kingdom adjoining the frontiers of Bohemia.

“Should, however, the force of circumstances render, in the end, the annexation of Saxony inevitable, His Majesty would, at all events, be compelled to make his consent thereto dependent upon the following express conditions:—

“1. That this question be considered, in conjunction with the other territorial arrangements of Germany, under the points of view I am about to explain in detail to your Highness; as well as

“2. Under the express reservation of arrangements to be entered into between the two Powers, as regards certain points connected with the frontiers; the state of fortifications of certain fortresses; the arrangements respecting commerce; and lastly, the free navigation of the Elbe.

“The bases laid down by the Emperor as *sine quâ non* conditions for any arrangement whatsoever in Germany, are simple ones, and result from the very nature of things; without them it would be impossible to imagine a state of real tranquillity, and, inasmuch as Austria has made immense sacrifices for the principle of union, she cannot forego the means of

making her direct relations with her neighbours rest upon the mutual advantage of the parties interested.

“ I proceed to explain :—

“ The more His Imperial Majesty is averse from ever desiring to see Germany divided into North and South, the greater his wish to preserve, as the fundamental principle of the future federal contract, a perfect unity, and the more he aims at establishing the most complete equilibrium in the influence which Austria and Prussia may be called upon to exercise over Germany, the less he is disposed to confound together the defensive systems of Austria and Prussia.

“ To commit such a fault as this, to permit one of these systems to encroach, in a direct manner, upon the other, would be tantamount either to annihilating both, or to making the one so subordinate to the other, that the equality of protection and influence of the two great German Powers would, from that moment, cease to exist.

“ The Emperor considers the line of the Mein, including Mayence, as equally necessary for the defence of the South of Germany and for the security of his own dominions.

“ He therefore insists upon this line remaining to the South. There would be no possibility of completing the allotments of the Princes of the South were Prussia to extend her possessions upon the right bank of the Moselle. He consequently establishes that river as the line of demarcation.

“ Without entering into any further details or calculations, it is evident that the security of the Prussian States is free from all risk whatsoever, enjoying as they do the protection of the fortresses of Belgium and Holland, as well as from their system of defence being strengthened and completed by the citadels of Luxemburg, Juliers, Wesel, and Ehrenbreistein, by the line of the Lahn, and by that of the Wesel, the Elbe, and the Oder. The Emperor will never give up reckoning among his means of defence the only important fortress by which the rapidity of an enemy's march upon the Lower Danube could be effectually opposed, and as little can he dispossess himself of the only commercial outlet which remains to him in the direction of the Northern seas.

“ In recapitulating the contents of the present overture, I think it my duty to make a summary of it in the following propositions :

“ 1. The Emperor indulges but one political wish, — that

of the most entire concurrence, both in views and interests, with Prussia.

“ 2. He relies upon the mutual support and the absolute conformity of action of the two Courts in the Polish question.

“ 3. He makes his consent to the incorporation of the Kingdom of Saxony to depend upon the above-mentioned reservations. At the same time he most earnestly requests His Prussian Majesty to consider whether he would not be able to obtain the object of enlarging his dominions, by preserving a nucleus of that kingdom, and thus rendering it unnecessary to assign an allotment to the King of Saxony by way of indemnity.

“ The Emperor insists upon the rétention of the Mein in the defensive line of the South, as also that the course of the Moselle shall separate the two portions of territory susceptible of being made subservient to the means of arrangements and of indemnities for the Princes of the North and South of Germany.

“ The Emperor being more interested than any other Power in placing the fortress of Mayence in such a state of defence as may defy all surprise, reserves to himself the entering into further explanations touching the means of accomplishing that object, such means being compatible with his direct relations with Bavaria, and likewise with the possibility of arranging the territorial allotments of Germany. As the measures to be adopted with this object are closely connected with the establishment of the federative compact, and with the means to be concerted for the defence of the Confederation, His Imperial Majesty is not of opinion that the discussion of them can be separated from that of these two objects.

“ 5. His Imperial Majesty unites all these questions in one and the same body of negotiations; what he promises he will maintain, connecting, at the same time, his promises with an engagement founded upon the principle of a perfect reciprocity. I have had the honour of explaining myself verbally to your Highness upon the provisional occupation of Saxony by the Prussian troops. I can only refer you to what I have said to you on the subject, and the Emperor flatters himself that the King will have derived from this proceeding fresh proofs both of his confidence and of his desire to do all in his power to serve those interests which he has accustomed himself not to separate from his own.”

When this note was transmitted to Prince Harden-

berg, a communication of all that had taken place upon the Saxon question was made to Prince Talleyrand, to which he replied, "That justice was the only basis on which the repose of Europe could be established, and that not to depart from this principle was the leading instruction he had received from the King his master. That with this feeling, his great desire would have been to see Poland restored to independence; that its partition in former times had been the prelude of the system of spoliation which followed; that the next great question was Saxony, and that to agree to the propositions now put forward respecting it, was to decide that kings might be judged, and without being heard condemned, they and their people punished, and confiscation reintroduced into the politics of Europe; that the people have no longer any rights; that they are like the beasts of the field, to be disposed of by conquerors; that the nations of Europe no longer exist in civil society together; that public rights are at an end; and that all arrangements among States are legitimate where force commands; that Europe had suffered too much, not to have a right to repudiate such principles. That as to a balance of power, the occupation of Saxony by Prussia would destroy the influence of Austria, and would dangerously increase the power of Prussia: that France, therefore, would not agree to anything further than what was proposed by Austria, namely, the reconstruction of Prussia by cessions made by the King of Saxony."

No. 2.

Translation of the LETTER written by PRINCE TALLEYRAND to
PRINCE METTERNICH.

"PRINCE,

"Vienna, 19 December, 1814.

"I lost no time in fulfilling the wishes of His Imperial Royal and Apostolic Majesty, conveyed in the letter you did me

the honour of writing to me; and I have also brought to the knowledge of His Most Catholic Majesty, the confidential note addressed by you on the 10th instant, to the Chancellor of State Prince Hardenberg, and which you communicated to me officially.

“To answer for the satisfaction which the resolutions announced in that note will afford the King, I have only to compare them with the orders given by His Majesty to his ambassadors at the Congress.

“France had no ambitious views, no selfish considerations to carry thither. Replaced within her ancient boundaries, she no longer thought of enlarging them, resembling in this the ocean, which only transgresses its limits after it has been lashed into fury by the tempest. Her armies, covered with glory, no longer aspire to fresh conquests. Delivered from that tyranny of which she had been less the instrument than the victim, happy in having recovered her legitimate princes, and with them that tranquillity which she had reason to fear she might have lost for ever, she had no claims to assert, no pretensions to raise. She has advanced none, and none will she advance. There still, however, remained for her to wish that the work of restitution might be accomplished for the whole of Europe, as well as for herself; that the revolutionary spirit might cease everywhere and for ever; that every legitimate right might be rendered sacred; and that every ambitious or unjust enterprise should find its condemnation, as well as a perpetual obstacle, in an explicit recognition and in a formal guarantee of those principles of which the Revolution has only been one long and fatal act of forgetfulness. This desire of France should also be that of every European State that is not wilfully blind. Without such an order of things, no one can for a single moment look with confidence to the future. Never was a nobler object proposed to the Governments of Europe: never was a result more necessary, and never could there be such hope of obtaining it, as at the period when the whole of Christendom was, for the first time, summoned to form a Congress. Perhaps this result might have been already completely attained if, as the King had hoped would have been the case, the Congress, upon assembling, had, while laying down the principles, defined the object and traced the only road by which it could be arrived at. Then, there is no doubt, certain Powers would not have been seen to make a pretext for destruction, of what could only have conservatism

for its end. Certainly, when the treaty of the 30th May determined that the last result of the operations of the Congress should be a *bonâ fide* and durable balance of power, it did not contemplate confounding together, in one and the same mass, all territories and all peoples, for the purpose of again dividing them according to certain proportions. It intended that every legitimate dynasty should either be preserved or re-established, that every legitimate right should be respected, and that vacant territories—that is to say, territories without a sovereign—should be distributed conformably to the principles conservatory of the rights of each and of the tranquillity of all. But it would be a very strange error to consider as the exclusive element of the balance of power, those quantities which are computed by political arithmeticians. ‘Athens,’ (says Montesquieu) ‘possessed the same forces both when she dictated the law with so much glory, and when degraded to a state of slavery: she had 20,000 citizens when she defended the Greeks against the Persians, when she disputed empire with Sparta, and when she attacked Sicily. She had 20,000 when dismembered by Demetrius of Phalerus, and when her citizens were counted like slaves in a market.’

“The balance of power, then, will be nothing but empty words, if abstraction be made, not of that ephemeral and delusive strength created by the passions, but of that real moral power which consists in virtue. Now in the relations that exist between one people and another, the first of all the virtues is justice.

“Impressed with these sentiments, the King has prescribed it as an invariable rule to his ambassadors, to seek, above all, that which is just, never to swerve therefrom under any circumstances, nor for any considerations whatsoever, to subscribe to, or acquiesce in, nothing that may be opposed to it, and, as legitimate combinations arise, to avail themselves of such as may most efficaciously contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a true equilibrium.

“Of all the questions to be mooted at the Congress, that of Poland would have been regarded by the King as the first, the greatest, the one pre-eminently European, superior beyond all comparison to every other, could His Majesty have hoped as much as he desired that a people so worthy of the sympathies of all other nations, on account of its antiquity, its valour, the services it formerly rendered to Europe, and its misfortunes, could be

restored to its pristine and complete independence. The partition which erased its name from the catalogue of nations, was the prelude, partly the cause, and, to a certain degree perhaps, the pretext for those convulsions of which Europe has been the victim. But when the force of circumstances, prevailing over even the noblest and most generous intentions of the Sovereigns who are in possession of the provinces formerly belonging to Poland, had reduced the Polish question to a mere affair of partition and limits, discussed by the Powers interested amongst themselves, and to which their special treaties had rendered France a stranger, all that remained to the latter, after having offered, as she has done, to support those claims which were the most equitable, was to wish that you might be satisfied, and to be so herself, if you were.

“From that moment the question of Poland could no longer hold that pre-eminence, not for France alone, but even for Europe itself, which it would have had, in the above supposition; and the question of Saxony then became the most important and the first of all, because there is at present no other in which the two principles of legitimacy and balance of power are compromised to so great an extent, as they are by the mode in which it is proposed to dispose of that kingdom.

“To recognise such a disposition as a legitimate one, it would be necessary to admit as just principles, that kings can be tried by him who has the wish and the power to possess himself of their dominions; that they can be condemned without having been heard, or having had an opportunity of defending themselves; that in their condemnation are necessarily involved their families and subjects; that confiscation, which enlightened nations have banished from their code, must, in the nineteenth century, be sanctioned by the general law of Europe, although there is no doubt that the confiscation of an entire kingdom is more odious than that of a peasant's hut; that peoples have no rights distinct and separate from those of their sovereigns, and that they may be assimilated to the cattle on a farm; that sovereignty is forfeited by the sole fact of conquest; that the nations of Europe are united to each other by no other moral ties than those which bind them to the islanders of the Southern Ocean: that they live among themselves by the law of pure nature alone; and that what is called the public law of Europe does not in fact exist, seeing, that although civil societies throughout the globe are either wholly or partially governed by

customs which have for them the force of laws, yet, nevertheless, the customs which are established among the nations of Europe, and which have universally, constantly, and reciprocally, been observed by them for three centuries, are not a law for them; in short, that might constitutes right. But Europe, to whom these doctrines have been productive of so many evils, and have cost it so many tears and so much blood, Europe has but too dearly purchased the right to detest and execrate them, and they excite everywhere the same horror, whether at Vienna, St. Petersburg, London, Paris, Madrid, or Lisbon.

"The disposition intended to be made of the kingdom of Saxony, however pernicious as an example, would be infinitely more so by its influence upon the general equilibrium of Europe, an equilibrium which consists in a due relation between the aggressive forces and the reciprocal resisting ones of the various political bodies: for it would wound them in two ways, both very serious ones.

"1st. By creating a very great aggressive force against Bohemia, and thereby menacing the security of Austria; for the resisting force proper to Bohemia must be proportionately increased, which could only be done at the expense of the general resisting force of the Austrian monarchy. Now the safety of Austria is of too much importance to Europe not to awaken the King's most anxious solicitude. 2nd. By creating in the very heart of the Germanic body, and for one of its members, an aggressive force wholly disproportionate to the resisting force of all the others; and which, by exposing the latter to a danger always imminent, and by compelling them to seek support from without, would nullify the resisting force, which, in the general system of the European balance of power, the aggregate body should present, but which it cannot possess without the intimate union of its members.

"France, like Austria, can truly say that she entertains against Prussia not the slightest feeling of jealousy or animosity; and it is precisely because she takes a sincere interest in her, that she cannot desire to see her obtain apparent advantages which, acquired by injustice and being dangerous to Europe, would, sooner or later, become fatal to herself. The acquisition by Prussia of all those which she may legitimately obtain, so far from meeting with opposition from France, she would be the first to congratulate her upon them. Let the question then no longer be what portions of Saxony the King of Prussia will cede

to the King of Saxony, a question by which every idea of justice is overturned ; but if it be asked what part of Saxony its King must cede to the King of Prussia, and if the more completely to confer upon Prussia an existence equal to that it had in 1805, certain cessions on the part of the King of Saxony should be necessary, the King of France will be the first to persuade that Prince to make such as are compatible with the interests both of Austria and Prussia, which, on this point, constitute the general interest of Europe. Your Highness, it appears to me, indicated the just proportion in the table annexed to your note.

“His Most Catholic Majesty, unalterably determined not to sanction, even by his silence, the execution of the schemes formed against the King and kingdom of Saxony, but wishing to believe that those schemes are the produce of some error or delusion, which a more attentive examination will dissipate, full of confidence in the personal integrity and sentiments of His Majesty the King of Prussia, who has himself also been acquainted with misfortune, knowing all that the influence of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia is capable of effecting, and all that he has a right to expect from the noble qualities which distinguish that monarch, and lastly persuaded that in a just cause one should never despair, His Majesty has not wholly despaired of that of Saxony, and will still less do so upon learning that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, with a determination worthy of him, shall have undertaken its defence upon high grounds, and declared that he will not abandon it.

(Signed) PRINCE TALLEYRAND.”

Prince Hardenberg, in a note of the 16th December, refused the propositions made in lieu of Saxony, and offered the King of that country an indemnity on the left bank of the Rhine, to consist of the Duchy of Luxemburg, a part of the Archbishopric of Treves, the southern part of the Duchy of Cologne, and Pruzm, Stavelot, and Malmesey, the whole forming a population of 700,000 souls ; Luxemburg, like Mayence, was to become an Imperial City. He declared that Russia and Prussia had desired to treat upon this question *conjointement*, and that as they were in possession of Saxony, if it was not ceded to him and recognised by

the other Powers, he should consider it fatal to any amicable adjustment. This language was met on the part of Lord Castlereagh by an explicit statement, that if such terms were persisted in, it would be better to break up the Congress; that there was no longer the means of deliberating, as neither Great Britain, nor France, nor Austria, nor any part of Germany would agree to them. That although in consequence of the hostile conduct of the King of Saxony during the war, these Powers might not have held his rights as paramount to any general political arrangement of Europe—yet as a most menacing attitude assumed by Russia (in the case of Poland) had been abandoned, they certainly would not now entertain such a proposition as the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia. It would be most unpopular throughout the world, particularly in England, and it would be the worst policy for Prussia. The strong language of Prince Hardenberg, although it was afterwards softened down, made so serious an impression upon the other Powers, that they determined to unite in resisting anything which might assume the appearance of dictation. A defensive treaty was therefore executed between Great Britain, Austria, and France, confined to this extraordinary case, and it was afterwards acceded to by Holland, Bavaria, and Hanover. It was at the same time agreed that the presence of M. de Talleyrand at all future conferences on the Polish and Saxon question should be insisted upon, in consequence of which Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich, on the 2nd of January, declared in the conference of the Plenipotentiaries, that they would not enter upon the question of Saxony unless the French Plenipotentiary was admitted.

These measures were crowned with entire success. The Cabinet of Prussia consented to accept of the proposed modifications, and on the 5th January Prince

Hardenberg communicated this determination to Lord Castlereagh, and asked for his assistance in bringing about the new plan of arrangements he was willing to adopt. This proposal was readily agreed to, upon condition, however, that the attempt, which was stated as about to be made by Prussia, to persuade the King of Saxony to accept of the offer of an indemnity on the left bank of the Rhine should be given up. Such an arrangement it was thought would be most objectionable in every point of view; it would place this new Power in the hands of France, who (as it was stated by Prince Talleyrand) decidedly refused to agree to it, although, if she were ambitious, she might have desired to see it carried into effect. Lord Castlereagh used the same arguments with the Emperor of Russia, and declared he would avail himself of the right, to which he was entitled by the Treaty of Chaumont, to refuse his consent to it.

The Emperor, in this conversation, alluded to the treaty he suspected had been made between Great Britain, France, Austria, and Bavaria, which Lord Castlereagh could not avow, but did not choose to deny; he stated the alarm which had been felt at the language held in these discussions, but added, that if the sentiments of those from whom it proceeded were as pacific as His Majesty had stated them to be, they had nothing to apprehend from the Powers he alluded to. Lord Castlereagh showed the Emperor the plan proposed for the reconstruction of Prussia, accompanied by a declaration, that if it was agreed to, both himself and Prince Talleyrand would support Prussia in the occupation of what was therein surrendered to her, notwithstanding the refusal of the King of Saxony to accept the arrangement.

The Emperor stated, that if Prussia was satisfied, he would agree to the modifications now brought forward,

and in the conference of the following day, Prussia declared her consent to them. In this, the fourth, conference, Russia agreed to the counter projects of Austria on the Polish question, and the admission of the French Plenipotentiary to the next conference was decided upon. Lord Castlereagh on this day placed on the protocol of the conferences, a protest against the erection of a Polish kingdom under the Crown of Russia, restating in it his former objections to the measure, lamenting that Poland had not been made independent, foreseeing great evils from the course pursued, and strongly recommending that the Poles should henceforward be governed by each Power to whom they might belong, as Poles, and not be treated as under a foreign yoke. Prince Talleyrand declared that he partook in all the feelings announced in this protest, and the Russian Minister also stated that the Emperor his master entirely agreed to them, arguing that His Majesty's conduct was in conformity with them in seeking to secure, as far as was in his power, the general happiness of the Poles, by obtaining for them a separate and national government.

While by the consent of Prussia to the modifications proposed on the Saxon question all further difficulties upon that subject appeared to be removed, a fresh discussion arose in consequence of the desire of Austria to preserve to the King of Saxony the fortresses of Erfurt and Torgau. Lord Castlereagh made a strong representation against these pretensions, declaring that unless the original plan of arrangements was adhered to with regard to Saxony, he should withdraw from the engagements into which he had entered. Lord Castlereagh had an audience of the Emperor of Austria upon this question, and found him strongly impressed with the necessity of adhering to the plan his Ministers had proposed, and desiring at least that the fortifica-

tions of Torgau should be destroyed. Prince Talleyrand to a certain extent agreed with these sentiments; but Prince Metternich, after some hesitation, consented to cede these places, on condition, however, that Leipsic should be preserved to Saxony. Prince Hardenberg strongly objected to giving up this important city, and he was strongly supported by the general feeling of the Prussian Cabinet.

To get over this difficulty Lord Castlereagh applied to the Emperor of Russia, who, to make the arrangement more palatable to Prussia, placed Thorn at his disposal, by the promise of which Prince Hardenberg was induced to abandon Leipsic, but accompanied by such modifications of the general plan proposed as were thought to be objectionable. Lord Castlereagh then determined to make a sacrifice on the part of the Prince Regent, from the amount of the compensations which he laid claim to in Germany, and of an equal sacrifice on the part of the Prince of Orange. Prince Metternich and Prince Talleyrand consented to this arrangement, and Lord Castlereagh proposed it to Prince Hardenberg, who at first rejected it; but after much discussion, seeing that the Prince Regent was thus making a considerable sacrifice to obtain a settlement for the King of Saxony, he accepted the proposal, by which Prussia received 850,000 Saxon subjects, and there remained to the King 1,200,000.

Thus, in the beginning of February, this great subject of contention was brought to a conclusion, and the Treaties between the three Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were drawn up, in which the stipulations for the limits of the different States were defined, and in which the city of Cracow, with a territory around it, was declared a free and independent State, and these Treaties were signed at Vienna on the 3rd of May, 1815. The conduct of the King of Saxony in

returning from Bohemia after the battle of Lutzen to join Bonaparte (thereby giving all the aid in his power to the enemy of Europe), was felt to be sufficient ground to refuse his claim to retain the whole of his dominions. He objected, however, at first to accept the portion which was reserved for him, upon which the Allies decided at once to give over to Prussia the districts which had been ceded to her, and to allow her to continue in the provisional government of the part which was to belong to Saxony. When at a later period the King of Saxony showed a disposition to accept the offer which had been made to him, the Prussians were unwilling to give up what was only held by them in deposit, stating as a reason, the doubts they entertained, of the King's sincerity as regarded the general alliance against France; but the Emperor of Russia and the Duke of Wellington (who had replaced Lord Castlereagh at the Congress) declared the stipulations must be adhered to, and in the end of March the formal tender of his kingdom according to the new arrangements was made to the King of Saxony, and accepted by him.

During the time in which the discussions which have been related were carried on, the Congress had been employed in various other arrangements. With regard to Italy, the propositions of Austria as to the territories which were to form part of her empire, and which included the greater part of the Kingdom of Italy as established by Napoleon,* having been agreed to, the next question of importance was the settlement of the claims with regard to Naples and Sicily.

The intimate connexion between these two countries makes it of interest to state here the language which the British Minister was at that time directed to hold in Sicily. By a letter of Lord Castlereagh to Sir W.

* See the Organisation of the Army of the Kingdom of Italy in the Appendix (Letter A), No. 3.

A'Court, dated Vienna, 29th September, 1814, he was authorised to announce to King Ferdinand IV., that Great Britain, in accordance with his desire, would allow the British troops to remain a short time longer in Sicily; but that he was to declare that it was the anxious wish of the English Government speedily to withdraw them. With regard to the Sicilian Constitution, although some of its regulations were admitted to have been too restrictive of the authority of the Crown, yet the repeated non-observance of its principles since the return of the King to the administration of his States had been seen with regret. The Prince Regent had hoped that the advantages of a Constitution would have secured the prosperity of Sicily, including the interests both of the Crown and of the people.

Sir W. A'Court was authorised to present a memorial tending to bring these parties to a compromise, and to secure the advantages of each. He was instructed that the example of the King of France might be cited, and that the King of Sicily should be encouraged to act in a similar way; that he should be told how fatal the breach of promise to maintain the Constitution would be to his interests in Naples; and that the British Government felt how deeply its honour was engaged in supporting the friends of the Constitution, whom it was called upon to protect against the vengeance of those at present in power. Sir W. A'Court, in making this declaration, was ordered to procure, if possible, some mark of favour for these persons, and a formal promise was to be demanded as to their protection, upon the attainment of which was to rest the continuance of British support; and unless this was obtained all advances of money were to be suspended, and the British Government would take no step towards the re-establishment of the King in Naples.*

* See in Appendix, Memorandum presented by Sir W. A'Court, 20th October, 1814 (No. 4).

With reference to this mention of the probability of King Ferdinand's return to Naples, it is of interest to state that when Lord Castlereagh passed through Paris on his way to the Congress of Vienna, and at his audience of the King of France, His Majesty represented to him how anxiously he desired to see the Kingdom of Naples restored to its legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand, and he stated that he had instructed his Ministers at the Congress to bring forward the question, and to use every endeavour to induce Prince Metternich to adopt his views upon that subject. The King stated that he felt the attainment of this object to be most important to him both in a dynastic point of view, and politically, as while Murat was at the head of the state of Naples, the aspirations of every revolutionary enthusiast would be to extend his empire and the democratic principle it represented. His Majesty also declared to Lord Castlereagh, the strong conviction which he felt, that, while Napoleon was in the island of Elba and Murat in Naples, there would constantly be communication between them, and that their own intrigues connected with their numerous partisans throughout Italy who had been displaced from their positions, and disappointed in their hopes of power and emolument, by the total overthrow of the French dominion in that country, would be so combined as to maintain a general agitation, if not to cause a more serious revolt and convulsion in that country.

Lord Castlereagh represented to His Majesty the difficulties and dangers which might attend any action undertaken at present in the direction to which His Majesty pointed; but that it was a question which more directly concerned the Austrian Government, for it was upon the basis of their treaty with Naples that the Armistice between Great Britain and that country was established, and that as His Majesty had stated,

that his Ambassadors had orders to bring the subject before the Congress, he might rely upon it that the most serious consideration would be given to it; Lord Castlereagh also stated that as His Majesty had alluded to Napoleon's residence in Elba, he would take the opportunity of mentioning that from Sir N. Campbell (who, upon the invitation of Napoleon, and the consequent orders he had received from his Government, was residing there), he had been informed of Napoleon's complaint that the full amount of the money due to him according to the Treaty of Fontainebleau had not been remitted, and Lord Castlereagh consequently entreated His Majesty to send a person to the island to settle this account, so that no well-founded complaints upon such a subject might be more seriously brought forward. The King gave Lord Castlereagh the assurance that he did not believe that any complaint of such a nature could be established, but that he would desire it to be enquired into and satisfactorily settled.

When at the latter end of February this Neapolitan question was brought by Prince Talleyrand before the Congress, Prince Metternich stated, that the Emperor of Austria could not take up the question as one of legitimacy, since Austria had recognised Murat as King of Naples, but that the maintaining the treaty which had been made with him, as well as the continued recognition of his authority, was always made to depend upon the reciprocity of Murat's conduct, who was bound to co-operate cordially with the Allies in the late campaign of Italy; that it appeared from the reports of Marshal Bellegarde, of General Nugent, and of Lord W. Bentinck that this was not the case, and that, even at the present moment, instead of limiting his views to the preservation of his kingdom, he was framing extensive projects for future aggression, and (in opposition to the reclamations of the Pope) was maintaining

possession of the marches, together with the fortress of Ancona; that all these things being taken into consideration, he, Prince Metternich, would not disguise from Prince Talleyrand that he was not blind to the inconvenience of leaving an ambitious soldier of Bonaparte's on the throne of that kingdom. The ultimate repose of Italy might be dependent upon the decision of this question.

The Emperor certainly saw with alarm the revolutionary principle, which was evidently re-establishing itself in that country; but he knew the difficulties of the situation, particularly with the menacing appearance of things in the north of Europe, and he strongly felt the danger of a war in Italy, undertaken upon the plea of national independence. With respect to the attack of Naples by a French army, to what dangers would not this expose both France and Europe! The Emperor could not allow such an expedition to pass through his states, and by sea it must take time to prepare it, and it must be protected by England. Prince Metternich, therefore, recommended patience for the moment; the time might come when Murat would not be disinclined to enter into some advantageous compromise.

If the Congress ended without his being recognised either by England or the Bourbons, and without a peace between Naples and Sicily, Austria would have a favourable opportunity of coming forward and making such propositions as might be acceptable to all parties. Lord Castlereagh held generally the same language. England was in no way bound to Murat, she had only an armistice with him, dependent upon his maintenance of the Treaty with Austria.

He therefore pressed Prince Talleyrand to let the question rest for the moment, and when the other arrangements of the Congress were terminated, Russia

and England, in conjunction with Austria, might make such proposals to Murat as it might be for his interest to agree to.

While these questions were agitated in Vienna, Count Blacas, at Paris, declared there was no sacrifice the King of France would not make to see Murat driven from Naples. While he was there and Bonaparte at Elba, the King could never be secure on his throne. He announced the determination of France to send an expedition against Naples, and requested that Austria should at least declare her neutrality in the contest which might result from it. The King of France was forced to adopt this measure, first by the representations of his most attached friends; next by those of Bonaparte's former generals, who were jealous of Murat's fortune; and lastly, by the army, which desired a war. If Austria would not agree to this, Count Blacas required that she should make a second Convention, binding herself in conjunction with France to drive Murat from his throne, six months after the close of the Congress. He wished also that the Powers of Europe should declare his *déchéance*.

During the time these discussions were going on, information was sought for, both by Prince Metternich and Lord Castlereagh, as to the conduct of Murat during the previous year of 1814, while co-operating with the Austrian armies in Italy, in order that a judgment might be formed from it how far he had fulfilled his engagements with that Government.

With a view of removing the unfavourable impressions which the Duke of Campochiaro was aware existed upon that subject, he laid before Lord Castlereagh (as stated in his despatch of the 7th Dec. 1814) an historical memoir on the political and military conduct of Murat from the battle of Leipsic to the peace of Paris, 30th May, 1814. In this expo-

sition of facts and circumstances, it was attempted to show :—

- “ 1. That Murat broke with France at a time when that Power had still a preponderance in Italy.
- “ 2. That he did everything which depended upon him to accede as early as possible to the coalition.
- “ 3. That he began to act against France before the treaty signed with Austria was ratified by her, and without waiting for the accession of the other Powers.
- “ 4. That he conquered the whole of Italy, as far as the Po, from the French army.
- “ 5. That his army was several times engaged with the enemy, that he lost considerable numbers of men, and that the King exposed his own person in support of the common cause.
- “ 6. That it was not in his power to obtain more decisive success was to be attributed to—First, the unexpected delay in the ratification of his Treaty of Alliance with Austria; secondly, the extraordinary conduct of Lord William Bentinck; and, finally, to the dilatory movements of Marshal Bellegarde.”

The Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 relate only to the degree of accession given by the other allied Powers to the treaty with Austria; the 13th states :—

“ That, to sum up the whole, the King, as an ally of Austria, and thus, according to the Treaty of Paris, being at peace with France, and who, before the war, had been acknowledged by all the powers of the Continent, was strengthened by his treaty with Austria, by the accession of the other allied Powers to that treaty, particularly England, by His Majesty's effectual co-operation in the cause of the coalition; and, in a word, by the Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris, the 30th May, 1814.”

In reply to this document, General Nugent, who had commanded the Austrian corps more immediately in conjunction with the Neapolitans in the Italian campaign of 1814, transmitted a memoir to the Congress,

in which he denied that Murat had rendered any service whatsoever. That, on the contrary, he had thwarted all the movements which he, General Nugent, had undertaken; that when he marched upon Placentia, the Neapolitan General at Reggio refused to let him pass, notwithstanding which he afterwards advanced against that place, and at the moment he was going to attack it Murat joined him and ordered him to retire, and thus forced him to give up an operation which promised the most decisive advantages. That it was not true that Murat had ordered, as he pretended, the passage of the Po at Saca, or the attack and capture of Casal Maggiore, but that it was entirely the act of General Nugent, without any communication with the Neapolitan head-quarters. That at another time, when General Grenier, with a corps of 20,000 French troops, advanced upon the position of the Austrians at Parma, Murat gave General Nugent no assistance, and allowed 3000 men of this force to take Guastalla in his rear, the consequence of which was that he was obliged to fight a battle at Parma to give his detachments on the Po time to join him, and then retire towards Modena. That after this affair, when the French had sent back the greater part of their force across the Po to join the Viceroy, General Nugent, notwithstanding the orders of Murat, attacked the remainder of their troops at Reggio, and, having defeated them, he enclosed them in the town; but upon Murat's arrival after the action he was ordered by him to allow them to evacuate it. That for all the above-mentioned reasons, Murat had not fulfilled his engagements, and consequently that the treaty with Austria was as little binding upon her as upon the other Powers.

By the communications from Lord William Bentinck, who was appealed to respecting the conduct which

Murat had pursued during this campaign, it appeared that, in a despatch to General Bellegarde as early as the 25th March, 1814, from Verona, he had stated his conviction that Murat was not acting honestly with the Allies; and when referred to by Lord Castlereagh upon that subject, he replied from Florence, 7th Jan., 1815, that the opportunities he had had of closely observing the whole of Murat's conduct from the period of his return from Leipsic to the end of the war, enabled him to form a tolerably clear conception of his character, his policy, and his good faith, which he expressed in the following words :

“ I can state at once, and without hesitation, that his views and principles were totally at variance with those upon which he offered himself and was accepted as the ally of the coalesced Powers; that he did not perform his engagements; and that, on the contrary, his conduct, although neutral and negative in its general character, was in its results much more beneficial to the enemy than to the common cause.

“ There can be no doubt that all the advantages contemplated from the alliance with Murat by Austria and the Allies would have been realized if he had embarked honestly and cordially in the cause; but his policy was to save his crown, and to do this he must always be on the side of the conqueror. His first agents were sent to me directly after his return from Leipsic. He then thought Napoleon's fortune desperate; his language was plain and sincere. He said, ‘ Give me an armistice, and I will march with the whole of the army against the French; give me the friendship of England, and I care not for Austria or the rest of the world.’

“ Subsequently, when Austria came to seek his alliance, he naturally discovered both his own importance and the uncertain issue of the contest. He then began to entertain views of aggrandisement, and by possessing himself of the whole of the south of Italy he seemed to think he could render himself independent, whatever might be the event of the war.

“ It may be necessary here to say a word of the counsels by which he was surrounded. Your Lordship already knows that the courage of this officer in the field is no less remarkable than

his indecision and uncertainty in the cabinet. This disposition, unfortunately for him, was actively worked upon by two contending parties in his court and army, the one French and the other Neapolitan. Murat's attachment was to France. In all his abuse of Bonaparte there was an evident feeling of fear and respect for him. He coveted above all the good opinion of the French army. His French advisers played upon these feelings, always magnified the successes of the French arms, and endeavoured to keep him in his alliance to their country. He was besides most anxious not to lose his French officers, who, he knew, would not stay with him from the moment his conduct became hostile to France. The Neapolitans, counsellors, army, and nation, were all against France, and were extremely desirous that Murat should join heartily in that cause. His most attached friends regretted his indecision. Living as much with them as I did, declaring always my sentiments with frankness, never concealing my regret at the necessity of the alliance, but, being once made, professing, what I always felt, a sincere desire that it might be productive of all the advantages to both parties which was expected of it—they seemed to consider me as their friend. They excused their master as well as they could, on the score of his old attachments and connexions, from which it was difficult for him to separate. They expressed their hope that I might succeed in determining his conduct. Both of these parties agreed in one sentiment, in that of Italian independence and in the aggrandisement of their chief. I have sometimes thought, when willing to see his conduct in the most favourable point of view, that he himself never knew on which side he was.

“One of the conditions of the armistice made by me at Naples stipulated that a plan of operations should be arranged between three allied corps. In pursuance of this object, Count Neipperg presented to me a *projet de campagne*, by which it was proposed that the Anglo-Sicilian troops should land at Leghorn and operate in the *rivière de Gênes*, drawing its subsistence from Tuscany. The Neapolitan army was to act on the right and the Austrians on the left bank of the Po, each maintaining itself in the countries they respectively occupied. I immediately agreed to it, and despatched Lieut.-Colonel Catinelli, in company with Count Neipperg, to arrange definitively the plan in co-operation with Marshal Bellegarde and Murat. I returned to Sicily; and, in order to avoid all loss of time, I ordered the

troops to proceed directly to Leghorn, and I appointed Lieut.-Colonel Catinelli to meet me at Naples, from whence, upon my return from Palermo, I proceeded by land to Leghorn.

“The Neapolitan army had in the meantime occupied the Roman and Tuscan states. Having followed the steps of this army, my own observations entirely confirm all that has been said in the ‘Paper of Remarks’ (by General Nugent) upon the subject of these first military operations of the Neapolitan army, and upon the misapplication of the term *conquest*, which has been so triumphantly used upon this occasion. The truth is, that everywhere there was an apparent concert between the French and Neapolitan authorities; there was no act of hostility on either side. The French garrisons were allowed quietly to evacuate all the fortresses and to reinforce the Viceroy in the north of Italy. Nobody believed that Murat was at war with France. Murat could not do a better service to Napoleon than by securing the quiet reunion of his scattered troops with the main army, or by taking to himself, and from the allied cause, the benefit of all the resources of the south of Italy, or by weakening by one half the force he stipulated to bring into the field upon the pretended necessity of occupying these conquered countries; nor is this occupation less worthy of remark. Here the manner of a conqueror was assumed. The countries were occupied, as it were, in permanent possession. No allusion was made to the ancient sovereigns. The Neapolitan agents in the Roman states discouraged the idea of the Pope’s return, and the principle of national union and independence was universally proclaimed.”

Lord William Bentinck also states in this despatch that he

“Certainly did hold to Murat the language which his conduct, so unjustifiable and faithless, called for,” because he “felt that the sooner the question of his ill faith was settled the better. He did not serve us as a friend—if our fortune should turn he would cause our ruin as an enemy.” . . . “I presented, in a note to the Duke de Gallo, a written declaration of the verbal assurances given in favour of Murat by Lord Castlereagh, and accompanied these assurances by a review of the conduct he had pursued; and I did so with the object of then establishing and officially recording the reasons upon which

the Allies might punish his infidelity, as well as in the hopes that such conduct might recall him to his duty."

Upon the receipt of all this information by Prince Metternich, together with the reports which came to him from all parts of Italy of the menacing attitude assumed by Murat, by the concentration of his army on the frontier of the Papal States, he presented to the French as well as to the Neapolitan representatives in the Congress, the following communications, by which he announced to both those Governments that His Imperial Majesty his august Sovereign would oppose himself to the passage of the troops of both those countries through the Austrian states in Italy.

No. 1.

Translation of Copy of a NOTE from PRINCE METTERNICH to PRINCE TALLEYRAND. Vienna, 25th February, 1815.

"The undersigned Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial and Royal Majesty has been commanded to make to his Highness Prince Talleyrand the following official communication.

"In the course of the negotiations which have taken place at Vienna between the plenipotentiaries of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, the undersigned has never ceased to give, in the name of the Emperor his august master, proofs of His Imperial Majesty's desire to secure to Italy a definite condition and a tranquillity which is closely connected with that of Europe and of his empire.

"The state of tension which still continues to exist between the Courts of France and Naples has so much the more engaged the Emperor's undivided attention at a time when large musters of troops are being made on the frontiers of the Kingdom of Naples, and concentrations of military forces are also taking place in the south of France.

"However averse His Imperial Majesty may be from attributing to either of the above-named Courts such hostile views as might compromise the tranquillity of Italy, and thereby that of an interesting portion of the Austrian monarchy, the

Emperor has, nevertheless, thought fit to renew the declaration which the undersigned considered himself called upon to make in one of the first conferences, of the firm determination of His Majesty never to permit that by the entrance of foreign troops into Italy the tranquillity of his provinces, or of those governed by the Princes of his family, should be disturbed, as the Emperor must regard every intention or proceeding contrary to that determination as directed against his interests, and consequently against himself.

"The undersigned, at the same time that he makes known to Prince Talleyrand that he transmits a similar declaration, directed to the same object, to the Court of Naples, begs his Highness to accept the assurances, &c., &c."

No. 2.

Translation of Copy of a NOTE from PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of CAMPOCHIARO. Vienna, February 26, 1815.

"The undersigned Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial and Royal Majesty at Vienna has been commanded to make to his Excellency the Duke of Campochiaro the following official communication.

"Ever since the establishment of relations of alliance between the Courts of Vienna and Naples the Imperial Court has never ceased to give the latter proofs of interest, regard, and confidence. The declarations which the Plenipotentiaries of Austria at the Congress had occasion to make at the very first conferences must have left no doubt in the minds of the Powers who have not recognised King Joachim as to the determination of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty not to allow political discussions to degenerate into a state of war which might disturb the peace of Italy. The explanations which have taken place between the undersigned and the Ministers of the King of Naples at the Court of Vienna furnish undeniable proofs of the solicitude of the Austrian Cabinet to contribute, in every possible manner, to remove the difficulties which still prevent friendly relations from being established between the Court of Naples and several other Courts of Europe. His Neapolitan Majesty, however, shows that he is not disposed to listen to the counsels of Austria, by maintaining and reinforcing daily armaments which exhaust the resources of the kingdom, and which, considering their direction, appear much more fitted to keep

up a state of suspense and doubt in Italy than to secure the frontiers from an invasion, the possibility of which is inadmissible, since His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty has decided upon not permitting the passage of foreign troops through his territory. It is with the view of putting a stop to a state of misunderstanding which is prejudicial to all the Powers of Italy, that the Emperor has just caused to be sent by the undersigned to the Plenipotentiaries of France, the annexed declaration, which His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty has, at the same time, ordered him to bring to the knowledge of the Neapolitan Cabinet.

“The undersigned must add the positive assurance that, however disinclined His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty may be to admit the possibility of such an occurrence, he nevertheless cannot but consider any movement made by the Neapolitan army beyond the frontiers of the kingdom and out of the cantonments it now occupies, as a rupture of the alliance, and as directed against himself.

“The undersigned has, &c.”

No. 3.

Translation of Copy of an Official LETTER from PRINCE METTERNICH to the
DUKE DE CAMPOCHIARO. Vienna, 26th February, 1815.

“The Emperor has ordered me to communicate with your Excellency upon the following subjects, which possess an interest too much in common to both Courts not to be taken by them into their deepest consideration.

“The King of Naples continues his armaments, notwithstanding the relations of alliance which exist between him and us. France, on the other hand, is beginning to assemble troops in the south. The Emperor desires the peace of Italy, and has continually furnished proofs of his determination to maintain it, nor can he give stronger ones of this his fixed resolution than by addressing to the Courts of France and Naples the notes which your Excellency will find annexed.

“It is not after a twenty years’ state of war or of dispute, of which the annals of history cannot produce a like example, it is not at a moment when all the great interests of Europe are under discussion, that the Emperor can capitulate as to the measures which must, at length, secure the tranquillity of

countries so interesting for his empire as are his Italian provinces.

"The more His Imperial Majesty has shown moderation in his views, the more he has displayed throughout the course of the negotiations which now occupy us here that spirit of conciliation which characterises him, the more he is entitled to aim at securing to his subjects a state of tranquillity which they so much need, in common with the whole of Europe. In causing the declarations in question to be addressed to the French and Neapolitan Sovereigns, the Emperor is as determined to act upon them, as he is convinced that the satisfactory relations which exist between his Court and those of France and Naples will render unnecessary any extreme measure, which would be as remote from his wishes as it would be contrary to the interests of the respective nations.

"I request your Excellency to bring the present official letter and the notes thereunto annexed to the knowledge of your Court, and to receive the assurances, &c., &c."

Shortly after the date of these despatches, Count Blacas transmitted to Prince Metternich some additional information as to the conduct of Murat during the years 1813 and 14, which he had extracted from the archives of Paris, from which it appeared that, at the end of 1813, Murat had proposed to Bonaparte to assist in defending Italy if all the *French-Italian* departments south of the Po were ceded to him; that Napoleon made no reply to this proposition, but M. de Bernadière gave his opinion that, if Italy was to be divided, the northern part ought to be increased, and not the southern. Several documents relating to the conduct of Murat at this period were transmitted by the Duke of Blacas to Lord Castlereagh, from which the following are extracts.

In the first of these Eliza Bacchiochi, Grand Duchess of Lucca, writing to Napoleon from Lucca, Feb. 14th, 1814, speaks of Murat as appearing to be in a state of great agitation, and she mentions the astonishment he had expressed

“ that she had quitted Tuscany upon the notion that he could be the enemy of Your Majesty and of France.”

She adds—

“ He loudly expresses his devotion and his gratitude to your person, and he even said to the Tuscan Deputies that he would prefer receiving the *first blow*, to drawing his sword against a Frenchman.

“ I know not how to reconcile this language, of which I do not suspect the sincerity, with all the arbitrary measures which have endangered my authority, and those which oblige me even now to provide for the safety of the French troops assembled at Pisa.

“ Your Majesty will appreciate these contradictions, which seem to me to proceed from a resolution deemed by the King conformable to his interests, but in which he has been dragged contrary to his own affections. I am assured that the language and conduct of the King are similar in his communications with the Viceroy.

“ (Signed) ELIZA.”

In a letter to his sister Caroline, Queen of Naples, from Nangis, dated 17th February, 1814, Napoleon says—

“ Your husband is a very brave man in the field of battle, but he is more cowardly than a woman, or a monk, when not in presence of the enemy. He has no moral courage. He has been frightened, and he has not hazarded losing for a moment that which he can only hold by me and with me. Make him fully sensible of his absurdity. When he quitted the army without my order, I foresaw all the evil counsels which would be given to him. I am, however, better satisfied with the message he has sent me through you. If he be sincerely sorry, let him watch the moment for proving to me that he has not been as ungrateful as he is pusillanimous. I may yet pardon him the injury which he has done me.

“ (Signed) NAPOLEON.”

In a letter from the Duke of Otranto to Napoleon, dated Lucca, 18th February, 1814, he reports that

“The Austrian and English Ministers reproach Murat with being French, and particularly with being too much attached to Your Majesty. The Revolutionists, who now govern Florence, assert loudly that the King of Naples has an understanding with the French, and that he deceives the Italians. They attribute to my counsels the inaction of the Neapolitan troops, which the Allies wished should march against the Viceroy at the moment when he was about to be attacked by General Bellegarde. The King is in the greatest distress; he now thoroughly feels in what a situation he is placed: it is difficult for me to send him advice. If there was as much firmness in his character as there are good qualities in his heart, he would be stronger in Italy than the coalition.

(Signed)

“THE DUKE OF OTRANTO.”

Prince Eugene, the Viceroy, in a letter to Napoleon, dated Volta, 20th February, 1814, states that

“The King of Naples, who appeared inclined to march against us, and to yield to the solicitations of the Austrians, changed his project as soon as he became acquainted with Your Majesty’s late victories of the 10th, 11th, and 12th, and had not yet received the ratification of his treaty the evening before last. I hope that he will not add to the wrongs of which he has been guilty towards Your Majesty, by firing upon your troops.

(Signed)

“EUGENE NAPOLEON.”

A letter also from Napoleon to the King of Naples may be added, dated Braine on the Vesle, March 5th, 1814:—

“SIR, MY BROTHER,

“I have already communicated to you my opinion of your conduct. Your situation has turned your head. My reverses have deprived you of your senses. You have surrounded yourself with men who hate France, and who wish to ruin you. I formerly gave you useful warnings. What you write to me is at variance with your actions. I shall, however, see by your manner of acting at Ancona if your heart be still French, and if you yield to necessity alone.

“I write to the Minister at War, in order to tranquillize him with respect to your conduct. Recollect that your kingdom,

which has cost so much blood and trouble to France, is yours only for the benefit of those who gave it you. It is needless to send me an answer, unless you have something important to communicate. Remember that I made you a King solely for the interest of my system. Do not deceive yourself; if you should cease to be a Frenchman, you would be nothing for me. Continue to correspond with the Viceroy, taking care that your letters be not intercepted.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

These communications abundantly confirm the observations of General Nugent, and the opinion expressed by Lord William Bentinck, concerning the character, policy, and faith of Murat, as contained in the documents above referred to, and served to confirm Prince Metternich in the propriety, or rather the necessity, of addressing Murat in the strong language he had adopted in his despatches above inserted.

It is now necessary to record the discussions which took place in Congress upon the other various important interests for which it had been assembled, and, in the first place, with regard to the settlement of the Helvetic Republic. The Conferences which were established for the negociation of the points affecting this country were carried on by the five Powers, *France* being admitted, and, on the part of England, Lord Stewart (afterwards Marquis of Londonderry) being appointed the Commissioner. It was anxiously desired that an exchange might be effected with France of Porentrui for the Pays of Gex, and a negociation was entered into for that purpose. The King of France, however, put an end to it by declaring that he could not cede any portion of the French territory—that it was contrary to the public opinion, but he would make suitable arrangements that the road of Vessoz should be common to both countries.

The Canton of Berne at first claimed the whole of its ancient possessions, comprising the Pays de Vaud

and the Canton of Argovie, but it afterwards modified its demands to the latter country.

Lord Stewart, as the British Commissioner, gave it as his opinion that the Canton of Berne should be satisfied with a rectification of her frontier on the side of Argovie, and agreed with the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers, that there was no objection to incorporate with it the Bishopric of Basle. Lord Stewart, as well as the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, were of opinion that the great Powers must become arbiters in the disputes which agitated Switzerland, and that the recognition of her independence should depend upon her acceptance of their decision. M. de la Harpe wrote a strong note against any alteration of the cantons as then existing, and against the pretensions of the aristocratic cantons, which would endanger the liberties of the people, conferred upon them by the Act of Mediation which had been established under the influence and dictation of Napoleon, and which had met with the entire approbation of M. de la Harpe, who, although attached to the Emperor of Russia, to whom he had been tutor, was a violent partisan of the principles of French democracy. The deputies of the Valtelline expressed a desire that their country should be given to Austria, or be declared an independent canton. Prince Metternich wished this state might be formed into an independent canton, but the Swiss deputies desired it should be annexed to the Grisons, which was accordingly decided upon. The representatives of Porentrui and the Bishopric of Basle also desired that those states should be formed into independent cantons, or that the bishopric should be restored to its former bishop; but a different arrangement was carried into effect, and these discussions were at last brought to a close by the decision of the Allied Commissioners, according to which the Valteline was

ceded to Austria; and the Bishopric of Basle and Porentrui divided between the Cantons of Berne and Basle. The States of the Valais, Geneva, and Neufchatel were formed into three new cantons, and added to those already existing, which remained without alteration, except that the King of Sardinia ceded a small territory to Geneva in compensation for the Genovese fiefs. Under these arrangements the declaration of the frontiers of the different cantons of the Helvetic Republic was agreed to on the 4th of March, and finally declared in Congress on the 20th, and accepted by the Diet of the Swiss Confederation at Zurich the 27th of May.

The arrangement for the annexation of the State of Genoa to Piedmont was negotiated between Lord Castlereagh and the Marquis Brignole, and the Convention was agreed to and announced to the Congress on the 7th of December, by which the political interest of those united states was secured by their alliance, and in conformity with which they both became connected with the military and defensive system of Italy. They also gained thereby protection against an invasion from France, such as that from which that country had so much suffered in the year 1796, when Bonaparte, at the head of the French armies, forced a passage into the Piedmontese territory, signally defeated the Austrian and Piedmontese armies, and after dictating a most humiliating peace to the King of Sardinia, occupied Milan and almost the whole of Lombardy. This great success could not have been effected without the good understanding which was at that time established between the State of Genoa and the French Revolutionary Government, and which the Allied Powers at this time thought it necessary to provide against. The Genovese Government, however, protested against this measure of annexation, and stated its rights as founded

upon a long independence, acknowledged by treaties; and it expressed a desire, that if Genoa as a Republic did not suit the views of the other European Powers, it should be established under a Prince, and made independent, or be placed under the protection of England. These feelings are strongly put forward by the Minister of Genoa, M. Pareto, in his letter dated Paris, the 18th of May, 1814, addressed to Lord Castlereagh, of which the following is an extract:—

“Your Excellency seems to have believed that if (according to the arrangements which have taken place under the sanction of the Great Powers) the State of Genoa was united to Piedmont, it would find in this union advantages which would be a compensation for the loss of its independence. But the real strength of states is found there where union, concord, and national feelings exist. This national feeling would certainly not exist in the new amalgamation of these two populations. Divided by their dispositions, by their habits, and by an invincible antipathy, the fruit of two centuries of political quarrels, it would be in vain to attempt to unite them into one nation.

* * * * *

“In resuming the different observations which the undersigned has had the honour to submit to his Excellency Lord Castlereagh, he flatters himself that he has proved that the union of Genoa to Piedmont would entail the ruin of that country without any real advantage or assistance to the views of the High Allied Powers:—that those views will be better forwarded by the re-establishment of the Republic, and by such arrangements as would ensure, in case of war, to the British Government the preservation of the ports and gulfs of Liguria: and, finally, that it is impossible to separate Genoa from her territory without destroying her commerce, and consequently risking the consummation of that ruin which it is sought to avoid.

(Signed) “PARETO.”

Lord Castlereagh regretted that the object of this protest could not be carried into effect, as it would cause weakness in the Italian arrangements. He argued that the defence of Italy could only be intrusted

to a single Power, occupying both Piedmont and Genoa, and he considered that the disasters which had been brought upon Italy and Europe by a different system, and by the divided counsels of the King of Sardinia and the State of Genoa in 1796, were sufficient evidence in favour of this reasoning. To the conduct of the Genovese Government at that time, by their co-operation with the French Republic, might mainly be attributed those misfortunes; he hoped, however, that the liberality of the present arrangement would succeed in the end in giving satisfaction to the State of Genoa as well as to the Piedmontese. On the 17th December Lord Castlereagh transmitted the order to Sir John Dalrymple, then commanding the British troops in the Genovese State, to deliver it up to the King of Sardinia, which he did, as announced by his despatch to Lord Castlereagh, of the 27th December, in which he enclosed a copy of the protest which was delivered to him by the President of the Genovese Government, M. de Serra, as also the Proclamation of the Provisional Government, the members of which stated that "in retiring from their functions there remained nothing further for them to do but to fulfil an honourable but melancholy duty—that of protesting that, although the rights of the Genovese to independence might be unrecognised, they could not be annihilated."

PROCLAMATION. *And the British Army, the City, the Hague, on the*

a The Governors and Procurators of the most Serene Republic of Genoa.

"Having been informed that the Congress at Vienna has disposed of our country by uniting it to the dominions of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, and being resolved neither to prejudice its inalienable rights, nor to have recourse to any, fruitless and ruinous attempts, we divest ourselves of an authority which the confidence of the nation, and the acquiescence of the principal Powers of Europe, had sanctioned. Whatsoever any Government, unprovided with other means

than those of justice and reason, might be capable of effecting in behalf of the rights and liberties of its people, we have attempted without reserve or hesitation. Nothing then remains for us except to recommend to the municipal, administrative, and judicial authorities the provisional exercise of their functions, and to the Government which may follow them, the care of the troops which we had begun to raise, as well as the civil officers who have faithfully discharged their duties; and to the people of the Genovese territory in general that tranquillity which is more necessary to nations than all other advantages.

“ We carry back into our retirement a soothing sentiment of gratitude towards the illustrious British General, who knew the limits of victory, and an unshaken confidence in the Divine Providence that will never forsake the Genoese.”

“ Palace of the Government, 26th December, 1814.”

“ GIROLAMO SERRA,

“ President of the Government.”

[For conditions see note.*]

The union of the Belgian Provinces to Holland, forming an united kingdom under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange, had been brought forward by Lord Castlereagh, and agreed to by the Allied Powers, including the French Government, during the discussions which took place amongst the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers while in Paris in 1814, when the Articles upon which that union was to take place were drawn up and decided upon. These Articles were submitted to the Prince of Orange by the Earl of Clancarty, the British Ambassador at the Hague, on the 21st of July, 1814, in conformity with the directions from Lord Castlereagh, with a view of obtaining their recognition, as those upon which the union of the two countries was to take place. The Prince on that day did so recognise them, and the Act by which his con-

* The conditions upon which the State of Genoa was united to that of Piedmont are contained in the 4th Article of the Treaty between the King of Sardinia and the four Powers, dated Vienna, May 20th, 1815, to be found in the Appendix No. 3.

sent was notified was signed by A. W. C. de Nagel, the Secretary-General for the Department of Foreign Affairs. Upon which Lord Clancarty, with the assent of the Ministers of Austria, of Russia, and of Prussia, at that time in Holland, concerted with General Baron Vincent, Provisional Governor of the Belgian Provinces, for the remission of those provinces to the authority charged to receive them by the Prince of Orange.

This united kingdom, as thus constructed, was estimated as containing 8,000,000 subjects in the finest part of Europe, and its constitution as a kingdom, having been finally decided upon by all the Powers at the Congress, was inserted in the General Treaty of Vienna on the 23rd March, 1815, together with the recognition of kingly authority in the person of the Prince of Orange as the Sovereign. In the discussions which had previously taken place it had been desired by Prussia that it should become a part of the Germanic body, or, as Lord Castlereagh recommended, form only a defensive alliance with it. Lord Castlereagh considered that by the first course the King would be too much under the direct influence of Prussia, or, if he sought to protect himself against it by forming connexions with some of the other States, he would alienate that Government from him which in case of danger from foreign invasion would be his best protector. It would besides be adding a naval Power to Germany, which was foreign from the general constitution of her States, and could only be a cause of embarrassment. The latter course was therefore adopted. Lord Castlereagh consented that Great Britain should charge herself with two-thirds of the Russian loan to Holland; first, because there had been a sort of promise to Russia to do so, and he conceived, upon obtaining her consent to the territorial arrangements, it was good

policy; even if the promise had been conditional, to adhere to it; next, because he conceived England was bound to some pecuniary sacrifice to Holland, as compensation for the cession of the West Indian Islands. The Prince of Orange was entirely satisfied with this settlement of the question. He felt only some regret at separating himself from a portion of his hereditary states which for so long a period had belonged to his family.*

With regard to the remaining territorial arrangements in which the Congress was engaged, there was some discussion on the subject of Pomerania, which the

* The conditions upon which the Netherlands, the Duchy of Luxemburg, and Holland were joined together are stated in the annexed Articles of the Treaty between the King of the Netherlands and the four Powers, signed at Vienna 31st May, 1815:—

Substance of the eight Articles of the Treaty between the Powers.

- 1st Art. This Union must be complete and entire, so that the two countries form one single and same State, governed by the Constitution already established in Holland, and which will be modified by common agreement according to the new circumstances.
- 2nd. There will be no innovation of the Articles of this Constitution which assure to all forms of religion equal protection and favour, and guarantee the admission of all citizens, whatever may be their religious belief, to public offices and employments.
- 3rd. The Belgian Provinces will be properly represented at the Assembly of the States General, of which the ordinary Sessions in time of peace will be held alternately in a Dutch and Belgian town.
- 4th. All the inhabitants of the Netherlands being thus constitutionally assimilated among themselves, the different provinces will enjoy equally all the commercial and other advantages of their respective positions, without any hindrance or restriction being imposed upon one for the advantage of the other.
- 5th. Immediately after the Union, the provinces and towns of Belgium will be admitted to commerce and the navigation of the colonies on the same footing as the Dutch towns and provinces.
- 6th. The charges as well as the benefits being in common, the debts contracted up to the epoch of the Union by the Dutch provinces on the one hand, and by the Belgian provinces on the other hand, will be at the expense of the Public Treasury of the Netherlands.
- 7th. Conformably to the same principles, the expenses required for the establishment and preservation of the fortifications on the frontier of the new State will be borne by the Public Treasury, as resulting from an object which interests the security and independence of all the provinces and the whole nation.
- 8th. The expenses of the establishment and keeping up of the dykes will remain at the charge of the districts which are most directly interested in this branch of the public service, excepting the obligation of the State in general to furnish succour in case of any extraordinary disaster, in the same manner as has been practised up to the present time in Holland.

Swedes objected to give up according to the Treaty with Denmark, until the expense of the war with Norway was paid to them. Lord Castlereagh instructed Mr. Thornton, the British Minister at Stockholm, to state to the Prince Royal, that until all the stipulations of that Treaty were fulfilled he would not bring before the British Parliament the grant of a million sterling to Sweden, which had been agreed upon in lieu of Guadeloupe. The Emperor of Russia, although not inclined to push any point against the Prince Royal of Sweden, yet engaged on this subject to act with England, and he was called upon by the Duke of Wellington to see justice done to the King of Denmark, consequent upon which the proposed arrangement was carried into effect.

The State of Pomerania was made over to Prussia by Sweden, as arranged by the Treaty between those two countries under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, and signed (together with the accompanying declarations, both Danish and Swedish) at Vienna on the 7th June, 1815.*

* Extracts from the Treaty between Prussia and Sweden concluded under the mediation of Russia:—

1. The King of Sweden and Norway cedes in perpetuity, for himself and his successors to the throne of Sweden, according to the order of succession, of Sept. 26, 1810, to the King of Prussia and his successors to the throne, the Duchy of Pomerania and the Principality of Rügen, with all its dependencies, islands, fortresses, towns and country.
2. The King of Sweden and Norway engages to deliver to the King of Prussia, with the fortress of Stralsund and the other fortified places in Pomerania and the island of Rügen, the artillery and the military stores belonging to them according to the agreement of His Majesty with the King of Denmark in the 24th Article of the Treaty of Kiel. His Majesty will also cause to be delivered to His Prussian Majesty 200 pieces of defensive cannon, and 6 gun boats for the maritime defence.
3. The public debt contracted by the Royal Chamber of Pomerania remains at the expense of the King of Prussia as Sovereign Prince.
4. The donations in domains made by the King of Sweden, which amount to an annual sum of 43,000 current Pomeranian rix-dollars, will be returned to the King of Prussia.
5. The King of Prussia engages to pay the King of Sweden for the cession of the Duchy of Pomerania and the Principality of Rügen the sum of 3,500,000 current rix-dollars of Prussia.
6. The Duchy of Pomerania and the Principality of Rügen will be delivered to the King of Prussia one month after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.
7. The

Upon the arrangements for Bavaria some difficulties arose with regard to the question of Salzburg, which both that Power and Austria were desirous of possessing; but it was postponed for the present by the temporary abandonment of her claims on the part of Austria. After the war with France, and after a very lengthened negotiation, Salzburg was replaced under the authority of Austria, but in the meantime Bavaria obtained the Grand Duchy of Wurtzburg and the Principality of Aschaffenburg.

Amongst the singular propositions which were brought forward at this Congress was one by the King of Bavaria to place the Ionian Islands under the sovereignty of the Prince Eugene Beauharnois, but the proposal was rejected, and a stipulation in his favour of a less important character (as having been distinguished as Viceroy of the King of Italy and the son-in-law of the King of Bavaria) was brought forward and adopted.

With regard to the former Electorate of Hanover, the King of Great Britain having assumed the title of

7. The King of Prussia and the King of Sweden will name each on his side Commissioners invested with full powers necessary for effecting the remission of the Duchy of Pomerania and the Principality of Rügen conformably to the tenour of the present Treaty.
8. The King of Prussia engages in the most solemn manner to assure to the inhabitants of Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen, with their dependencies, their rights, liberties, and privileges, as they now exist, and were determined in the years 1810 and 1811.
9. The King of Prussia engages to maintain the religious establishments, and especially the Academy of Greifswalde, in their present state, allowing them to enjoy all their capital and actual revenues.
10. The King of Prussia engages to maintain English commerce in all the ports and prerogatives granted by the Treaty of Stockholm, the 3rd March, 1813, and confirmed by the Treaty of Kiel of the 14th Jan. 1814.
- 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 relate to interior arrangements.
17. The high contracting Powers invite the Emperor of All the Russias and the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to give their adhesion to the different stipulations contained in the present Treaty, as well as the reciprocal declarations of the Plenipotentiaries of the King of Sweden and of the King of Denmark, as annexed to the present Treaty.
18. The present Treaty will be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Berlin in the space of six weeks from this day, or sooner if possible.

LE PRINCE DE HARDENBERG.
LE BARON DE HUMHOLDT.
LE COMTE CHARLES AXEL DE LOWENHJELM.

Vienna, 7th June, 1815.

King of Hanover, which was recognised by all the Powers assembled at Vienna, it was there decided to increase the limits of the new kingdom, and the King of Prussia agreed to cede for this purpose the Principality of East Friedland, and part of the Principality of Prussian Munster, receiving in return part of the Duchy of Luneburg, and some of the adjacent Bailiwicks. This arrangement was confirmed by the 27th Article of the Treaty, afterwards signed at Vienna on the 29th May, 1815.

In relation to the question of the Slave Trade, Lord Castlereagh proposed to Prince Talleyrand that Great Britain should cede an island in the West Indies, or pay a sum of money, in compensation of losses which might be incurred by French subjects, if France would entirely abolish that traffic. Lord Castlereagh felt great embarrassment in his negotiation upon this subject, from the strong and general expression of public feeling respecting it in England, which impressed other countries and Cabinets with an erroneous belief that Great Britain must have some important Colonial object in the question. He determined, however, to press the subject with all his power, and he proposed a Convention, to be generally agreed to by all the Sovereigns, not to purchase Colonial produce from the States continuing the Slave Trade. He succeeded in persuading the Emperor of Russia to agree to his proposals, comprising the establishment of a Commission composed of the representatives of those States determined to resist this traffic, which should assemble at London or Paris, to watch the means of putting an end to it, and it was decided, notwithstanding the opposition of Spain and Portugal, that the subject should be discussed by the Plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers. The declaration of the Congress upon this subject was agreed to on the 8th of February.*

* See State Papers for 1815-16, page 971.

Soon after the termination of this negotiation Lord Castlereagh, having obtained from the Emperor of Russia a declaration of his pacific sentiments with respect to Turkey, and of his desire to settle every question under discussion with that Power under the mediation of Great Britain, Austria, and France, and having resigned his commission as first British Plenipotentiary at the Congress, returned to England, and on his passage through Paris on the 28th of February, he again strongly urged the King of France to give up the project of sending a French army against Naples, and also repeated to him the recommendation that he should depute a person to Napoleon, at the Island of Elba, to settle with him the claims which he preferred, for money which he stated was due to him, in virtue of the Treaty of Fontainebleau.

On the 7th of March the Powers assembled at Vienna were astounded by the news of the departure of Napoleon from Elba. This intelligence was contained in a despatch addressed by Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh, but transmitted to the Duke of Wellington at Vienna, and dated Florence, the 1st instant. It announced that Bonaparte had taken with him from Elba his guards, amounting to 700 men, a battalion of Corsican Rangers, 300 strong, together with a corps of about 200 Poles, and five field-pieces; the whole embarked in five feluccas, and convoyed by a brig-of-war, an armed bomb-boat, and a half-decked armed vessel, the *‘Caroline.’* Napoleon was himself on board his brig-of-war, and left the harbour of Porto Ferrajo with the rest of the fleet at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 26th of February, the whole having been embarked with great secrecy in the course of the previous afternoon. All the general officers in Elba accompanied him, and the major of the town, M. de la Piere, was nominated by him a major-general, to whom he entrusted the

defence of the town and island, together with about 150 soldiers and the gendarmerie of the place.

The event here recorded was the origin of one of the most sudden and extensive convulsions with which the civilised world has ever been visited. In the midst of profound peace all the States of Europe were called to arm to their utmost power, and to present themselves on the battle-field to defend the independence which only so lately, after years of desolation and warfare, they had believed themselves to have secured.*

* The immediate occasion of this event was so entirely accidental that it deserves to be distinctly detailed. Upon the abdication of Napoleon at Fontainebleau in April, 1814, four Commissioners from the Allies were appointed to accompany him to Fréjus, where he was to embark for the island of Elba. These were General Baron Koller from Austria, General Schouvaloff from Russia, Count Truchsess from Prussia, and the Author, then Lord Burghersh, from England. On the morning of the day on which the Commissioners were to set out from Paris, Lord Burghersh was obliged, from private circumstances, to request Lord Castlereagh to allow Colonel Sir Niel Campbell, a most distinguished officer, who had been severely wounded at the battle of Ferre Champenoise, to replace him in this duty. Napoleon consequently departed from Fontainebleau accompanied by these Commissioners, and when he reached Fréjus he requested Sir Niel Campbell to embark with him on board the English frigate which he had chosen for his conveyance to Porto Ferrajo; and when Sir Niel Campbell reported to Lord Castlereagh his arrival there, and the wish expressed by Napoleon that he should remain with him, he received orders to conform to that desire.

In the month of November Lord Burghersh was appointed His Majesty's Minister in Tuscany, and Sir Niel Campbell, who was residing in the island of Elba, was placed under his orders, and this officer repaired to Florence to report himself to Lord Burghersh, and to receive his instructions, the only essential part of which was, that he should remain in the continuance of the respectful attentions to Napoleon which he had maintained since by his request he had accompanied him, but, at the same time, that he should be watchful of any circumstances, either of visits or preparations, which might be indicative of projects in any way likely to threaten danger to the tranquillity of the world. Sir Niel immediately returned to Elba, but in the course of a few weeks he again visited Florence, reporting a certain change of conduct in Napoleon, indicated by complaints of the want of punctuality in the payment of monies from the French Government, which he stated to be due to him (and which were secured by the Treaty of Fontainebleau), and also by the visits of persons who were supposed to be connected with his partisans in France and Italy, and more particularly with Marshal Murat, then King of Naples. The armaments of this latter person at the beginning of the year 1815 had excited considerable attention, and Lord Burghersh thought it would be advisable to send to Naples an officer of some rank, to inquire what were the facts with regard to them. Sir Niel Campbell having learnt this intention, most earnestly requested Lord Burghersh to make choice of him for this commission, as it would relieve him from attendance on Napoleon, who, since he had feuded himself so much with the etiquette of a Court, was no longer as unreserved and familiar with him as he had previously been. Lord Burghersh replied, that it was impossible for him to take upon himself to remove him from the important duty with which he was charged; that, considering the unsettled state of things which existed at that period (the end of January, 1815), he thought Sir Niel ought most strictly to perform the service for which he had been allowed to remain at Elba. Lord

Upon the receipt of this intelligence and of the landing of Napoleon in France near Antibes on the 1st of

Burghersh begged him immediately to return there, but told him that, as he seemed so much to desire to be removed from that duty, he would report it to Lord Castlereagh, and would inform him in Elba of his reply. Sir Niel Campbell consequently returned, and Lord Burghersh made the application he had promised to Lord Castlereagh. On the 18th January he received an answer from him, by which he approved of Lord Burghersh's intention of sending an officer of rank to report upon the military preparations in Naples, but he desired him on no account to employ Sir Niel Campbell upon that service, as it was of the greatest consequence that until the close of the Congress of Vienna he should remain in Elba in order to report anything worthy of remark which might take place there. Lord Burghersh was preparing to transmit this intelligence to Sir Niel, when, to his great astonishment, that officer walked into his room, to report his having returned to Florence, being impatient to know what had been Lord Castlereagh's decision as to his employment in Naples. Lord Burghersh found great fault with Sir Niel for having thus disobeyed the strict orders he had given him to remain at his post, and, putting into his hands the letter he had received from Lord Castlereagh, he entreated him to return to the island of Elba without delay. Sir Niel expressed his sorrow for the indiscretion he had committed, and assured Lord Burghersh he would return immediately, but stated that the sloop-of-war (the 'Partridge,' Captain Adye) which was under his orders, and which had brought him to Leghorn, had returned to Elba, and would not be back in Leghorn till Saturday, the 26th. Lord Burghersh told him he must exert himself to return immediately; that he might judge from Lord Castlereagh's letter of the importance which was attached to the strict discharge of the duty assigned to him, and that he could only repeat to him that he ought to return at once. Notwithstanding this injunction, Sir Niel did not leave Florence till the Saturday. Upon his arrival at Leghorn he wrote to Lord Burghersh a despatch and a private letter, both dated the 26th of February, stating that upon his arrival there he received the report from Captain Adye, as well as from the Vice-Consul Ricci, that evident preparations were making by Napoleon for leaving the island, and that he consequently should immediately embark on board the 'Partridge,' and proceed there.

Lord Burghersh heard no more on this subject till the evening of the 1st of March, when he received at Florence a despatch from Sir Niel Campbell, brought by Mr. Grattan, an English gentleman who for a short time had been a resident in the island of Elba, and who was a witness of the departure of Napoleon, and his fleet on the night of the 26th February. This despatch, of which an extract is given, details this event, together with the measures which Sir Niel had determined to take upon it. They are of trifling importance, as they failed in averting the convulsion which was brought upon the world, but they are confirmatory (together with the circumstances which preceded them) of the fact, that if Sir Niel Campbell had conformed to the directions he had received both from his Government and from Lord Burghersh, or had immediately on his arrival at Florence, on the 19th of February, returned to Elba, he would have been in a position, on board the 'Partridge,' to have interfered with Napoleon's departure at that time, and probably to have taken such measures as would have prevented it altogether. It is fair to state that in this transaction no further blame was attached to Sir Niel by Lord Castlereagh or Lord Burghersh than for his disbelief in the urgency of the orders he had received, and the want of foresight which allowed him to suppose that no immediate project of departure from Elba had been formed by Napoleon, while at the same time he had persuaded himself that if he made any movement from Elba it would be to combine in some operation with the troops of Marshal Murat.

Extract from DESPATCH from SIR NIEL CAMPBELL to LORD BURGHERSH.

"MY LORD,

Leghorn, 26th Feb., 1815, 4 P.M.

"Captain Adye left this on the afternoon of the 22nd to visit Elba and Palmayola during my absence, and to return here this day to carry me back.

March, the general impression upon the Sovereigns and the members of the Congress was, that, however rash and startling this enterprise of Napoleon might appear to be, he would, nevertheless, probably succeed in collecting a large army from the officers and men who had served under him, and had formed a great attachment to him, and that he might thus become a source of serious danger to the Government of the King of France. Many others, and more particularly M. de Talleyrand and the French plenipotentiaries in Vienna, most conscientiously maintained an opposite opinion, in support of which they cited not only the want of consideration or attachment which had been shown towards him on his passage through France to embark at Frejus, but also what had passed at Orgon, on the road to Lyons, where he had been attacked whilst detained at the post-house, and obliged to escape on the horse of his courier; so that afterwards, when rejoined at the inn in which he had taken refuge, by the Allied Commissioners who accompanied him, and were present

From a Memorandum transmitted to me by Mr. Ricci, containing information of what has occurred there since my departure upon the 16th—from what Mr. Mariotti, the French Consul here, has heard from his correspondents in Elba and Corsica,—from what Captain Adye, this *moment* arrived, tells me, and other information which I have obtained here, combined with suspicious circumstances for a short time past, I am fully persuaded that Bonaparte means to quit Elba, and join Murat *immediately*, or to be in readiness to do so, if there is any decided step taken by the latter.

"I mean to sail this night for Elba.

(Signed) "I have the honour, &c.,
"NIEL CAMPBELL."

Extract of a LETTER from SIR NIEL CAMPBELL to LORD BURGHERSH.

"MY LORD,

"On board H.M.S. the 'Partridge,' off Porto Ferrajo, Island of Elba, Mid-day, February 28th.

"This morning being becalmed I landed in a boat at Porto Ferrajo. Bonaparte left there upon the 26th instant at 9 P.M., on board of his brig 'L'Inconstant,' with the bombard 'L'Etoile,' the half-decked boat 'La Caroline,' and four feluccas. Yesterday at 10 A.M. he was seen from Porto Ferrajo to the northward of Caprezia, and was lost sight of soon afterwards. Mr. Grattan, an English gentleman, saw the embarkation of the whole, and saw them yesterday in the situation described. I am therefore induced to change the opinion I had entertained of Bonaparte's intention to go to Naples, and think he is destined for the frontier of France and Piedmont. Captain Adye will steer in that direction, so as to endeavour to overtake them before they land.

"I have the honour, &c.,
(Signed) "NIEL CAMPBELL."

at the scene above described, he decided to continue his journey under the disguise of an assumed name, and after some discussion selected that of L. Burghersh.*

The opinions of those who differed from the French Legation as to the probability of Bonaparte's success gained strength from day to day, and on the 19th of March intelligence was received of his successful entry into Paris, together with an official statement of the retreat of Louis XVIII. from that capital across the French frontier into the Netherlands.

This astonishing event was brought about by the defection of the whole French army from the cause of the King, and its assembly under the banner of Napoleon. Officers and soldiers within reach of the influence of his passage through the country alike partook of this movement. This transfer of the alliance of a whole army from one Sovereign to another may in part be accounted for by the fact, that all the corps of that army, being unchanged both as to officers and men, remained the same as they had been while serving and gaining laurels under his command. It was therefore too much to expect that enthusiastic soldiers, accustomed to be led to victory, should resist the call which their leader, almost unattended, had come to make upon them.†

* This circumstance is singular enough to require some explanation, and is thus related by Count Truchsess, the commissioner from Prussia, who was in attendance upon Napoleon and accompanied him to Frejus.

† It is not improbable that this calamity might have been averted, if a measure had been carried into effect, which had been decided upon by the Count D'Artois when he arrived in Paris after the entry of the Allies, and received on the 14th April from the Provisional Government the sovereign authority as Lieutenant-Governor of the Kingdom, and as exercising the authority of the King in accordance with the powers entrusted to him, which he expected to retain for a considerable time. The Count and the council which he had assembled around him, had determined to give to the whole French army, as a well-merited reward for their distinguished services and long-protracted labours, a general congé of from four to six months, during which each individual soldier was to receive his weekly pay at his domicile in his commune or arrondissement. During the period of this congé the whole of the troops, officers and men, were to be re-formed, as the Royal army, into new corps and regiments. The prisoners of war returning from foreign countries, and of which there were nearly 60,000 in England, were to have been allowed

Upon first receiving information of the landing of Napoleon in France the Powers, assembled in Congress, determined without hesitation to make war against him in defence of Louis XVIII.; but upon further intelligence of the King's departure from France, and of the complete re-establishment of Napoleon's authority throughout the kingdom, this decision was so far changed that the four Powers only bound themselves by the renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont to make war against Napoleon, and all the other Powers of Europe were invited to accede to it, so that the number of troops to be brought against France was calculated to amount to 840,000 men.

The Treaty was signed on the 25th of March, but no stipulation was made as to the subsidy to be given by England, though every Power applied for some portion of it, without which they stated the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of their being able to put their troops in motion. Russia required a sum of 4,000,000*l.*, but the Duke of Wellington declared a grant of such an amount to be totally impossible, and that he was authorised by Lord Castlereagh to offer 7,000,000*l.* as the subsidy to all the Powers, and the British army in the field to amount to 75,000 men.

The first idea as to the general command of the army of Europe was, that the Emperor of Russia should be

to profit by the same favour as that accorded to the troops found embodied. The military service of the State was to have been entrusted to the Garde Nationale, which upon the return of the ancient Royal Family to the throne of the country had shown their favourable and even enthusiastic approval. When the period for the re-assembling of the army after the expiration of the congé arrived, it was also intended to give a great many entire congés for long service, or for distinctions gained on the field of battle, or for well-attested merit, so that the number of old soldiers recalled to the army would have been greatly diminished, and as they would all have been formed into new corps with a great number of new officers and soldiers, it is not likely that they would have retained that enthusiasm for the name of Napoleon, which was displayed on the present occasion. It is therefore reasonable to believe, that the catastrophe of 1815 would not have occurred, if the intention of the Count D'Artois had been carried out, which was, however, prevented by the early return of the King himself from England, and his assumption of the royal authority upon his arrival at Paris on the 3rd of May.

named Dictator, and that the Duke of Wellington should take the field with him as first of the military council, but this project not meeting with general approbation, and the Duke of Wellington having desired to be with his own army, or, as he expressed it, to be allowed to carry a musket, it was given up, and an unanimous wish was expressed by the Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress, that the Duke of Wellington should assume the command of the British and confederate army assembling in Belgium, and that he should proceed to assume that command as soon as the troops composing it had been brought together. And the Duke being himself convinced that his doing so would meet the wishes of the British Government, and be the wisest course to pursue, he determined to leave Vienna, placing the affairs of the Congress in the hands of Lord Clancarty, by whom they were brought to a conclusion. Before the Duke's departure he was engaged in the negotiation of the affairs which had occupied the attention of the Congress, the general character of which is reported in the following despatch :—

“ MY LORD,

“ Vienna, March 4th, 1815.

“ Some progress has been made in all the affairs in negotiation since I last addressed you.

“ The Emperor of Russia has consented to Austria's retaining possession of the Valteline and the Valley of the Chiavenna and Bornio; and that Berne should have the Porentrui, on condition that the Powers should propose to Berne, through the deputy of that Canton now here, some alterations in its constitution. This has been consented to, and as a treaty has been arranged with Monsieur le Comte de Marceau, by which the King of Sardinia will cede to Geneva a small district in the neighbourhood of that town, including Carouge and a tract of land between the road of the Simplon and the lake, on condition of the cession to His Majesty of the Genoese Imperial Fiefs, and of including in the Swiss system the Savoyard districts of

Chablais and Fossigny, I consider the affairs of Switzerland as settled. The Commission will meet to-morrow, and I will urge that its report may be taken into consideration by the eight Powers without loss of time.

“I enclose a new project given in by Marshal Prince Wrede for the settlement of the questions still depending between Austria and Bavaria. Upon receiving it Prince Metternich sent for the Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, Count Nesselrode, and myself, and with the exception of Frankfort, which is to be made a free imperial town, and of a cession on the left of the Rhine for Prince Eugène, and with the addition of the cession on the part of Bavaria of the town of Salzburg, the principle of this project was generally admitted as reasonable and fit to be adopted. The Chancellor has, I understand, spoken to the Emperor of Russia upon the subject, who equally approves of the plan, objecting, however, positively to Bavaria's receiving anything more than she has a right to by treaty.

“Knowing that your Lordship had always intended that Bavaria should be the German power on the left of the Rhine, in communication with the Sovereign of the Netherlands, I urged this measure upon the consideration of the meeting at Prince Metternich's; but the Prince de Wrede had expressed himself so decidedly against the possessions on the left of the Rhine, even with Mayence, since the Prussians were placed on the right of the Moselle, and in any case without having Mayence, that there was no hope of succeeding in prevailing upon him to take them. The Chancellor and Count Nesselrode were decidedly against alteration of the system agreed upon for Mayence; and both appeared to think that it was most fortunate that Bavaria had herself proposed to receive her compensations on the right instead of the left of the Rhine.

“There will be no difficulty respecting the cessions to be required from Wurtemberg; and as there appears none on the part of the Emperor of Russia respecting that required from Baden, this power will consequently receive its indemnification. It is intended to place Prince Eugène in a sovereignty dependent upon the King of Bavaria, but where is not settled.

“The only difficulty in this settlement appears to be Salzburg, to which both Austrians and Bavarians attach the utmost importance. The former are strong in treaties. The secret Treaty of Paris which contains the three articles of the Treaty of Kiel regarding cessions, particularly specifies Salzburg

among other points to be ceded to Austria; in return for which she promises her good offices to obtain for Bavaria the cession of Mayence, Frankfort, and Hanau. The two former cannot be got, and Bavaria will have the last.

“The line of the Inn and Salzburg are certainly important to Austria. In the possession of Bavaria Salzburg is a menacing point upon Vienna, and upon the communication with Italy, and it breaks in upon the whole system of the Austrian line of defence. It is true that Salzburg in the hands of Austria is likewise menacing upon Munich; but it is to be observed, that Austria does not require that point for that object. Whereas, though Bavaria should possess Salzburg, a movement from the Tyrol or from Bohemia would turn her position on the Inn; and the two Powers are not, nor cannot be so nearly balanced in strength as to render it desirable to Bavaria to keep Salzburg as a menacing point to be used in a counter movement for her own defence.

“In every view, then, of the question, whether of the treaties by which the Powers are bound, or of their military convenience or security, I conceive Salzburg ought to belong to Austria.

“The Austrian Cabinet appear determined to persist in demanding it, and the Bavarians to refuse it. It is unfortunately not only a point of personal convenience to the Prince Royal, but has been made one of vanity to the nation; and I am much afraid that it will not be ceded to Austria without creating a good deal of coolness.

“The Emperor of Russia was here some nights ago, and spoke to me respecting the state of the questions between the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, regarding the Treaty of Kiel. His Majesty appeared at first to think that the Prince Royal had cause for some complaint against the King of Denmark; and he wished to know what line the Prince Regent intended to take upon this subject.

“I referred His Majesty to your Lordship’s letter of the ——— to Mr. Thornton, which it was obvious he had not read. I then told him that after the enquiry and reports that had been made by the Commissioners on the part of the Allies, it was impossible to allow the Prince Royal to charge the King of Denmark with encouragement of the resistance of the Norwegians, and that His Majesty could not now be put on his trial on the vague surmises of Mons. de Lewenhelm; that the Prince Royal, if he

has any proof, ought to produce it; and if he had not, he ought to be required to perform his treaty.

“I then begged His Majesty to reflect upon the unfavourable impression which would be made throughout Europe, if a treaty which had drawn so much attention were not performed in its articles in favour of the King of Denmark, and I told him that I was quite certain that the Prince Regent would not pay the compensation for Guadeloupe, till the treaty was performed.

“His Imperial Majesty said he would read your Lordship’s despatch to Mr. Thornton, and it appeared to me, that what I had said to him had made some impression upon him.

“I have since received, yesterday, the duplicates of Mr. Thornton’s official and secret answer, Nos. 6 and 7, to your Lordship’s despatch. I propose to send the former to be laid before the Emperor, with what observations I shall think useful; and I will afterwards endeavour to obtain an audience from His Imperial Majesty, in order if possible to prevail upon him to order his Minister at Stockholm to act in concert with Mr. Thornton on the subject, before he will leave Vienna.

“His Imperial Majesty’s departure is now fixed for the 15th, and I understand will probably be delayed till the 20th. I think he will not go till after I have heard from your Lordship from England.

“Nothing more has happened on the affairs of Italy. Murat has, I understand, in some degree altered his tone, since he has heard of the state of affairs here in the commencement of February.

(Signed)

“WELLINGTON.”

On the 12th March the Duke of Wellington, M. de Talleyrand, and Prince Metternich, waited on the King of Saxony at Presburg, to lay before him, and to propose for his acceptance, the arrangement which had been come to among the Powers respecting Saxony, begging him to consent to the cession of a part of Saxony, which it had been found necessary to require of him. To these proposals the King of Saxony absolutely refused to agree, and the protocol of the Congress, dated the 15th of March, declared that the King having refused the portion of his kingdom which had

been reserved for him, the whole country should be made over for the temporary occupation of the Prussian troops.

On the 25th March the Duke of Wellington stated that Count Campochiaro called upon him to propose on the part of Marshal Murat, that he would join the Allies with his whole army against Napoleon. On the day previous, the 24th inst., Lord Castlereagh writes to the Duke of Wellington, to announce that M. de Pocco, his Neapolitan agent in London, had waited upon him on that day to make the same proposal, and he instructed him (the Duke of Wellington), in case he should consider that Marshal Murat was to be relied upon, to carry out the negotiation. Shortly before this, on the 18th of March, Baron Sebzeltern, the Austrian Minister in Rome, announced to Lord Burghersh at Florence, that he had intelligence which he could rely upon, that the Neapolitan troops would immediately enter the Roman States on the side of Terracina, as they did, in fact, on the 28th March; this intelligence was immediately transmitted to Marshal Bellegarde at Milan, and by him to Vienna, where it arrived at the same time with the propositions of alliance which had been made to the Duke of Wellington, and to the Austrian Government, as above stated. It was afterwards known that the Neapolitan army, which already occupied the marches of Ancona, had been reinforced by the troops which passed the Tronto on the 28th March. Lord W. Bentinck and Marshal Bellegarde, immediately upon receiving this information, wrote to Vienna to enquire, in case of the invasion of the provinces occupied by the Austrian troops, which were menaced, what course they were to pursue. The answer of the Austrian Government and of the Duke of Wellington, on the 26th March, was, that if Marshal Murat attacked the Austrian forces in those provinces

he was to be opposed, and that the armistice with England was at an end, as it was only negotiated and signed, as being dependent upon the peace with Austria. On the day following the date of this letter, the Duke of Wellington announced to Lord Castlereagh, that, on the day on which the proposal of Cariate and Campochiaro was made to the Austrian Government, the Austrians were aware that the Neapolitan troops had invaded the Roman States on the 21st March, and that therefore they could place no reliance on the good faith of that proposal. The Duke also encloses a copy of the despatch that he had consequently written to Lord W. Bentinck, on the 28th, stating that he considered the invasion of the Roman States by Murat as constituting an infraction of the armistice.

Extract of a LETTER from the Duke of WELLINGTON to Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK, dated Vienna, 28th March, 1815.

“Prince Metternich has communicated to me a copy of your Lordship’s letter to Marshal Bellegarde, of the 20th March, in which your Lordship states your opinion, that in case Murat should make a movement with his troops, which is considered as an act of hostility and breach of treaty with the Emperor of Austria, your Lordship will consider the armistice existing between His Majesty and Murat at an end.

“I beg to inform you that I entirely concur with you in that opinion, which I have reason to believe to be in conformity with that of His Majesty’s Government.”

Marshal Bellegarde, on receiving the first notice of the entry of the Neapolitan troops into Terracina, despatched General Stahremberg to Marshal Murat’s head-quarters at Ancona, to enquire of him the object of his advance into the Roman States, and of the concentration of so large a body of his troops in the Marches of Ancona, which appeared to menace the Austrian troops in occupation of the Legations. General Stahremberg arrived there on the 26th March, and the following is a copy of the letter he addressed to Lord

Burghersh, which contains an account of the conversation he had had with Marshal Murat, and of the conviction which he had received from it that it was the intention of Murat to drive the Austrians out of the Legations.

Translation of a LETTER of General STAHEMBERG to Lord BURGHESH.

“ MY DEAR LORD BURGHESH,

“ Bologna, 27th March, 1815.

“ I hasten to acquaint you with the result of my mission to King Joachim. In an interview which lasted above three-quarters of an hour, he demonstrated to me by a verbiage devoid of common sense, the absolute necessity of his movements, that they were provoked by the marching of our troops into Italy (whereas his troops had quitted Naples much sooner). In order however to keep open the road to Bologna as long as possible, I employed all means to gain time, and after I had used very strong language to him, he assured me he would make no forward movement till he had received the courier he expected from Vienna. As I met that courier yesterday at Pesaro, and he will probably bring a reply analogous to the King's views, I do not think I am mistaken in believing that he will commence to-day, or at latest to-morrow, his movements towards Bologna. He assembled his first division yesterday at Sinigaglia (which I saw), to pass in review, the second division at Ancona, and the third at Macerata and Tolentino, and they are equally ready to march, so that finding little resistance on our side, he might be by the 30th or 31st at Bologna. There is only one frigate in the port of Ancona; he sent one away to Leghorn, under pretext of taking Princess Pauline on board to conduct her to Naples. I found a confidential person in the suite of the Duke de Gallo, who gives me the surest intelligence; I hope to receive some up to-morrow evening, or the day after to-morrow, at Milan, which I will communicate to you, if I know where you are.

“ Your friend,

(Signed) “ STAHEMBERG, General.”

This report was not calculated to inspire Marshal Bellegarde with any confidence in the intentions of Marshal Murat; he therefore hurried forward as much

as possible the reinforcements which were arriving to his army, and as they were still at some distance in the rear, he determined to evacuate Bologna and the Legations, in case the Neapolitan army should push forward. This advance of the Neapolitan army was not long delayed. For Marshal Murat, on the 30th March, three days after General Stahremberg had left him, issued from Rimini the following proclamation to the Italian people.

MURAT'S PROCLAMATION, 30th March, 1815.

"Italians!—The hour is come when the high destinies of Italy must be settled. Providence calls on you at last to be an independent nation.

"From the Alps to the Straits of Scilla a single cry is heard—the independence of Italy.

"By what right do foreigners pretend to deprive you of this independence, which is the first blessing and first right of every people? By what right do they rule over your finest provinces? By what right do they appropriate to themselves your riches to transport them to the countries of their birth? By what right, finally, do they tear your sons from you to serve, to languish, and to die far from the tombs of their ancestors? Is it, then, in vain that Nature raised for you the barrier of the Alps? Is it in vain that she provides you with still more insurmountable barriers in the difference of language and of manners, and the invincible antipathy of races? No, no. Purge the Italian soil of all foreign domination. Once masters of the world, you expiated that dangerous glory by twenty centuries of oppression and of misery. Now, may your glory be to have no masters. Every nation should confine itself within those limits traced by nature. Seas and inaccessible mountains—these are your limits. Never aspire to pass them, but drive back the stranger who has violated them, if he does not hasten to return within his own. Eighty thousand Italians from the Kingdom of Italy march, commanded by their King, and swear not to seek repose till Italy is liberated. It is already proved that they know how to maintain what they swear. Italians of other provinces, second the magnanimous design. Let those amongst you who are accustomed to the use of arms take them up again, and let the

inexperienced youth hasten to learn to wield them. Let all who possess generous hearts concur in this noble effort, and call, in the name of the country, on every true Italian to raise the cry of liberty. In short, let all come forward and display, in every form, the national energy. It is now to be decided whether Italy shall be free, or whether she is again for centuries to bow down her humiliated head to servitude. The struggle must be decisive, and we shall see secured for long the happiness of a country so beautiful that, maimed and bleeding as she is, can still excite such passions in the foreigners. The illustrious men of all countries, every nation worthy of a liberal Government, the Sovereigns who are distinguished by greatness of mind, will rejoice at your enterprise and will applaud your triumph! And can England refrain from applauding you—that model of constitutional government, that free people, who reckon it their glory to fight and to spend their treasures for the liberty of nations?

“Italians, for a long time you have wondered that you called upon us in vain. Perhaps you reproached our inaction, when your aspirations reached us on all sides. But the proper time had not arrived. I had not yet had proof of the perfidy of your enemies, and it was necessary that experience should show the falsity of the lying promises of which your former masters, on returning amongst you, were so prodigal. Experience soon and fatally demonstrated! I call on you as witnesses, brave and unfortunate Italians, of Milan, of Bologna, of Turin, of Venice, of Brescia, of Modena, of Reggio, and of every other illustrious and oppressed region. How many valiant warriors and virtuous patriots are torn from their native lands! How many groan in irons! How many victims! What extortions and unheard-of humiliations! Italians! put an end to these miseries. Unite firmly together, and a government of your own choice—a truly national representation, a constitution worthy of the century and of you—will guarantee your liberty, and your internal prosperity as soon as your bravery shall have guaranteed your independence. I call around me all brave men to fight. I call also all who have profoundly meditated upon the interests of their country, that they may prepare the constitution and the laws which will for ever govern the happy Italy—the independent Italy.

(Signed) “JOACHIM NAPOLEON.

“Rimini, March 30, 1815.”

It was a singular circumstance that all the privations of the Italian independence, the rule over their finest provinces—the appropriation of their riches, the tearing away their sons to serve, to languish, and to die far from the tombs of their ancestors, had been for the last ten years exclusively the work of the French ruler, who from the frontier of Savoy to the Straits of Messina, had occupied and governed the Italian soil.* Consequently this bombastic call by Murat's Proclamation was as little responded to as their aspiring liberators proved themselves equal to the task.

Marshal Murat not only invaded and occupied the Legations, but also, after writing to assure the Pope that he intended no hostility against him, took possession of the Roman States, the Pope having escaped from the capital and reached Florence on the 25th March. Again, after addressing a letter to the Grand Duke of Tuscany on the 27th March, in which he stated that he would not enter his territory, he did directly the reverse, and sent a corps of 6000 men into Florence.

No. 6.

From King JOACHIM MURAT to the Grand Duke of TUSCANY.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,

“Ancona, 27th March, 1815.

“I am informed that Your Imperial Highness is quitting Tuscany, and the motive assigned to your departure is the movement of my troops, whom I have found it necessary to cause to advance upon the Po. Never having under any circumstances had other than friendly relations with Your Imperial Highness, I cannot conceive that you consider my troops as enemies, and that you have thought it necessary to leave your dominions because they are to approach them. If I could think

* The state of things in Italy as thus described corresponds very precisely with the statement made shortly after the battle of Austerlitz in 1805 by Napoleon as to his intentions respecting that country to the Marquis Lucchesini, who repeated it to the Author. When speaking of the general political affairs of the world, he said, “A l'égard d'Italie, je la regarde comme ma maîtresse : je veux y coucher seul.”

that such an idea has entered your mind I should hasten to reassure Your Imperial Highness, by declaring that I have never had any motive or any project of hostility towards Tuscany, and that it was even my intention not to send my troops into that country if Your Imperial Highness had remained there. Under present circumstances Tuscany cannot without danger remain deprived of the presence of her Sovereign. The country, if abandoned to the intrigues and passions which are in agitation everywhere, might become a theatre of disorder. As I have the greatest interest in preventing at this moment anything likely to disturb the tranquillity of Southern Italy, I venture to request Your Imperial Highness to return to Florence, and I forewarn you that should my invitation remain unattended to, I may find myself under the necessity of occupying Tuscany in order to preserve it from the disturbances which might arise in it.

“The line Your Imperial Highness has determined to adopt pains me the more as it appears to have been concerted with that taken by the Pope. I cannot conceal from Your Imperial Highness that the absence of the two Sovereigns whose territories are composed of the countries which are about to find themselves between my kingdom and my army, may possibly force me to take extraordinary measures which I would fain avoid.

“I pray God to take you, Sir, my Brother, into his holy keeping,

“Your good Brother,

“JOACHIM NAPOLEON.”

No. 7.

The Grand Duke of TUSCANY to King JOACHIM MURAT.

“Florence, April 2, 1815.

“The letter with which Your Majesty has deigned to honour me reached me through the English Minister only this day. It has found me in Florence, and I have never believed that the troops of Your Majesty were about to touch my dominions. I have received with much pleasure the declaration you have the goodness to make to me of the immunity of my territory, which I have no reason to quit at the present moment. This declaration may serve to dissipate the alarms which might spread amongst my subjects, who take interest in all that concerns me. I therefore beg to offer you very sincere thanks for it.

&c.

&c.”

No. 8.

JOACHIM MURAT to the Grand Duke of TUSCANY.

“ SIR, MY BROTHER AND COUSIN,

“ Bologna, April 12, 1815.

“ I have received Your Imperial Highness's letter of the 2nd inst. It is with regret that I have been obliged to order my guard, which was to have moved from Foligno by the Furlo to Pesaro, to pass through your States; but Your Highness is too just not to admit that I could not leave an Austrian corps on my flank, and that I was under the necessity of marching my troops against General Nugent. I had always hoped that, having forbidden them to commence hostilities, the Austrian General would have allowed me to return to my former positions, as I announced that I should only take them to await the determination of the Allies; I must therefore declare to Your Imperial Highness that, retaining for you the same sentiments of friendship, I am ready to evacuate Tuscany, provided you on your side will engage to have it evacuated by all other foreign troops, and to insist upon its neutrality being respected.

“ I beg Your Imperial Highness to receive the expressions,

“ &c. &c.”

He further carried out these pacific declarations by occupying Bologna on the 3rd April and attacking the Austrian troops under General Bianchi on the 4th of April, on the Panaro. He made other attacks upon them on the 6th near Cento, at Occhio Bello on the 8th, and at Carpi on the 10th, and met with considerable loss between Ferrara and Ponte Lagoscuro; being defeated in all his attempts, he evacuated Bologna and the Legations on the 12th of April, and directed his troops at Florence to fall back, they having been, equally with those at Bologna, unsuccessful against the Austrian General Nugent, who had been joined by a part of the Tuscan forces. Thus he began his retreat unrewarded for his unexampled disregard of all treaties and public engagements, and with the mortification of having witnessed the total failure of the commencement of his

ambitious aspirations. This conduct of Murat extorted from Austria a declaration, dated Vienna, 12th April, 1815, which begins by stating that the King had made overtures to the Court of Austria declaring his intention of uniting his policy to that of the said Court, as early as at the end of 1812; it recounts the tergiversation of the King, which caused him to lean to France or Austria according to the successes or defeats which seemed to favour the one or other Power during the year 1813; the signature of a Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Naples, which was signed on the 11th January, 1814, but that, on one pretence or another, the Neapolitan army remained passive; that substantial proofs fell into the hands of the Allies of the treachery of the King, who, while negotiating with the Allied Powers, had kept up a constant correspondence with the enemy, and denied to the Emperor Napoleon that such negotiations had taken place; that the victories of the Allies in France and the capture of Paris put an end to the vacillation of Joachim, and the Neapolitan army at length opened the campaign; but that when the foreign troops left France the Neapolitan army retired into the Papal Marches, to which the King might in consequence of the treaty of the 11th January form some pretensions. That when at the Congress of Vienna the Bourbon Courts protested loudly against the recognition of King Joachim, a wise and prudent policy would have led him to restrict all his views to the preservation of his fine kingdom; instead of this he secretly meditated immense projects of future aggrandisement, and prepared for their execution by uniting the elements of a political and military revolution; that Austria saw through all his intentions, and was aware of all his acts; that when on the 5th of March the news of the evasion of Bonaparte arrived at Naples the King assured the Austrian

Minister of his fidelity to the Alliance, and made the same declaration to the Cabinets of Vienna and London. At the same moment he sent one of his aides-de-camp, Count Beaufremont, into France to assure Bonaparte of his support; and that on learning the entry of the latter into Lyons, he declared to him that "he considered the cause of Napoleon as his own, and would prove to him that he had never abandoned it." That at the same time he demanded of the Pope the passage of two of his divisions through the Roman territory, adding that they would not act in a hostile manner, or derange the Holy Father in his capital; that the Pope protested against this violation of his territory, and when it took place His Holiness left Rome and repaired to Florence. That on the 8th April the Neapolitan Plenipotentiaries at Vienna presented a note to the Cabinet protesting the friendly sentiments of their master, and his determination never to separate from Austria; but announcing that His Majesty "in consequence of the change of events, and the military measures deemed necessary by all the Powers, had thought proper for his own security to extend the position of his forces, and that they would occupy the line of demarcation which the treaty of the year 1813 had assigned to the Neapolitan army." Meantime, the Neapolitan army, without any preliminary declaration, had commenced hostilities against the Austrian posts in the Legations on the 30th of March; and that His Imperial and Royal Majesty, confiding in the justice of his cause, the valour of his army, and the tried fidelity of his people, and on his intimate relations with all the European Powers, has announced to the Neapolitan Government, by a note of the 10th of this month, that he considers the state of war established between the two Powers, and that all ulterior decision remains with the force of arms.

This declaration was on the part of Austria the formal commencement of the campaign, of which the events are related in the following letters.

The first of these is from General Stahremberg to Lord Burghersh.

General STAHRMBERG to Lord BURGHESH.

“DEAR BURGHESH,

“Bologna, 30th March, 1815.

“I hasten to inform you that I am arrived here to take the command of the advanced guard. If we are obliged to go back some steps, I promise you that we will soon advance *au galop*. . . . I have done all that was possible with Nugent to make the Marshal move, and I hope that all will go well.” . . .

SAME to the SAME.

“DEAR BURGHESH,

“Bologna, 2nd April, 2 o'clock in the morning.

“I am in despair at being obliged to cede ground to these aggressors, but I hope that will soon change, and that instead of the rear guard, I shall soon be commanding the advanced guard. I shall evacuate this town about 4 in the morning; therefore our communication is stopped in this direction, which I much regret, dear Burghersh. According to Colonel Dalrymple's account the head of the 4th division, with the Guards, will be on the 3rd at Florence; I almost doubt therefore if this will find you there. Dalrymple writes to you at length on military and political matters, so I shall add nothing but a copy of Murat's Proclamation.

“I do not go far. I shall only pass the Reno, and I will write again by Pistoja. I hope Nugent will do good service.

“Your friend,

“STAHRMBERG, General.”

General NUGENT to Lord BURGHESH.

“MY DEAR LORD BURGHESH,

“Pistoja, April 2nd, 1815,
10 o'clock at night.

“I am just arrived here, and by to-morrow morning I shall have my troops in this place, about 2000 men. I shall endeavour to make them pass for more, and in every way make as much of my means as I can. I have so many arrangements

to make that I cannot stir to-night ; but I shall come to-morrow to Florence. I hear, however, the Grand Duke intended to leave that place to-day. Write me word what your movements will be. Colonel Dalrymple informs me from Bologna that a strong Neapolitan column is to march through Tuscany. What accounts have you from Florence on this subject ?”

The SAME to the SAME.

“ Pistoja, April 7, 1815.

“ Hitherto nothing important has taken place. The enemy is very slow in his motions and extremely cautious. My advanced guard is at Prato, and my posts halfway between that and Florence. I have no report of the enemy’s having entered Florence. I have taken measures to annoy his further movement upon Bologna, and the armament in the mountains is extending very rapidly. The Neapolitans begin to believe that England is against them, and deserters are coming here even from Modena and Bologna. The Neapolitans entered Florence this day with great caution.”

The SAME to the SAME.

“ Pistoja, April 13, 1815.

“ I just receive the account from General Bianchi, that the Neapolitans were beaten at Occhio Bello on the 8th, and at Carpi on the 10th (500 prisoners). Our troops were to enter Modena on the 11th. The same force, two divisions of the Guards, is against me, which makes me presume that Murat is preparing to retreat entirely, otherwise he would not leave aloof so considerable a body of his best troops. Against this force, which is not quite three times mine, I shall be able to manœuvre and cover Leghorn, provided, however, a sufficient naval force remains at that place. Should even Murat retire through Tuscany, I shall, I think, prevent his extending to Leghorn. As this object is not only important for the operations, but likewise for trade, and that I suppose considerable stores are there, you and Captain Campbell will find it important to support my operations, which are thus tending to secure the property of British subjects. We have been hitherto attacked every day, though not seriously ; the Neapolitans had always the worst of it. The expedition to Naples is suspended for the moment by the presence of the Neapolitan divisions here ; but when Murat

begins anew to run, then would be the time to embark and get before him. Endeavour to arrange everything to that effect. It is necessary for the war in France to destroy Murat without loss of time, and this will be the means to do so.

“P.S. This moment I receive the report that the enemy is falling back upon Florence.

(Signed) “NUGENT.”

Lord BURGHESHS to General NUGENT.

“MY DEAR NUGENT,

“Pisa, April 13, 1815.

“I have received your letter of this morning, and am delighted at the news. I look to Murat being very soon put *hors de combat*. You have done magnificently with your corps. The retaining the two divisions from joining the Grand Army has done essential service. I have communicated your letter to Captain Campbell; you may depend upon having every assistance from him if you require it. I have directed him to send the intelligence from this part of the world to Sicily, pressing in consequence an expedition from thence to Naples, which if undertaken immediately might meet you when you are enabled to commence your operations in the same direction. If I can come to you the day after to-morrow I shall do so. You know that a column of Neapolitans is reported to be at Segra, on the road from hence to Florence. The Governor of this place seems to think it might be coming in this direction. The only chance of its being intended for this part of the world would be the advance of the Neapolitan column, which is near Rome, upon Sienna, from whence it might be intended to join the one from Signa near La Scala, and thence move on Leghorn.

“I am, &c., &c.,

(Signed) “BURGHESHS.”

From Colonel WEBKLEIN to Lord BURGHESHS.

“MY LORD,

“Lucca, April 13, 1815.

“I hasten to communicate the account of the movements of our troops in Lombardy, which I have just received. Offensive operations commenced on the 10th instant. The corps of General Baron Bianchi arrived that day at Reggio. A column directed on Carpi found there a considerable corps of the enemy, which was obliged to abandon Carpi, and we took 600 prisoners,

amongst whom many officers. General Bianchi proposed to march to Modena on the 11th, to attack the enemy, should he maintain himself in that town. The greater part of the Neapolitan army is directed on Ferrara, and a sharp fight had taken place between that town and Ponte Lagoscuro. The loss of the Neapolitans was considerable, and without attaining their object. The General did not know the details; but he writes that the enemy's troops are much discouraged, and that the officers themselves advise the soldiers to throw away their arms. We shall shortly see the roads covered with Neapolitan traineurs.

“With great respect,

“Your Excellency's, &c., &c.,

“WERKLEIN.”

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General STAHREMBERG to Lord BURGHERSE.

“DEAR FRIEND,

“Foligno, 28th April, 1815.

“I profit by the departure of a courier, who is sent to you from Ancona, to write in haste two words. I arrived here yesterday morning without having been able to catch these fellows, who retire in the greatest haste by the road called the Furlo. My detachments go by Gubbio as far as Cagli, and by Sterravallo towards Tolentino. I hope to be myself at Tolentino after to-morrow, and to push my detachments on to Loreto and Civita Vecchia. Then their communications will all be intercepted. I believe our troops will be to-day at Rona. The head-quarters of Joachim are at Fano. I cannot think he will allow himself with his whole army to be shut up in Ancona; and I believe therefore that in two or three days we shall come to blows with these Neapolitans. How I wish you may be an eye-witness of the manner in which we will settle them! As soon as any thing of importance takes place I will inform you instantly. Try to get a flotilla soon before Ancona; there are five or six Neapolitan vessels there, which would be a good prize for you.

“Your friend,

“STAHREMBERG.”

In the last of the above letters from General Stahremberg, it is stated that Murat was moving towards Macerata, and that he himself was marching upon

Tolentino, where he hoped to meet Lord Burghersh, who had expressed to him his intention of joining General Bianchi's army.

In order to explain the circumstances of the short campaign just described it is necessary to return to the period when Marshal Murat passed the Roman frontiers, and brought his large army up to Ancona. When at that time he was seeking to evade the return of any positive declaration to General Stahremberg (on the 27th of March) of his intentions, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Duke de Gallo, was employed in drawing up a paper explanatory of the reasons upon which he undertook to drive the Austrians out of the provinces occupied by them according to a Convention with the Pope, and to which he now laid claim, as having held them before the settlement of the Peace of 1814 and the return of the Papal Government to their occupation. The manifesto, transmitted by the Duke de Gallo to Marshal Bellegarde, is inserted in the Appendix, but the tone of the argument by which it is attempted to be supported is deprived of all weight, by the language of the Proclamation, which had been issued two days after the letter to the Marshal, namely, on the 30th of March, and been published at Rimini, and by which every engagement and every tie of peace or friendship had been cast to the winds. A similar letter had been addressed to Lord William Bentinck, of his reply to which the following is a copy :—

Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK to the Duke de GALLO.

(Translation.)

“ YOUR EXCELLENCY,

“ Turin, April 5, 1815.

“ I have received the letter that your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, dated March 28th. Your Excellency declares that the object of the Cabinet of Naples, in advancing so powerful an army towards the North of

Italy, and in developing such considerable preparations of war as have been making for some time, has nothing in common with the relations which happily exist between London and Naples, and that those military measures have no influence on the Armistice. The only relation of which I am aware as subsisting between the two Governments is that Armistice. Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the nature of the engagements which exist between the Allied Powers, and must be equally aware that an act of hostility against one of them by any other nation would be mutually regarded as an insult to the General Alliance ; and your Excellency cannot be ignorant that the coalesced Powers have engaged reciprocally to maintain the tranquillity of Europe. Up to this moment I have received no advices from the Austrian Commander-in-Chief in Italy of the commencement of hostilities between the Austrian and Neapolitan troops, but I must announce to you, M. le Duc, that I should consider such a notification not only as putting an end to the Armistice, but also as imposing on the English military and naval Commanders of the forces in the Mediterranean, the duty of lending succour, and seconding, with all the means at their disposal, the Austrian armies. I do not disguise from your Excellency that I look upon the Proclamation of the Neapolitan Government, dated 30th of last March, as a most unjust act of aggression, and an attempt to raise up the subjects of the King of Sardinia against their legitimate Sovereign ; one of the most ancient and faithful Allies of His Britannic Majesty, and at the time when part of the English army is in the States of that monarch for the purpose of protecting them.

“ I declare then, in consequence, to Your Excellency, that I consider myself bound by all the ties of friendship, honour, and good faith which unite the two nations to employ all our efforts in concert with those of the King of Sardinia to repel so unworthy an attack against this Sovereign, which was wholly unprovoked. I profit by this occasion to repeat to your Excellency the assurance, &c., &c.

(Signed)

“ W. L. BENTINCK.”

The Duke of Gallo in his reply, dated Bologna, 11th of April, stated that he had not received Lord William Bentinck's despatch of the 5th until the 10th, and that the King of Naples could not perceive without sur-

prise and extreme concern, the dispositions therein manifested, and “which,” writes the Duke,

“are absolutely contrary to the political situation in which the King finds himself with regard to Great Britain. Your Excellency announces to me that engagements exist between the Allied Powers, in virtue of which hostility directed against one among them is to be considered as an attack on the Alliance in general, and that the same Powers have engaged to maintain the tranquillity of Europe. His Majesty, not having received any communication of the acts relative to these engagements, does not venture to conjecture whether the same acts oblige all the contracting parties equally to acknowledge as Allies whoever should have contracted an Alliance with one of them to co-operate with the common cause * * * These differences can never prevent the King from being the best and most useful friend of England in Italy; he calls for the testimony of your Excellency,—for that of all the English who have been or who are at Naples,—and of all the English proprietors and merchants, who will attest how they are treated in the King’s States.”

The Duke then adopts a line of reasoning, which it is useless to insert, as being totally destroyed by the terms of the Proclamation of the 30th of March above given, and in direct opposition to the facts which were taking place at that moment, namely, that Murat had attacked the Austrians, and driven them from Bologna to the Po, without giving a single notification of the commencement of hostilities.

